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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation identifies the white right-wing in South Africa describing the various sub-
groups comprising the movement which are more numerous and diverse than was commonly 
accepted. 
The thesis assumed a positive correlation between reform and increased support for the right-
wing, and that a "hardening of attitudes" took place during the 1988-1993 period, with a 
resurgence of nationalist, racist and right-wing sentiments. 
This thesis argues that there is a propensity to fissure on the part of the right-wing which gives 
rise to diverse tactics and areas of concern including resorting to violence to achieve political 
ends. The potential strengths and \Veaknesses of the right-wing in the light of this tendency are 
highlighted. 
The right-wing can only be understood in terms of the powerful ideologies underlying it, in 
particular Afrikaner Nationalism and European fascism, and this study explores these influences. 
However, it was felt that a new theoretical framework needed to be elaborated in order better to 
understand the motivation behind and roots of support for right-wing ideas. Such. a theoretical 
framework needs to integrate both the objective/material and the subjective/ideological and 
psychological determinants in order to be all encompassing and holistic in its thrust. 
The assumptions were tested using questionnaires and interviews in the field. Questionnaires 
\Vere either posted to individuals and organizations, or were hand delivered either by myself or 
other previously established ~·contacts". Open-ended questionnaires were used to facilitate 
discussion. Among other things, questions sought to solicit opinions on the use of violence in 
political action, the feasibility and desirability of establishing a volkstaat or white homeland and 
the willingness to make economic sacrifices in order to realise goals. Further, the importance of 
religious ideas and the nature of the fears of respondents were probed. 
This study is essentially a qualitative, descriptive one based on fieldwork in selected 
geographical regions. Traditionally conservative communities situated in the Northern Cape, 
Orange Free State and the Transvaal were chosen. Interviews were also conducted in Cape 
Tov.n. The sample included respondents from a wide range of organizations, including political 
parties, church groups and trade unions. Both employed and unemployed people's views were 
obtained. The majority of the respondents were male and at least a third were under the age of 
twenty-five. Patterns are discernible from their answers and these are recorded in the thesis. 
Most of my hunches are confirn1ed by the fieldv,1ork. It emerged that the right-\ving is a 
forn1idable force with a larger and more diverse membership than is commonly realized. A 
greater diversity of organizations exists and fascist ideas have infiltrated right-wing groups more 
than is generally ackno\'dedged. 
Individuals and groups within the movement have increasingly come to view violence as both 
necessary and justifiable, and this exacerbates the threat posed to democratization. Current 
socio-economic conditions are conducive to a further proliferation of right-wing activity. The 
possibility of an alliance of conser\'atives (including black conservatives) is a further cause for 
IX 
,, 
concern. The problem is compounded by the powerful and emotional nature of ethnicity and the 
pervasiveness of white fears. The greatest threat in the long term \Viii come from the new forms 
of right-wing organizations that have emerged, specifically the splinter groups with a neo-fascist 
and overtly violent agendas. The possibility of compromise exists, nonetheless, as the dominant 
component of the right-wing, which favours the establishment of a volkstaat, might be able to be 
accommodated within the new dispensation. 
Sharyn Berenice Spicer 
45 Beresford Road 
Walmer Estate 
7925 
(021) 478767 
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INTRODUCTION 
The aims of this dissertation are fivefold; 
(i) To describe the various sub-groups comprising the rightwing movement and the principal 
actors. 
(ii) To argue that reform and the upsurge in support for the rightwing are directly linked, 
and that the present environment in South Africa is conducive to a further proliferation in 
rightwing organizations. 
(iii) To suggest that present theories explaining the motivation behind membership and 
allegiance to extreme rightwing causes are inadequate. The study therefore posits an 
approach to the study of right wing communities which combines socio-psychological 
representations with structural concerns. 
(iv) "Ibis dissertation also demonstrates that the propensity to fissure on the part of extremist 
groups within rightwing organizations. It will be argued that this tendency increases the 
likelihood of violence. 
(v) Finally, the dissertation assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the movement in the 
light of this tendency described in the above paragraph. \Vhilst present conditions are 
conducive to the grov,th of righnving parties, certain factors mitigate against this. 
The study, more broadly, focuses on the influence of European fascism on Afrikaner nationalism. 
The white ultra right in contemporary South Africa draws on nvo ideological sources, Afrikaner 
Nationalism and European fascism. Fascism penetrated the Afrikaner nationalist movement and 
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influenced rightwing politics in this country far more deeply than is generally recognized. This 
thesis sets out to establish this link. 
Therefore an analysis of ideology in general and the appeal of nationalism ( and related ideologies 
like fascism), in particular was undertaken in order to W1cover the nature, extent and potential 
danger implicit in these fears. Evidence obtained in my research revealed that ideological factors 
are relatively autonomous from the material base. Economically reductionist arguments fail to 
explain such fears nor the tendency of righnvingers to behave contrary to their best material 
interests. 
Twenty five (25) in-depth interviews were conducted. A further 35 questionnaires which include a 
demographic profile of the sample were administered. Methodological problems and the actual 
research design are covered separately in the Appendix A. 
A closer analysis and understanding of the rightwing is of fundamental importance to the process 
of democratisation in South Africa. Although the strength of the rightwing should not be 
underestimated their propensity to undermine democratisation in South Africa has been assessed as 
profoW1d by various authors. 
Xll 
The thesis is overall structured as follows: 
CHAPTER BREAKDOWN: 
Chapter One provides a profile of the rightwing. It discusses the nature and dimensions of the 
rightwing organizations. Existing literature is reviewed in this chapter. 
Chapter Two discusses the trends, tactics and strategies adopted by the contemporary righming 
movement, with particular attention paid to the 1988-1993 period. Its propensity for violence is 
discussed. I focus on policy statements, pamphlets, radio announcements and the text of public 
speeches. This chapter draws on interview material and demonstrates that splinter groups have 
deviated from Afrikaner nationalist ideologies. Some of these groups mimic neo-fascist 
organisations which have emerged in countries like Germany. These nee-fascist groups have 
committed acts of violence. The major Afrikaner nationalist organisations have on the other hand 
pursued non-violent actions. 
Chapter Three investigates both the points of convergence and divisions within the rightvving. 
Their strengths, the influence they exert in state circles, their easy access to arms, their influence in 
media organisations are described. Large numbers of civil servants, police force and defence force 
personnel are members of the rightv,ing. The rightwing is also ex1.ensively funded from overseas. 
Their real strength however does not lie in their numbers or their political influence, but in the 
strength of their beliefs and the biblical-like conviction in the goals they have set. 
Their weaknesses are the extent to which they are isolated. The rightwing is unable to build 
alliances across social or ideological lines. The movement is also riven ,vith internal conflict. The 
policies also appear to be impractical and urn),_'orkable - therefore it is w1likely that the rightwing 
will grow nun1erically unless their "cultural" beliefs are compromised. 
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Chapter Four traces the historical and ideological roots of the contemporary rightwing. This 
chapter looks at the way in ,vhich the success and the demise of Afrikaner Nationalism as a 
mobilizing ideology, has shaped rightwing movements today. The chapter also traces the infusion 
of European fascist ideas into Afrikaner political life and thought. 
The theoretical framework employed is set out in Chapter Five. I argue that the appeal of a 
particular ideological form, like Afrikaner Nationalism can only be comprehended if the nature and 
appeal of ideology in general is understood. In the South African context, exclusivist etlmically 
orientated ideologies embntced by the rightwing are popular because they provide "security" to 
their adherents. White fears are widespread. Ethnicity and nationalism thrive in such 
circumstances. 
Afrikaner leaders have highlighted these emotional concerns in order to gain support. The nature 
and scope of white fear is extensive and provides a fertile breeding ground for destructive 
impulses. Warnings of the "swartgevaar" and impending national disaster strike a chord ·with 
many whites, especiaily among those concerned \vith threats to their economic and ethnic survival. 
In conclusion, the rightwing has undergone mutations and realignments in response to ever 
changing reality and these need to be properly contextualized if they are to be understood and 
contained. Case studies are of singular importance. More broadly we need an historical analysis 
in order to understand fully the rightwing. This study demonstrates that racial attitudes amongst 
righnvingers have hardened in response to socio-political changes. Studies wruch attempt to 
dissect the character of the rightwing need to focus on both socio-psychological processes and 
nationalist discourse. These factors bond the rightwing and provide the cement on which their 
social fears ride. The study demonstrates the currency of these views. 
CHAPTER ONE 
The purpose of this Chapter is to provide firstly a profile of the rightwing and to discover who or 
what constitutes the rightwing movement in South Africa. It must be noted at this stage that the 
particular understanding of the "rightwing" employed for the purpose of this thesis includes the 
broad ensemble of cultural and political groups whose central aim is the preservation of separate 
developmen~ as a prerequisite for "white survival" and this includes both those groups adhering to 
Afrikaner Nationalist principles as well as those who have deviated from this doctrine. In terms of 
the former political parties like the Conservative Party and the Herstigte Nationale Party are 
included and the latter category includes rightv.ing groups comprising other than Afrikaans 
speaking groups and also those groups resembling neo-fascist movements like the Church of the 
Creator and the Blanke Bevrydigingsbeweging. 
Rightwing groups are changing in character, moving away from exclusively Afrikaner concerns to 
broader white ones and in the process new organizations have emerged to accommodate this. 
These new organizations need to be included in a discussion on the white rightwing in South 
Africa. All these groups, despite fundamental differences in opinion and policy are agreed in 
fostering vvhite interests at the expense of all other groups. Their activities can only be understood 
- in the context of history, since many of their concerns have been historically fommlated. (A 
historical analysis ·will be elaborated in Chapter Four of this thesis). If present social reality is to be 
understood the ·processes through ,vhich group interests eme;ged historically must be outlined. It is 
imperative to develop such an understanding in the light of a revival of these political ideas in the 
modem era. The modem condition is such that it fosters the gro,\1h of social and political ideas 
2 
which seek absolute solutions to society's dysfunctions in an increasingly relativised and morally 
confused world. 
The "riglzrnling" has not been immune to the conflict and strife that characterized the Afrikaner 
Nationalist movement from the outset. The origin of this intra group conflict can be traced back to 
the time of the Anglo Boer War, ,vhere both the Hensoppers and the Bitterenders suffered a 
defeat at the hands of the British. (van Rooyen: 1992) Divisions ,vithin the Afrikaner group 
persisted and it ,vas this conflict known as "broedertwis" 1 which led to the formation of rightwing 
political parties and organizations. 
The actions of the Afrikaner Broederbond during the 1930's and 1940's were largely aimed at 
reconciling the t\vo factions within Afrikanerdom in order to establish a measure of unity within 
the volk. According to O'Meara (1983) "the Afrikaner Broederbond was born into, and self-
consciously as a result of these divisions. " The Bond, despite its concerted efforts, was 
unsuccessful in preventing splits within the National Party and both rightwing parties, the 
Herstigte Nationale Party (HNP) and the Conseniative Party (CP) eventually broke away in 
1969 and 1982 respectively, in order to establish their ovm political agendas. The CP in particular, 
came to. challenge the National Party's position of sole mouthpiece for Afrikaner Nationalism in 
the l 980's. (Welsh, 1988) 
The existence of the rightwing is intrinsically linked to Afrikaner Nationalism and cannot be 
Yiewed separately from it, even as aims and intentions differ. For this reason it is crucial to assess 
the fom1s of organization and struggle taken on by the "righr.1,ing" in contemporary South Africa 
in the context of preYious organizational and ideological forms and the processes giving rise to 
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"' them. The contemporary righnving movement m South Africa has been shaped by another 
ideology, fascism, which was harnessed to the Nationalist cause during the 1930's and the 1940's. 
Chapter One will, in addition to defining ,vho or what constitutes the white righnving, provide a 
literature review. 
1.1 WHAT IS THE "RIGHTWING" ? 
Broadly speaking, the "rightv.1ing" constitutes a significant sector of the white electorate who have 
decided to resist the inevitability of a non-racial society. This numerically small group of people 
(in terms of the total South African population), have taken it upon themselves to ensure that the 
transition to a non-racial society doesn't take place and to hamper its efficacy if it does. 
Wnilst defining the right\Ving is problematic, it seems safe to conclude that a significant portion of 
white opinion falls within this broad category. Individuals and groups supporting the rightwing 
collectively have a vested interest in the maintenance and reinstitution of apartheid. The white 
rightv.ring has made known its intention to reconstruct and implement partition "often in a form 
more radical than envisaged by apartheids original architects". (Zille, 1987:55)2 
One usage of the term "rightwing" implies that the white Democratic Party is to be situated to the 
left of the govenunent, which is awarded the centre position, and the Conservative Party and the 
Herstigte Nationale Party are on the right. (Indicator SA: Issue Focus) This simplistic definition is 
adequate if it is applied .to the narrow platform of v,hlte politics in South Africa, but if all 
significant political parties and movements are included, then the term "rightwing ,. is no longer 
adequate to describe the groups under investigation, since organizations like lnkatha could be 
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labelled righnving. Welsh (1988) makes the point that, by any standards •the National Party in 
many ways, resembles a rightwing party: thus this definition is too broad and remains inadequate. 
According to Indicator SA (1985:5) 
"in }.fay 1987, three in ten South A.ft-icans roted for one of the two rightv.:ing 
parties ... this represents a large portion of white opinion in the counhy". 
During July 1990, it was estimated that 70 righnving organizations existed, most of which ,i..1ere 
launched during the previous five years. These include political parties, extra parliamentary 
political organizations, cultural, academic, women's, youth and military groups, churches and 
Trade Unions. In a recent publication, Back to the Laager, (1991) the authors speculate that 
approximately 85 000 whites are actively involved in rightv.ing organizations and activities, whilst 
support for the rightwing is ten times that. In 1989 the CP won 31 % of the votes, concentrated in 
the Transvaal and OFS constituencies. 
Approximately 50% of Afrikaners voted for the white rightv.ing. Geographically most of these 
voters resided in either the Transvaal or the Orange Free State. Divisions based on language and/or 
cultural orientation and territorial location are evident. Within this provincial location, the 
righni..ing in the Transvaal can be broken down further, since the majority of the rightv.ing's 
support in this region is concentrated in rural areas. (van Rooyen, 1992:293) This concentration of 
righni..ing support in certain regions, ,i..ithin particular communities has implications in terms of 
secessionist policies and the drawing up of volkstaat boundaries. It is. ,i..ithin these areas, where the 
rightwing enjoys the support of the white inhabitants that proposed policies ,i..ill be put into effect. 
Rightv,ing control over Regional Services Councils will facilitate the re-introduction of racial 
segregation within communities under the auspices of the RSC's. The CP, like many other 
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rightwing groups believes that a large percentage of the whites in the security forces, especially the 
police, support the rightwing. This commonly held perception was challenged during the "Battle 
of Ventersdorp". 3 Back to the Laager (1991:7) claims that the "righr.11ing" obtains most of its 
support from white farmers, civil servants, workers, policemen and soldiers - the groups that 
historically benefited from Afrikaner Nationalism. 
Despite the fact that these groups and individuals are deeply divided on policy issues, aims and 
strategies, common threads can be detected in terms of ideology. van Rooyen, (1992:72) suggests 
that: 
"the rightwing should be viewed as a segment of the white racial group with a 
distinct ideological and strategical approach to the question of how Afrikaner 
identity and status should be preserved, viz through self-determination and racial 
exclusiveness ". 
A strong Afi·ikaner thrust can be identified with.in the various political parties. Although most of 
these groups have actively tried to canvass English and other white language group support, 
Afrikaner interests remain paramount. The New Right appears to be a white rather than a strictly 
Afrikaner movement, it appeals to both Afrikaner Nationalist sentiments and to white racist values. 
(du Toit, BM, 1991 :657) Not all Afrikaners support the righming while a considerable number of 
English conservatives have aligned themselves with rightwing groups. Even ,vithin the top 
echelons of rightwing parties, one finds a few non - Afrikaner individuals and some, most notably 
Clive Derby-Lewis of the Conservative Party, hold prominent leadership positions. 
The Afrikaner \Veerstandsbeweging (A \VB) _has made its intention clear, in that it wants to draw 
"the cream of the white people of Europe·· into its ranks. Terre'Blanche told a crowd of supporters 
in Turfontein' s Portuguese hall that the creation of a new "volk ·· of whites with different origins 
was in the offing. (Weekly Mail, August, 1992). 
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The Blanke Bevrydigingsbeweging (BBB) has ahvays stated that they desire unity between v.rhite 
rightwingers both nationally and on an international scale. BBB leader Schabert claims that the 
BBB is affiliated to five English rightwing groups in South Africa and to others abroad. (The Cape 
Rebel, August, 1988). 
The white rightwing enjoys a significant measure of support from the youth. An Idasa sponsored 
survey of white university students countrywide found that 90% of Afrikaans students and 58% of 
English speakers \Vere unsympathetic to the ANC. Only 8% of Afrikaners would accept an ANC 
govenunent, 32% would emigrate for political reasons and 44% said they "would resist 
physically". The corresponding figures for English students are: 28% ; 38% ; 10% ; (Giliomee 
1991:79). This unwillingness to accept the ANC whether it is voted into power or not is indicative 
of the intolerance toward that organiz.ation on the part of white South Africans. Even young, 
educated whites, generally thought to be more liberal in outlook, are fairly hostile towards the 
Ai"\JC. 
A similar pessimistic view is presented by the results of a poll conducted in October 1990 by the 
fim1 Market and Opinion sun1eys. According to these findings, 70% of Afrikaners and 58% of 
all \vhites were in favour of stricter government action against the ANC and its allies. Animosity 
tO\vards the Ai"'JC is indicative of the fear felt by many whites on the inevitability of black 
majority rule. These fears are more intense amongst the politically conservative sectors of the 
\Vhite population. The Institute for Future Studies at Potchefstroom Uni\•ersity claims that, "a 
growing group of young white people do not believe that racial harmony is necessary and that 
Yiolence can be justified on Christian grounds as a merhod of achiering goals. '"(quoted in 
\Velsh. 1988: 14) 
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My own interviews reinforce this notion of the white youth being extremely conservative and 
militant. The most extreme views were definitely expressed by the younger respondents. 
Although my sample was far more limited and less representative than the above findings, 
similar anxieties and ideals were evident. Whilst acknO\vledging fear and anxiety regarding a 
future ANC government, respondents also indicated that the ANC should not think that they 
(right,ving whites) were afraid of them. 
"Jf A1andela and the Al\iC think we are afraid of them, they are mistaken ... Jf they 
dare to take over our farms and properties, we '/l show them who's boss . . , · 
(Kimberley, July 1991) 
Research findings of the South African Institute of International Affairs from a survey on white 
opinion indicate that the white youth, (16-24) appear to be more conservative than their elders 
on key issues. This is especially so among Afrikaners. The factors that influence this apparent 
conservatism are low income, geographical location etc. Anxiety and defiance are extremely 
high amongst young whites. In South Africa, the white youth seem to be poorly informed. Their 
attitudes are shaped early (through various socialization structures) and apartheid rule has 
prevented their interaction ·with black youth. As a result the latter are viewed with fear and 
suspicion. International isolation and the experience of militarization amongst South Africa's 
white youth all contribute to the development of extremely conservative attitudes ori their part. 
Barend Strydom is very young and if he represents ·the "generation oft he future" this poses 
serious problems for this country. \Vhite youth are often schooled not to internalize and consider 
issues for themselves, but simply react. It is not surprising that reactionary, conservative views 
preYail amongst many of the white youth. (Weekly J\1ail July 1990) 
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Another ideological strain, present in right wing organizations, is fascism. Groups influenced by 
this ideological form include the Blanke Bevrydigingsbeweging (BBB), the Church of the 
Creator, the Israel Vision Church, better known as the Israelites. These groups reject 
Christianity and favour an amalgan1 of Teutonic 111)1h and pseudo-scientific social Darwinist 
inspired beliefs about racial superiority. The "Aryan soul" is believed to possess an "inherent 
love of nature", which is not shared by blacks who are essentially anti-nature, and through their 
barbarism and savagery are out to destroy the planetl (Schabort, BBB meeting, Parow, 1988). 
BBB leader, Johan Schabort, a bio-chemist is clearly obsessed ,vith matters pertaining to genetic 
purity and superiority and has outlined a "master-race" theory in terms of the BB B's blueprint 
for a new white dominated and racially pure South Africa. (Sunday Star, November 20, 1988) In 
an official document printed before the banning of the BBB in 1988, it is claimed that, 
"the BBB sees the coming racial struggle as a holy struggle, which we will never 
end, but will continue until we have triumphed and the non-whites, with their 
genetically proven negative properties, have been removed fi·om White South 
Afi·ica". (Schabort, August, 1988:5). 
Pseudo-scientific racism is evident, and the BBB states, 
"We believe in the genetic superiority of the white race, and (that) it is the duty of 
the white race to stop the natural increase and the decadence of the black races 
from desn·oying this planet." (Zille, 1988:61). 
After examining much of the existing literature dealing Vvith the so-called "rightv.1ing", one is left 
'Vlith the impression that most authors retain broad based definitions. Zille (1988) uses the term 
"rightwing" as a blanket term to refer fo a wide range of organizations, strategies and policies. The 
tenn "ultra right., is in many ways more fitting, since it refers specifically to that section of the 
white population who belongs to one or more rightv,ing organizations. (ibid) 
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In terms of this definition, the CP is right, whilst the A WB and other splinter gfoups, like the 
Israelites and the BBB are ultra right. Both the right and the ultra right are determined to reserve 
membership for the white population group and whose ultimate aim is the fostering of \vhite 
interests as opposed to broader South African interests. Another author, Griffin (1991) uses the 
term ultra nationalist to describe groups like the National Front in England and the A \v13 in 
South Africa. Ultra nationalist will, for the purpose of this thesis be used interchangeably v.-ith ultra 
right. 
1.1.1. The nature of rightwing organizations: 
It is necessary to provide a brief overview of the types of rightwing organizations that exist in 
order to gauge what types of activities the movement as a whole may become engaged in. A broad 
spectrum of rightwing organizations exist, each with their ovm agenda and strategy. Over and 
above its party political dimension, the rightwing comprises several other elements, 
i) 
ii) 
iii) 
iv) 
religious-incorporating those dissidents from the Ned-Geref Kerk (NGK) 
who have joined the three established Afrikaner Protestant Churches 
particularly the APK. 
(Religious groups like the Church of the Creator and the Israelites \\'ill also 
be included into the discussion.) 
the extra-parliamentary and para-military element represented by the 
Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (A WB). 
the intellectual element located in institutions such as the Afrikaner 
Volkswag. 
the wide range of civic bodies and organizations (Indicator SA 6 (1/2), 
1989) (These include Trade Unions, women's groups and youth 
organizations.] 
In terms of political parties, there are two categories of organization, those who favour the 
parliamenra,y option, like the Consen·ative Party (CP} and the Herstigte Nationale Party 
(HNP), and those who choose to operate outside of parliament. The Conservative Party is the most 
significant of the two parliamentary parties and has a broader support base than the HNP. The 
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latter lost much of its support with the fomrntion of the CP in 1981. The CP is described as the 
political "torch-bearer" of Afrikaner Nationalism. van Rooyen claims that; 
"the CP, stands out as the pivotal axis and also the parliamenta,y representative of 
the rightwing. .. " (1992:72). 
In terms of party policy, the Conservative Party in contemporary South Africa from 1987 onwards, 
has been compared to the National Party in the early 1980's. Mark Swilling (Sunday Star 10/9/89) 
claims that this comparison can be made since the NP previously aimed to exclude blacks from the 
central political institutions, promoted influx control, the independence of homelands etc. In 1987 
· the NP embarked on a new course of action and the CP took up where it left off. 
Membership of one righnving organization does not preclude membership of another, and "these 
membership bonds often cut across and mutually support one another: a follower typically belongs 
simultaneously to a rightwing to11•n council, a rightwing church and a righttt'ing political party". 
(Indicator SA: Issue Focus). 
Individuals belonging to one of the extra-parliamentary groups can choose to vote for the either the 
CP or the HJ\TP in an election. From the election results it is apparent that the CP has attracted the 
majority of conservative white support. The Conservative Party emerged as the official opposition 
in 1987 ·with 32% of the total white vote, as opposed to just 19 .2% in 1981 for the combined 
CP/HNP vote. (BM du Toit, 1991:641). According to Kaaplander, the 10% swing to the CP away 
from the NP 1989 parliamentary by-election ,vas the second biggest since its inception. The 
. growth in support indicated by the Umlazi by-electi~n that took place earlier that year was the 
biggest e\'er. (December, 1990). 
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There is little dispute that the CP has grov,n in 'electoral support, but the implementation of 
political policies \Vill detennine the future strength of the CP. According to Bekker and 
Grobbelaar, the control of certain local authorities by the CP will allow whites in those tov.ns "to 
test CP policies against reality". (Indicator SA 6(112), 1989). Whether the workability of the CP's 
policies will stand up to tests or not, the CP \vill be able to maintain control over local churches, 
school committees, regional services councils and trade unions and agricultural co-operatives. 5 
In terms of the latter it seems reasonable to say that the rightwing has been successful, and the 
governments Agricultural Departments have lost credibility and come under fire from the 
righnving. If the crov,•d reaction toward the Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Tobie Meyer at the 
· farmers march and meeting in Potchefstroom during May 1993 is anything to go by, the 
government has lost legitimacy in the eyes of the farmers it purports to represent. van Rooyen, 
(1992:107) argues that; 
"at local government level and in other civic fields, the CP 's position was more 
powerfal, as it controlled the majority of local authorities in the Transvaal, and its 
rightwing policies could be implemented without too much central government 
interference ". 
He claims that the right\ving is at its most powerful position at municipal level. This view is 
echoed by Bekker et al, 1989. The CP has at this level attempted to reintroduce petty apartheid 
measures such as Separate Amenities. 6 The CP resorted to a number of tactics ranging from the 
charging of high membership fees to cutting off power supplies to simply closing dov.n public 
amenities like S\virnming-pools to direct violent attacks to secure these ends. Links and nenvorks 
established by the CP, will play a central role in the political activities of the rightwing in the 
future. An Indicator SA Issue Focus on the rightwing, claims that these "grassroots links form the 
organi:ational foundations of the new white right." A proper understanding of the CP is only 
possible if its links with other rightwing groupings are identified and contextualised. Even if the 
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CP is unable 10 seize control at national level, its control over local affairs through local councils 
cannot be disputed. For this reason alone the white rightv,ing needs to be taken very seriously. 
On an extra-parliamenta1J1 level, various parties can be identified, including the Boerestaat Party 
(BSP), and the Blanke Party (previously the Blanke Bevrydigings Party). These are not 
particularly significant, and in van Rooyen's opinion; "they have little political relevance and do 
not merit serious consideration, except to add that they exempl[fy the propensity of extreme radical 
organizations to fission, and rhat their very existence testifies to the vigorous underbrush of 
rightwing organizations" (1992:90) 
These parties are numerically small, the BSP for instance has approximately 200 members. They 
are unlikely to attract widespread support because of their "boere" emphasis. The BSP advoc3:tes 
the establislunent of a smaller, culturally homogeneous volkstaat. Both the BSP and the Blanke 
Volkstaat Party (BVP), promote this version of an Afrikaner volkstaat amongst the rightwing. 
Although factions within the rightwing movement as a whole are extremely marginalised and 
numerically insignificant, the 1_1ature of their activities and their ideological make-up is such that it 
warrants careful consideration. These organizations range from para-military units, to essential 
non-Christian religious sects and individual hit-squads. The upsurge of anti-Semitism must be 
viewed in the light of this sectionalism within the rightv,ing. Strong anti-Semitic propaganda and 
sentiment is promulgated in official literature and is clearly visible at rallies and meetings. Not all 
right-wing groupings share the same feelings about the Jewish people, in fact few have formulated 
a definite policy regarding the role of the Jewish population in a future South Africa. 
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The rightwing has shovvn a propensity for resorting to paramilitary options over the past few 
years in order to realize their goals. According to Wim Booyse (1990:7) to date there exist more 
than 20 para-military groups with a membership of over 18 000, and a further 30 fundamentalist 
organizations. The commonly held belief is that of white supremacy, hence any attempt to 
dismantle the apartheid system is resisted. Their methods range from rallies and marches to the 
disruption of meetings, to random acts of violence against blacks to carefully planned acts of 
terrorism and murder. Several authors and observers, Fordred (1988); Hyslop, ( 1987); Giliomee, 
(1990); Indicator SA, ( 1989); Project for the study of Violence (1988/9) are convinced that the 
white ultra rightwing will employ violence as a means to an end. 
Some of the para-military units are extremely small, comprising a few individuals. (Zille, 1989:59) 
It is exceptionally difficult keep an accurate record of their membership and activities since new 
groups spring up overnight and others simply disappear. Booyse lists the most important as; the 
Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (A WB); the Boereweerstandsbeweging (B\VB); 
Kommandoleer; Brandwag; Volksleer; White Front; Aquila Defence Unit; Stormvalke; 
Magsaksie; \Vhite Security; National Manpower Action; Action Self-defence; Wit Wolwe; 
Flamingoes; Order of Death; Cape Rebels; White National Movement; \Vhite Resistance 
Movement; Patriotic Front; Boer Army; White Commando; Orde Boerevolk; Purified 
Afrikaner \Veerstands beweging; Transvaal Separatists and the Blanke 
Bevrydigingsbeweging. (disbanded in 1990) 
In his opinion, the most important of these are the A \VB; the BV{B; the BBB; the World Apartheid 
\1oYement; the Order of Death and the Orde Boerevolk. The \Vorld Apartheid Movement (WAM) 
exemplifies the desire on the part of the ,vhite ultra right in South Africa to collaborate ,,·ith 
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international movements with a similar agenda, the ensurmg of white supremacy.7 (The 
international link will be discussed later on in this chapter). 
The assassination of former SACP leader Chris Hani, in 1993 illustrates the tendency to employ 
violent means to realize political objectives on the part of the rightv.ring. Prominent rightwinger 
Clive Derby-Lewis was convicted alongside Polish immigrant Janus Walus for the murder of Chris 
Hani. Hani's murder allegedly formed part of a plan to assassinate various leftwing leaders by the 
white ultra right. 
The activities of the recently launched Afrikaner Volksfront and in particular the so-called "Plan 
C" component of their strategy, which emphasizes direct confrontation and violent action, need to 
be considered in terms of assessing rightwing potential. The rightwing invasion of the World Trade 
Centre \\'as apparently just a "curtain-rdiser" to this national resistance campaign kno\\n as "Plan 
C" or the "Ten Plagues" (Weekly Mail, July, 1993). The campaign was formulated by Afrikaner 
Volksfront (A VF) strategists to force negotiators into agreeing to the establishment of a Afrikaner 
homeland. Part and parcel of Plan C is the formation of a "government within a government", 
which demonstrates the rightwing's determination to establish a volkstaat, even if it is obtained 
through secession. Plan C was developed in response to the failure of Plan A,the parliamentary 
path and Plan B, the negotiations. Plan C incorporates a variety of strategies including "indusn·ial 
sabotage" and the refusal t~ pay taxes. Civil disobedience and passive resistance are integral to 
this strategy. The rightvving has also threatened to slow down the State bureaucracy even further. 
The announcement of Plan C is indicative of the rightwing's determination to forge a measure of 
unity and execute a centrally controlled and co-ordinated progranune of action to safeguard white 
priviledges and foster the establishment of a ,,o]kstaat. 
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The Afrikaner Volksfront ,vas fonned on 19 May, 1993 to forge a measure of unity among 
I 
rightwing groups in order to create some kind of political authority to ensure that proposed plans, 
including secession can occur relatively smoothly. A secret "Committee of Generals" (CoG), 
detern1ined to realize the goal of establishing a volkstaat, assumed control of the righn,.ing and 
provides the leadership for the AVF. Among the groups inv~lved in the Volksfront are the 
Transvaal Agricultural Union (TAU); the Herstigde Nationale Party (HNP); the 
Afrikanenyeerstandsbeweging (AWB); Boerestaatparty; the Afrikaner Volksunie; the 
Consen,ative Party (CP); sections of the ultra right Church of the Creator; Volkseeinheid 
kommitee (Vekom); Oranjewerkers; Mine \Vorkers Union (M\VU); the Pretoria 
Boerekommando; and English speaking rightwing groups. (Weekly Mail; July, 1993). The 
previously unkno\\n organization known as EK 25 which campaigns for a volkstaat is also 
involved. 
No discussion of Afrikaner Nationalism or its righrning heirs can take place without an 
understanding of the role played by the Church in effecting policy. Historically the Church 
provided the moral fibre and justification for Apartheid and separate development. The belief in 
the divine purpose of Afrikanerdom and the necessity of developing separate racial and ethnic 
identities was justified by the church (specifically the Dutch Reformed churches) in South Africa. 
These churches have historically played a pivotal role in shaping and forging Afrikaner identity. 
Religion has from the outset been enh\ined with the Afrikaner Nationalist movement and Calvinist 
Christianity helped shape the overall ideology. (Moodie, 1975; de KJerk, 1975) 
The Afrikaans Refom1ed Churches were actively involwd in providing the biblical justification for 
the apartheid system of govenm1ent. Unity within these churches was weakened due to changes in 
political opinion. The NGK itself experienced tension ben•,een its verligte and verk.ran1pte 
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el;ments.8 Dissidents within the church reacted on the one hand by fom1ing the NG Bond, aimed 
at opposing the liberalism from within. Treumicht followed this path. On the otherhand, others 
broke away and formed their o,m church, the Afrikaanse Protestante Kerk, (APK) in 1987. The 
APK is needless to say an all-white church grouping and insists that racially exclusive worship is 
both biblically defensible and socially necessary. (APK Jaarboek, 1990). The formation of the 
APK indicated that; 
"the floodgates are breaking. The Ajikaner wants a church of his own- and not one 
which he is coerced into sha,:ing with blacks. " (Lubbe, Rapport, August, 1987). 
"The APK 111as founded with a particular pwpose in mind. .. to counteract the 
liberalization of rhe NGK and to ensure that Christian values continue to dominate 
political thinking in this count,y. These values include the distinct nature and 
autonomy of nations. Our membership has grown considerably as people become 
increasingly dissatisfied with both the NP and the NGK. We anticipate that 
membership and congregations will continue to grow in the future". (Interview, 
Kimberley December, 1990). 
The APK has undoubtedly made an impact and certain rightwing organizations such as the A WB 
require all their members to belong to the APK. Most of the people interviewed seemed to belong 
to the APK whilst the rest remained loyal to the NGK. Only two respondents claimed religious 
affiliation to neither and deviated from generally accepted Christian teachings. 
Fundamentalist religious organizations in general, have become increasingly prominent, and the 
activities of the Israel Vision Church (the Israelites) are significant. The Israelites like the so 
called Church of the Creator, and the Gemeente van die Verbondsvolk. claim that only whites 
go to heaYen since they are descendants of the "chosen people". Blacks are animals and were 
made by Satan. (Sunday Times 17.03.91). Blacks an~ Jews are referred to as "the crownless 
animals ofrhefield''. 9 
17 
TI1e grov,th of fundamentalist religious movements is not w,ique to South Africa and is in line 
with developments globally. Some of these church groups are extremely militant and vociferously 
campaign against communism and progressive church groups, which have been branded together. 
An example of such a magazine is the Aida Parker Newsletter. The Church Alliance of South 
Africa law,ched in December 1988, aimed to provide an alternative to the South African Council 
of Churches. 10 Anglican and Protestant groups opposing the progressive tendencies within the 
SACC have formed their o,vn groups, like the Catholic Defence League and Young South 
Africans for a Christian civilization. Rightwing splinter groups are also emerging in the 
Methodist and Pentecostal churches. Although not all the affiliated churches are rightwing as such; 
they all represent an attempt to counter the inherent liberalism of the SACC and they formed the 
Church Alliance of South Africa to aid them in this endeavor. (New Nation, 12/01/1989). 
Certain right·wing church groups have decided to include like minded blacks, although most are 
racially exclusive. It is alleged the state has helped to infiltrate and support some groups, such as 
the Reformed Independent Churches Association, the United Christian Conciliation Party, the 
\Vestem Cape Council of Churches and Jesus Christ for Peace which says it aims to "avoid blacks 
suffering under a black government"'. (Back to the Laager, 1991 :158) 
. In recent years there has undoubtedly been a proliferation of rightwing Christian groups. 
(RWCG's). A particular interpretation of the Christian Bible was historically used to provide· the 
religious means to maintain the status quo in this country. (Laubser, 1987) Clearly these tactics 
v,ill be re-employed to achieve a similar aim. RWCG's have publicly attacked progressive leaders 
such as Bishop Tutu and the SACP in general. 
''The· =ea! of their propagai1da sounds similar to .l\'a:i fascism in the 1930/40', 
which rallied Christians to support Na:ism in order to save Europe from a 
communist menace". (Crisis News. No\'ember, 1988). 
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Traditionally "church ideology·· has promoted obedience to authority and has adopted a strong 
anti-communist stance. RWCG's have exploited this theology in an attempt to persuade Christians 
to support the government and/or other anti-communist political groups. RWCG's in south Africa 
have links with the international religious right which has been instrumental in bolstering 
conservative governments globally. Righnving Christians have been dubbed "·wolves in sheep's 
clothing". (New Nation, 01.09.88). 
"This practice of destabilizing the church by the rightv,:ing can be compared to the 
CL4 's tactics of using fundamentalist Christian groupings to further the political 
interests of their masters". (ibid) 
RWCG's share certain broad objectives including their anti-communist stance with other righnving 
political movements. An intolerance for non-Christian systems of belief such as Judaism and Islam 
exists. RWCG's are essentially anti individual freedoms such as the right to abortion and 
homosexuality. Many of their campaigns are waged against individuals and movements attempts 
to forge a measure of acceptability in society for groups like the Pro-Life movement. They have 
aligned themselves v.ith such groups in order to coordinate legislative battles and to air political 
issues from a conservative perspective. (Liebman and Wuthnow, 1983:2). 
If the proliferation of rightwing church groups are in some way indicative of social trends and 
developments as a whole, then it appears that a conservative backlash is taking place. South Africa 
is not inunune to global developments and processes, and in a society historically prone to both 
reactionary political thought and church involvemen,t in the politicai affairs of the country, the 
gro,vth ofR\VCG's can be expected to continue. Similarly the spread of rightwing ideas in general 
can be expected to increase, as this society moves into a new, uncertain era. There is clear evidence 
that the rightwing is making significant inroads into v,:hite, and specifically Afrikaner civil society. 
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The v.'hite right has come to exert considerable influence in the Afrikaner churches and ,:vithin 
Afrikaner culture as a whole. 
The rightwing is comprised of various intellectually based organizations including SABRA (The 
South African Bureau of Racial Affairs) fanned in 1948 in an attempt to counter the liberal 
SAIRR (South African Institute of Race Relations). (Zille, 1987:58). Along with the Broederbond, 
this organization took on the task of developing the philosophical and intellectual components of 
Afrikaner Nationalism and the corresponding apartheid system of government. (Leach, 1989: 168) 
claims that it became the perfect "ideological assembly line for the Nationalist government''. 
In the contemporary contex1, intellectuals within organizations like SABRA, serve the purpose of 
intially identifying new rightwing ideas and strategies, ,vhich are later promoted for mobilization 
purposes. SABRA continued the conservative tradition and came to provide the rightv,ing 
movement with ideological input. This organization conducted considerable research on racial 
issues within the contex1 of separate development. (Zille, 1987:58) labels it the "rightwing think-
tank" and claims that it is "primarily engaged in examining alternative models of partition". 
SABRA distanced itself increasingly from the NP and rejected the 1983 tricameral parliament. 
Instead it offered a solution of a volkstaat for each volk in 1985. (van Rooyen, 1992:92). Relations 
between SABRA and the CP became increasingly strained since the former favoured the institution 
.· 
of a smaller Afri~aner state than envisaged by the latter. Carel Boshoff, chainnan of SABRA 
founded the Stigting Afrikanen·11·heid in 1988 and increasingly distanced himself from the CP. 
His grand plan culminated in the purchase of Orania in the North Western Cape. Boshoffs 
demands were not excessive and most of the land he requested was sparsely inhabited. The 
Vereniging van Oranjewerkers, founded in 1980 and Jed by Verwoerd' s son, v,as born out of 
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research conducted by SABRA. There \Vere 17 members originally but it is alleged that by (986 
membersrup had increased to approximately 2500. (Bekker et al, 1989:42). The Oranjewerkers are 
intent on establishing a volkstaat for whites. Self-sufficiency is emphasized and Morgenzon in the 
Eastern Transvaal was established as the first growth-point. 
Another key rightwing organization is the so-called Toekomsgesprek (TG) founded in 1983 
which was to provide an alternative to the Bond for the CP. (Zille, 1988:59). Its aim is to infiltrate 
all spheres of South African society and to establish a strong and coordinated rightwing presence in 
. trus society. Zille states that at this stage it is difficult to assess to what extent it has coordinated its 
strategy aimed at infiltrating a variety of bodies including civic associations, school committees, 
agricultural co-operatives and the like. Professor Hennie Kotze, a political scientist, claims that the 
TG is the force behind the CP's influence in cultural and agricultural institutions in rural and semi-
urban areas. It consists of many ex-Broederbonders and has close links v.,ith the CP and the 
right\ving as a whole. According to Kotze, 
"the aim of the TG is to propagate conservative Afrikaner ideology on the broadest 
possible level by infiltrating cultural organizations, school committees, church 
councils and agricultural boards". (Cape Times 13.10.91) 
Cultural organizations such as the Afrikaner Volkswag (AV) formed in 1984 by Carel Boshoff 
once he had resigned from the Broederbond, comprise another dimension of the right\ving 
movement. The AV aims to engage in rightv.·ing struggle at a cultural level and the basic unit of 
membership is the family. An estimated 7000 families are members (Zille, 1987:56). According to 
Bekker et al (1989) this figure is closer to 50 000. The AV was particularly concerned about 
countering the activities of F AK. The A V's biggest success to date was illustrated at the 150 yr 
celebration of the Great Trek in 19.88 where they totally upstaged the official F AK activities. The 
organization aims to facilitate and promote Afrikaner unity: most key righnving leaders including 
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the late Andries Treumicht, Jaap Marais and Eugene Terre'Blanche are AV members. (Welsh, 
1988:4). 
The righnving has tried to consolidate its support base in traditionally conservative Trade Unions. 
Part and parcel of this process was the proposed creation of a rightwing super union to combine the 
forces of all \Vhite workers. This ambition has failed to materialize, because of factors like the 
"territorial anxieties of union leaders and the hist01y of acrimony, said to have its roots in 
personal animosities .. " (Weekly Mail, February, 1991) Despite the lack of success in terms of 
forging union unity, as social and economic conditions worsen, rank and file may pressurize 
leaders to reconcile personal differences in order to promote this. Hov-.1ever, the white working-
class has repeatedly sho,,.n its reluctance to unite on the basis of class, and has historically been 
mobilized in terms of ethnicity. This reflects the primacy of ideology over material interest in 
white working-class politics in particular and white politics in general. Material interests are only 
advanced in so far as they coincide with ideological ones. During the apartheid era, this did occur, 
and in the wake of its demise, ideology is once again accorded primacy over economics and 
material concerns. The reluctance on the part of white workers to allign v..ith black labour in 
Cosatu affiliated unions, which would ultimately work towards the realization of their class 
interests, illustrates the tenacity of ideology in white working-class politics. 
~arious women's groups exist, like the Afrikanervroue Kenkrag (AVK), which means . 
. . 
(Afrikaner women strength in knov-.'ledge). This group was formed in 1983 by a group of women 
\'l·ho were determined to counter the governments attempts at integration. The rightwing has also 
played an active role in providing white women with military and self-defence training. This 
culminated in the formation of an all female security group, the Rooi Valke. 
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The rightwing recently launched its own radio-station, Radio Pretoria to counteract the "liberal" 
SABC. It is hoped that control of their own media \Viii assist them in their campaign and will allow 
them to reach many whites alienated by the NP and its propagation machine, the SABC. (Patriot, 
September, 1993). The rightv-.ring have various publications and newsletters which help them 
disseminate information central to their political campaigns. In this way the rightvvi.ng is able to 
counteract what it believes to be unfairly biased nev,'s coverage. Rjghtwing access to media is 
crucial in terms of disseminating infom1ation and mobilizing support. Mobilization is thus 
advanced by the broadcasting of new rightv-.ring ideas and programmes of action. The ov.mership of 
its O\VIl radio station goes a long way toward furthering this objective. The potential of the media 
to influence public opinion cannot be under estimated, and the launch of Radio Pretoria is 
significant in that it forms the foundation for alternative right\ving media. Although the new radio 
station battled to attract advertisers during the first week of broadcasting, this may pick-up as it 
becomes more established. 
The white rightwing movement in contemporary South Africa comprises a myriad of organizations 
and, any investigation of these organizations needs to encompass more than the narrow limiting 
categories based purely on either objective or subjective considerations if they are to illuminate the 
complexity of the issue. Objective I material and subjective I ideological and psychological 
considerations need to be fused together if the analysis is to be hol.istic and all encompassing. For 
this reason a new framework needs to be elaborated (see Chapter Five) so that it integrates both 
these considerations in an attempt to uncover the roots of and the motivation behind membership 
and aUegiance of such extreme righnving,causes. Such sentiments have a diversity of origins and 
are fuelled by several concerns. thus only an explanation which is equally complex and totai' in its 
thrust will suffice to shed any light on the issue. A discussion of both the strengths and weaknesses 
of existing literature dealing v,ith the subject follows. 
23 
.. 
, 
1.2 PERSPECTIVES IN LITERATURE: 
At this stage, it is imperative to review critically, the available literature. Vast lacunae exist within 
available literature which prompted me to conduct this research and formulate my theoretical 
perspective so as to encapsulate more than the traditional theoretical concerns. Existing literature 
dealing with the contemporary rightwing movement specifically and even its Afrikaner Nationalist 
predecessor seems to neglect neo-fascist type groupings. Existing literature also fails to provide a 
holistic explanation which effectively fuses several approaches in an attempt to explain and 
understand the origins of and the underlying dynamics motivating the members of such ultra right 
groups to take action. 
My ov.n preferred reading centres on texts which emphasize ethnic/cultural and ideological 
considerations as opposed to economic categories. I have used key texts ·within the various 
theoretical frarne,vorks dealing with Afrikaner Nationalism, including authors such as T.D. 
Moodie, Dan O'Meara, Adam and Giliomee, W.A. de Klerk, David Welsh and Jonathan Hyslop. 
The works of Patrick Furlong and Roger Griffin have been used as the basis for understanding the 
fascist element in righming discourse. 
In terms of elaborating a theoretical paradigm the work of social psychologists Erich Fromm 
(1942\56\64) and \Vil}ielm Reich (1977) have been used. Theorists incorporating an international 
dimension to the discussion on fascism and fundamentalism have been selected and these include 
authors Glock,C and Stark,R (1966); Hadden,.TK and Shupe,A (eds) (1989) and Paul Wilkinson 
(1981 ). 
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Some conunon elements or trends within the existing literature can be identified. A large portion of 
the literature dealing ,vith Afrikaner Nationalism has been written from a pro-Nationalist 
perspective and one recurrent theme seems to emphasize the Calvinist background of the Afrikaner 
people. Nationalist mythology attempts to present a case for the intervention of "divine ·will" 
forging Afrikanerdom into a united edifice with a unique historical purpose. O'Meara (1983:4) 
states, "much of it self consciously seeks to construct a political or cultural mythology. " He refers 
to Scholtz, ( 1964 ), who goes so far as to claim divine appointment for this task. Afrikaner 
Nationalism has been extensively analyzed from a perspective which focuses on the history, 
language and religion peculiar to this group of people. A wide range of authors emphasize these 
aspects; \V. H. Vatcher, (1965); W.A. de Klerk, (1975); Adam and Giliomee, (1979); T.D. 
Moodie, (1975); van Jaarsveld, (1964) and generally tend to ignore or at least downplay 
considerations of a material nature. 
Accounts of Afrikaner Nationalism in English have generally been unsympathetic to the Afrikaner 
cause. Pro-British, neo-colonial sentiment is often disparaging in its view of the Afrikaners and 
seeks to condemn rather than understand Afrikaner interests. One author, who attempts to provide 
a socio-psychological analysis of the Afrikaner people, refers to them as "immature psychopaths in 
a sociopathic culture." (Lambley, 1980) Vincent Crapanzano in his book "Waiting-The w/zites of 
South Africa", 198 7, has been criticized for being unethical in his treatment of his respondents, 
white conservative Afrikaner communities. Crapanzano's attitude exemplifies this tendency to 
write them off as fringe lunatics ·with no real political legitimacy. Attitudes like his do little to 
.3.SSist in uncovering the underlying dynamics behind the Afrikaner Nationalist movement and of 
the Afrikaner psyche. since the starting premise is essentially etlmo-centric and assumes 
superiority. O'Meara notes that "accounts of Afrikaner Nario1ialism in English have generally 
been written by peopfc opposed to 1he Xatio11al Party.·· (1983:5) 
' 
He goes on to say that; 
"the liberal analysis of Aji-ikaner }lationalism remains at the level of counter-
ideological history. It presents but a pale, negative, mirror-image of the 
assumptions of Afrikaner Nationalist analysis. " (ibid) 
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Furlong (1991 :xii) supports this and identifies a tendency prevalent within a historical period 
which was essentially liberal and anti-Nationalist in its thrust. The tendency was to view Afrikaner 
Nationalists as Nazis. Vatcher, (1965) and Bunting, (1969) have been identified by Furlong as 
constituting a sector of this camp. 
Although a fairly large amount of literature dealing with Afrikaner Nationalism exists, most of it 
tends to emanate from sources with the above mentioned assumptions. Marxist authors tend to 
conflate race relations ,vith class relations and in so doing have generally not dealt effectively v.ith 
the role played by the ideology of Afrikaner Nationalism in creating identities. 
F.A. Johnstone, (1976); Wolpe, (1973) and Davies, (1979) deal with the issue of white workers in 
South Africa, but have little to say about Afrikaner Nationalism and the role it played in shaping 
consciousness. In other words they pay insufficient attention to the subjective realm of human 
experience in their analyses. 
Despite the fact that O'Meara fails to elevate his discussion from the level of economic 
reductionism, it is extremely valuable in terms of providing the historical context and also the 
economic conditions in which this ideological form developed. O'Meara's work is invaluable and 
of utmost importance in terms of illuminating the class interests behind an apparently ethnic 
reYolution. O'Meara (1983) filgues that Afrikaner Nationalism; "is a historical spectfic. flexible 
and d({(erentiated response of various identifiable and changing class forces-in alliance to the 
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contradictions and struggles generated by 1he dewlopment of capitalism. " He makes it his mission 
to analyze; 
"the historical contradictions and processes of struggle around the development of 
capitalism through which the relations of production came to take form through 
racial categories. " (Adam and Giliomee, 1979:6) 
Why specific collectives of social agents came to be collectively mobilized in a particular 
conjuncture in tem1s of an ethnic ideology of Afrikaner Nationalism rather than other ideologies of 
the period is the question O'Meara tries to ans\ver. Class based theories like this, tend to downplay 
the influence of factors such as race and ethnicity \vhich cannot simply be reduced to class. 
O'Meara is critical of those who elaborate theoretical explanations which are devoid of historical 
content. It is his aim to move beyond this "uncritical, a-historical approach" (O'Meara, 1983:8). 
O'Meara is extremely wary of relegating phenomena such as the emergence of Afrikanerdom and 
the entrenchment of Afrikaner power to the realm of ideas. 
"T¥hilst cultural values, belief systems, ideologies etc. are crucial aspects of social 
reality, in no sense do such ideational phenomena constitute sufficient explanations · 
of reality or of themselves." (0 'Meara, 1983:9) 
In my opinion, O'Meara's criticisms are not unwarranted, but he does tend to ignore the fact that 
certain authors within the "idealist" camp do in fact acknowledge the role played by economic 
factors in the formation of the Afrikaner Nationalist alliance. Granted, Moodie places less 
importance on the role of socio-economic factors in the realm of ideology and belief than does 
O'Meara, but the fonner does acknowledge the existence of such determinants. It is thus a 
mistaken assumption on the part of O'Meara that, 
"idealist ,1riters -attribute Afrikaner Nationalism only to its ideology, a number 
have recognized the social causes of changing riews. ·• (Goldberg, 1985: 125) 
o·Meara also underplays the cultural dimension of Afrikaner Nationalist thought and ideology. 
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At this stage it is necessary to examine the work of theorists wl;o emphasize the importance of 
ideological, cultural and psychological issues in the forn1ation of Afrikaner Nationalist ideology. T. 
D. Moodie (1975) is one of the key authors who accords due credit to ideological considerations. 
In his earliest ·writings he tends to concentrate on the ways in which Afrikaner Nationalist 
ideologues were able to interpret the world for themselves and the volk so as to provide the 
fran1ework for a powerful social and political movement. He provides a lengthy description of the 
key beliefs which came to constitute Afrikaner policies and his concept "civil religion" assists one 
in understanding the appeal of this particular ideology. "Civil religion., relates to the constellation 
of symbols which united Afrikanerdom for a period of history extending from 1934-48. An 
understanding of the nature of these is crucial to the overall understanding of the appeal of this 
ideological form, since symbols a.re often deliberately manipulated for the purpose of ensuring 
allegiance to a particular ideological form. 
· Moodie attempts to analyze the symbolic manifestations of the Afrikaner psyche which comprised 
the civil religion. These symbols are invoked by ideologues at various stages to elicit a desired 
response on the part of the audience to which it is addressed. He argues that beliefs and rituals 
constitute an important dimension of reality for individuals and groups and that they can be 
modified in response to changing conditions. 
Although the class reductionist and idealist approaches are in a sense mutually exclusive, analysts 
outside their prospective frameworks can draw on the insights of both approaches. O'Meara 
explains broedertv,is and the verkra.mpte verligte struggle \Vithin the National Party as an 
essentially class based struggle. Authors such as Welsh (1989) question this and argue that the split 
in Afrikanerdom, especially the Conservative Party split cannot be analyzed from an exclusively 
class based perspective. Ideological factors are also important. Welsh doesn't deny the existence of 
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a correlation between class and right-wing support, but alerts us to the complexity of the CP's base 
of support. 
Adam and Giliomee (1979: 13) claim that class based explanations fail to demonstrate why people 
are rendered susceptible to movements which may go against the realization of their real, material, 
class interests. They attempt to elaborate a view which encompasses a conception of ethnicity and 
psychological "group-bondedness". Their discussion of the out-group is extremely useful in terms 
of understanding such phenomena and will be used in so far as it sheds any light on the matter. 
Whilst class factors may have played a significant role in the formation of the contemporary right-
wing, other factors such as ideology and notions of ethnicity were also crucial in this regard. Lower 
income-group \Vhites have traditionally relied on the state to protect their privileged position, but 
their position was weakened by factors such as rising inflation, the decline of the rate of growth of 
the GDP in the 1970's/80's and changes in government policy. The state has attempted to.narrow 
the racially based wage gap and has attempted redistributive policies in favour of blacks. Whites 
have responded by joining political parties, including the right-wing. Jonathan Hyslop (1987:393) 
argues that the A \\TB' s rise to prominence, 
was the product of a conjunction of features in South Afi"ica 's political and 
economic crisis: the political .fi"agmentation of the NP; government's shift toward a 
greater element of fi"ee market orientation. in its policies, resulting in less state 
protection for the white working and lower middle classes against black economic 
competition,· the deterioi·ating econmnic position of the lower white social classes 
after the collapse oft he 1980-81 boom; and the development of mass resistance to 
rhe existing social order in the townships." 
The influence of fascist ideas in Afrikaner political thought and action has been overlooked. even 
though a historical understanding of this ideological form is useful in terms of identifying latent 
fascist tendencies within the present social formation in this country. O'Meara for instance 
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overviews the main tenets of the fascist analogy as applied to the South African situation, but 
decides not to use this analogy in his analysis. He concedes that the fascist analogy offers some 
"comparative insights" even if these do not "compensate for the lack of historical specificity". In 
his opinion it does not really extend the theoretical understanding of the South African social 
formation in general and Afrikaner Nationalism in particular. 
It is my contention that the fascist movement of the 1940's contributed to the formation of right-
wing thought and action and should be incorporated into discussions relating to the historical 
development of the contemporary right-wing movement. van Rooyen (1992:3) states that, 
"although the present-day right wing officially came into existence in 1969 u'ith the 
founding of the HNP, its origins can be traced back to the mobilization of Afrikaner 
Nationalism during the 1930's, the fascist A.fi"ikaner movement of the 1940's, and 
especially to the NP 's apartheid policy after 1948. " 
This is supported by Furlong (1991 :xiv) who states that key authors dealing with Afrikaner 
Nationalism, including O'Meara and Adam and Giliomee fail to take this analogy seriously even 
though it influenced the form ideology took during the 1930's. In his opinion anti-Semitism and 
other elements of fascist ideology made inroads into South African political life and thought during 
the 1930's.(1991 :·45). The outbreak of the Second World War brought these currents of Afrikaner 
Nationalist politics that had remained submerged to the surface. Thus the authoritarian 
transformation of the National Party which had begun in the 1930's was brought into fruition in 
1942. Furlong makes a convincing case in support of his claims that fascist ideas came to permeate 
mainstream Afrikaner political thought more than is commonly realized. Whilst Afrikaner 
Nationalism cannot be explained entirely in tem1s of the injection of fascist ideas during the 1930' s 
and the 1940' s, this link in the chain of eYents that contributed to the electoral success and 
continuance of this ideology must be acknowledged. (This is dealt v,;ith in greater detail in 
Chapters Four and Five). 
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In this brief overview of existing literature, it has become apparent that each approach contains 
inherent limitations which constitute obstacles in the path of an overall, all encompassing 
theoretical paradigm. However, each has its own strengths and should be credited accordingly. The 
short-comings of existing theoretical frameworks can partially be alleviated through synthesis and 
eclecticism. Incorporating social-psychological theoretical ideas into this discussion (as has been 
done in Chapter Five of this thesis) assists in overcoming the inherent short-comings· of 
sociological and political theory in m1derstanding the phenomenon of fascism specifically and 
reactionary ideas in general. 
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ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER ONE 
1 Broedemvis literally means conflict between brothers. In political terms, it refers to 
schisms within the Afiikaner group. 
2 For the purpose of this thesis, the rightwing does not include conservative or reactionary 
blacks, whether or not they belong to established political groups or conduct vigilante type 
operations. 
3 The "Battle of Ventersdorp" which occurred during August, 1991, crushed some of the 
illusions rightwingers had about the police. When the A WB attacked black commuters in 
the tov.-n and disrupted an NP meeting , the police didn't hesitate to take action against 
them. (Sunday Times, 11/08/91). 
4. A group known as "The Speelgrond" (The Playground), operates on Tukkies campus and 
has disrupted several of the left's political meetings. These young white students exemplify 
the lack of acceptance of change and an intolerance for political opinions contrary to their 
o·wn. 
5 Existing structures like farmers' organizations are being used to mobilize white support, 
and injlammato,y statements and the controversial "Kill the Boer/Kill the farmer" slogan 
popularized by ANC Youth leader, Peter Mokaba, have provided impetus for these 
initiatives. (Weekly Mail, April/May, 1993). 
6 A total of approximately 102 toivn councils in the Transvaal alone are controlled by the 
CP. (Back to the Laager, 1991:96). 
7 The World Apartheid Movement (WAM) has apparently set-up self-defence training camps 
and has also contributed to the legal costs of rightwingers on trial. (Weekly A1ail, June 
1993). 
8 The NGK, one of the biggest Afrikaner Reformed Churches recently decided to admit black 
Christians into its congregation. Many hardliners were disillusioned when the NGK 
apologized for the "sins of apartheid". 
9' The CoC denies the existence of a deity and dismisses Christianity as an "evil Jewish 
fable". A strong neo-Nazi pseudo social-Darwinian inspired notion of the sun1ival of the 
fittest [white race] is evident. (Weekly J.1ail, January, 1993). 
10 Its leaders include preachers from the Full Gospel Church, the Rheema Church and a 
Soweto preacher. (New 1'/ation, 12\01 \1989). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The previous Chapter provided a profile of the rightwing movement in modem South Africa. This 
Chapter sets out to trace the trends, tactics, and strategies taken by the rightwing movement in 
the contemporary social and political environment. It is necessary to identify the present nature of 
rightwing organizations in order to understand the very real threat their existence poses to a 
peaceful transition to a non-racial society. The existence of these new organizational forms located 
on the far right of the political spectrun1 is evidence of the movements propensity to fissure. The 
types of groups that have emerged are indicative of the movements inclination to resort to violence 
in the present context. Violence has constituted part of righn,..ing strategy ·with increased 
frequency. 
The assumption is that rightwing splinter groups v.,ith violence on the agenda are likely to 
proliferate, and even the more established organizations, like the CP are undergoing constitutional 
changes and are likely to condone and encourage extra-parliamentary forms of protest. This is not 
to say that the CP v.ill take up arms and be transformed into a "liberation movement", but that the 
role it has assumed up until now v.ill be altered as it becomes jnvolved in non-parliamentary forms 
of protest. 
The dominant volkstaat component of the righnving movement need not constitute any major 
threat, if the righn\·ing can be included in negotiations and compromise reached on this issue. The 
CP may be persuaded to accept a smaller volkstaat, as advocated by cultural leaders like Carel 
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Boshoff. However, it is the smaller militant groups who clearly favour violence who pose the main 
threat and could hamper the negotiation process and also the transition to a new South Africa. 
2.1 NEW TRENDS, TACTICS, STRATEGIES: 1988 to 1993 
The righnving movement in South Africa, like any other political movement, needs to decide on 
w-ruch strategy to employ in order to achieve its policy objectives. Whether it decides to implen.1ent 
partition or secession to achieve its ultimate aim of self-detennination, the rightwing collectively 
needs to decide whether to enter into negotiations or if it should employ passive resistance and/or 
violence. The right\ving has had to adopt a wide range of policies and tactics in response to 
changing reality and not all options considered constitutional and/or legal. At present the right\ving 
is tom bet\veen using constitutional or unconstitutional means of achieving its major objectives. A 
weakness of the present negotiation process and the legitimacy of the new constitution is reflected 
in its inability to incorporate the parties of the Freedom Alliance who walked out of the talks 
earlier this year. 
During the years 1988 to 1993, the right\ving has engaged in a number of activities ranging from 
passive fonns of resistance, including civil disobedience, hunger-strikes, the bizarre "suicide in the 
desert" 1 incident to more overtly aggressive and destructive behaviour such as bombings and hit-
squad type assassinations. The righnvi.ng has also opted to occupying buildings of historical and 
symbolic significance to voice their dissatisfaction '"''ith reform. These activities in a sense 
represent a departure from previous ones, in that new tactics have been employed for the purposes 
of entrenching white privileges. The white righming has been involved in numerous incidences of 
Yiolence OYer the past few years. (see Figure 2). These activities are indicative of the extent of 
rightwing organizational networks. These activities need to be analysed in tenns of the underlying 
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motiYes prompting such action (outlined in Chapter Fi,•e), in order to try and assess the 
movements future potential for violence. 
Despite apocalyptic warnings and threats of insurrection, the rightv,'ing has also tried to ensure the 
re-establishment of apartheid structures through "peaceful" means. A v.ide variety of methods has 
been employed to ensure that racial segregation persists. For instance, the Separate Amenities Act 
was lifted in October 1990 and certain CP controlled town councils have used all kinds of means to 
try and keep apartheid alive. These include the charging of high entrance and membership fees, the 
actual closing dov.n of amenities such as swimming-pools in towns like Kuruman and Springs, and 
the privatization of facilities. More confrontational methods have been employed which include 
racist and violent incidents at public amenities in towns like De Aar and Olifantshoek (Back to the 
Laager, 1991 :98). However, when "peaceful" means failed to keep blacks out· of public 
sv.imming-pools, violence was used. Whites would forcibly evict black people from amenities or 
through the use of force and intimidation prevent their entry in the first place. Certain sectors of the 
\vhite community have decided that public amenities are to be reserved for the exclusive use of 
whites and any integration at this level will be resisted. As one white respondent put it, 
"It's not that I hate blacks .... No, we must work with them - but, hell we don't 
have to live and mix with them ... to hell with them coming to our swimming-pools; 
let them build their own - in their own areas. "(Welkom, December, 1990) 
As mentioned, the righming has had to decide whether or not it would enter negotiations. The 
CP, in particular, has had to take a stance and has repeatedly reiterated its commitment not to 
negotiate with the "ANCISACP alliance". Pragmatists within the CP, have put pressure on the 
party to reconsider its stance on entering present talks. (The Argus 18/10/90) Individuals such 
as Koos \'an der Mef\ve and Carel Boshoff of the Afrikaner Volksv,ag have expressed a 
willingness to negotiate. Boshoff has made it clear that he ,\ill negotiate in order to achieve his 
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ideal of an Afrikaner Volkstaat. Traditionalists within the party like Ferdi Hartzenberg refuse 
to negotiate ~·ith groups and organizations ,vhich have not rejected violence and conununism. 
It seems that T reumicht was caught up between the two factions, and his primary concern was 
to prevent a split.in the CP. The CP has since had talks \\'ith the ANC, but remains unVv-illing to 
' 
negotiate a settlement for a future South Africa. The CP is willing to negotiate and even forge 
alliances with black leaders like Buthelezi and has reached an agreement with IFP president 
Buthelezi on the basis of similar aims including an "adherence to Christian principles, 
rejection of communism, terrorism and domination". (Cape Times 3/11/90). This attempt at 
forging an alliance is hardly surprising in the light of both groups' convictions about ethnicity 
and nationalism. )The implications of such common interests will be dealt with in Chapter Five 
of this thesis). 
Before moving on to a discussion on rightwing violence, it is necessary to provide a summary 
of the latest developments in rightwing strategy. The ,vhite rightwing has attempted to canvass 
broader support for its policies by "winning the hearts and minds of the people". Not only are 
they preparing for war, they are also trying to canvass popular support for their activities by 
offering material benefits to impoverished whites. The setting-up of soup kitchens and the 
distributing of clothing for poor whites and the employing of white labour by rightwing 
companies and individuals helps to secure support for the.rightv.ing on an everyday level. The 
A WB in particular have been instrumental in setting up white feeding schemes. The A WB has 
thus filled the vacuum in working-class white politics, and supporters who include farmers and 
professionals provide food to be distributed by the "volkshelpskeme" (people's help schemes) 
which have been set up. (Sunday Times. 04/12/1988) The right\\1ng may, in this way secure 
suppon from poor whites v,ho otherwise may not haYe supported them. 
, 
In the words of an unemployed railway worker, 
"Who can we turn to, the NP are so busy fl)dng to impress eve1J7one overseas, they 
forget about their own people. The only ones )\'ho will feed and clothe us are the 
A WB. How then can we not support them. I personally am quite happy living here, 
I don't want no volkstaat, but I will vote right next time around " (Kimberley, 
December, 1990). 
The implications of support for the righnving from the poorer white classes are self-
explanatory. As the economic plight of the lower echelons of \\"hite society worsens, support 
for rightwing parties which favour white material advancement and State subsidization of 
whites at the expense of blacks, can only be expected to increase. It is necessary to 
acknowledge that there is an identifiable class basis for righmring support, although this is not 
the concern of this study. 
llighmringers have apparently been preparing for the inevitable conflict, not only by stock-
piling weapons and undergoing military training, but have been chopping wood and 
accumulating water supplies for periods without electricity and the like. Survival camps have 
been mapped out and anned righmringers are being mobilized within existing structures like 
SADF commando structures. (Weekly Mail, October, 1993) It is virtually impossible to obtain 
confirmation for these allegations, but righN,ringers often "boast" about the fact that they are 
preparing for the inevitability of civil \\'ar. During my field-work, such claims were often 
made, but it is hard to gauge ,vhether they are realistic or not. 
Recent claims that the a v,,,hite ultra righnving group, Israel Vision, was training mentally 
disabled individuals in the use in explosives have been confirmed by the group, who are 
unashamedly proud of their recruits. The Boereweerstandsbeweging (B \VB) are also 
implicated in the training of these "specials" or "soldiers of Jesus Christ., as they were 
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originally tenned. Trainers of these units have been used to guard prominent rightwingers like 
the recently acquitted Gaye Derby-Lewis at public gatherings. (Weekly Mail, October, 1993) 
This extremely racist religious sect has gained support from fundamentalist rightv·.'ingers 
looking for a biblical justification for their beliefs. Conservative whites in South Africa, who 
favour racial segregation have always tried to justify their beliefs in tem1s of religion, thus it is 
. not surprising that extremists have once again turned to Christianity to obtain legitimation for 
their cause. Groups \Vho have rejected Chritianity, like the CoC are numerically small, and this 
could, amongst other factors, be related to their inability to provide religious sanction for their 
beliefs an1ongst a group of people who have historically relied on the Bible for moral guidance. 
In other words, their teachings and ideas are relatively alien to white conservatives, who have 
shaped political beliefs in tenns of Calvinist Christian interpretations of reality. 
It appears that the white ultra right is gearing up for war, and is trying to obtain support for this 
change in policy from the white constituencies they represent. They have employed a variety of 
mechanisms (material and ideological) to achieve this. Violence has become an attractive 
option and the majority of rightv.ing organizations view it as unavoidable and justifiable under 
the present circumstances. 
2.2 VIOLENCE AND THE RIGHTWING: 
Before discussi11g the rightwing's propensity for violence, it is necessary to define what 
constitutes violent activity. van Rooyen (1991 :453) suggests that in tem1s of the rightwing the 
term non-violent should be actorded a broader understanding than Ghandhi's usage and should 
include means of resistance like mass protests, marches and the breaking up of NP meetings .. 
The rightwing also considered options such as strikes, the refusal to pay taxes, the refusal to 
arrive for military sen·ice and the like. (ibid:455) The strategies mentioned above, in tenns of 
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this broad definition are essentially "non-violent". The breaking up of a p;litical rivals 
meetings could be seen as a violent action, but for the purpose of this discussion, it will not be 
vie\ved in this way. 
Political analyst \'Velsh ( 1988) believes that present circumstances in South Africa provide 
favourable conditions for the gro-wth in violence. The rightwing is not exempt from the 
processes underway in the country and it appears that the strategy of active resistance may 
become a feasible option for the contemporary rightwing movement. Political violence on the 
part of the ultra right targeted against the state and also at the left has increased radically since 
1989. (see Figure 2). As the ruling National Party prepares for a transition to· a more 
democratic non-racial South Africa, the rightwing has become increasingly dissatisfied and 
determined to curb this transformation. 
Rightwing groups and individuals have publicly declared their willingness to use violence to 
achieve their ends and in many instances these threats have been carried out. Even the CP has 
reinterpreted its position and a significant shift in policy regarding violence has taken place. 
Since February 1990, the CP undertook to resist the government at various levels and their 
strategy included the formation of "self-defence" units in the light of the government's 
decJaration on the irreversibility of reform, the CP had to reassess its position. CP member 
Koos van der Merwe claimed that, 
"although the CP rejected violence and was essentially committed to constitutional 
methods the government's present action could lead to civil war". (Patriot 
25/10/90) 
The CP has also attempted to justify \·iolence on moral and biblical grounds and has repeatedly 
tried to legitimate its increasingly \·iolent stance to the public. Further justification is found in 
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comparing the position of whites in South Africa to ethnic minorities in Eastern Europe. For 
I 
example the Baltic republics attempts to obtain independence from the Soviet Union is used as 
an analogy. (van Rooyen, 1992:478) 
Wim Booyse claims that the CP returned to parliament in August 1990 in a more aggressive 
and militant mood. The CP assisted in the fom1ation of a private army called Brandwag. 
(ibid) The role played by the Conservative Party in terms of supporting the Blanke Veiligheid 
(\Vhite Security) organization in Welkom \\ill be discussed in this chapter. 
A hardening of attitudes on the part of respondents was apparent, and this is significant since it 
corresponded v..ith the governments decision to unban the ANC and the SACP and the opening 
of the NP to all races. The first spate of interviews were conducted prior to February 1990, and 
several respondents remained unwilling to resort to violence to achieve political goals since 
these methods were favoured by the "barbaric enemy". (interview, November 1988). They felt 
' 
that since its inception the CP was a parliamentary party which used constitutional means to 
achieve political ends. However, when interviewed a second time, after de Klerk's speech in 
February 1990, attitudes had changed. The same individuals expressed a willingness to use 
violence to obtain goals. 
"In the final instance, when all other options have failed (as they have nO't\~ 
violence is necessa1J1. " (Kimberley, July 1991) 
Respondents \vho initially were either ambivalent on the issue of violence or who rejected it 
outright v;·ere far more \villing to consider the violent option. Apart from the usual vague 
threats expressed, direct and clearly planned courses of action were emphasized. 
39 
A Welkom miner boasted that he, 
"had joined a security operation aimed at curbing crime in white areas ... and in 
the process ensuring that blacks were kept in their place once and for 
all... "'(December, 1990) 
When further prompted he went into great detail about the setting up of similar units nation-
\\ide and offered assistance in setting up a "women's group". This admission of a definite plan 
· of action for "white security" and supremacy was echoed by other respondents. 
A CP official who was relatively militant in 1988 was extremely outspoken on the perceived 
legitimacy of violence in 1990. In 1988 he elaborated that, 
"violence was justifiable under the following circumstances: vvhen the government 
does not obey God and when the government behaves dictatorially". (Kimberley, 
June, 1988). 
\Vb.en asked the same question in 1990, the respondent answered the question ·with a simple, 
"Yes - definitely. Now it's war. " Another individual who was rather moderate in 1988, was 
not as conciliatory in 1990. He stated that 
"We Afrikaners must be taken seriously, we are not by nature a violent people, but 
if we are backed into a corner, as we are now, ·what choice do we have?" (Cape 
Town, 1990) 
By the end of 1990, all respondents interviewed, ·with the exception of a church minister who 
refused to comment, said that violence was justifiable in political action. A significant 
percentage of those were prepared to engage in violence themselves. This is significant since 
several respondents were unwilling to do so in 1988. 
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2.2.1. Para-military rightwing groups: 
(a) Self-defence Units: ) 
In the light of increased violence on the part of the rightwing, it is necessary to identify the 
I 
types of organizations and structures involved in one way or another with promoting violent 
activities. In both my O\\'Il empirical investigation and that done by the authors in Back to the 
Laager, (1991), the to\\'11 Welkom was identified as an area where the white rightwing had 
made significant inroads in terms of successfully mobilizing whites into forming self-defence 
units. \V elkom was the scene of the most violent and organized righnving action during 1990. 
The political dynamics that exist in this town can be found in many other regions, especially 
the Transvaal and OFS. When conducting intervie,vs in this mining to\\'11 most people 
interviewed were either directly involved or strongly sympathized with the aims of these 
groups. As one respondent put it, 
"I mean we don't want the kaffirs singing and dancing on our streets. 
(November, 1990) 
Another added, 
"if a kaffir so much as tries to rob my house and harm my family, he's dead .. we 'l/ 
find him. " He went on to say, "we are preparing/or war, it's not about politics -
its about the kaffir mentality ... we've got to shoot it out of them. "(ibid, 1990) 
Clearly these statements are shared by significant sectors of the local white population. \Vhites 
in Welkom have taken A\VB leader Eugene Terre' Blanche's statement seriously: "Histo1)l . 
has shov.n that an unarmed white man in South Aji-ica is a dead man. " According to the SAP 
in Welkom, during April 1990 alone, 1100 new gun licences were issued. (Back to the :taager, 
1991:68) As mentioned, Welkom is a predominantly mining tO\\TI and MWU organizer A.rrie 
Paulus has openly encouraged white miners to arm themselves before going underground. He 
echoed the call preYiously made by rightwing political organizations in response to an incident 
. 
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where a white miner was found dead underground. Clearly this exacerbates an ~!ready tense 
situation in a tov,m rife ,vith racial animosity. (Argus 14/08/90) Arrie Paulus is not the only one 
encouraging whites to arm themselves, militant organizations like the Boerestaat Party and 
the Transvaal Separatiste openly declare their plan to ann 1 million whites within five years. 
In fact several rightwing groups promote or support a call to arms to achieve an Afrikaner state. 
Terre' Blanche takes a radical view, "If they want to take this counhy by force and violence we 
v.-illfightfor the love of God. '"(Argus 4/02/92) 
White South Africans generally have easy access to weapons and over the past few years many 
rightwinger attempts to steal arms from the armed forces have been exposed. Access to 
explosives in particular has far reaching consequences in terms of the overall stability of this 
country and could interfere vvith the 1994 elections. Righm.ing bomb blasts have occurred with 
increased frequency. Both those sympathizers in the armed forces and on the mines have 
relatively easy access to explosives. Rightwingers have even tried to purchase weapons abroad. 
Two A WB members ,vere arrested in Britain for attempting to buy arms from an international 
gun-running syndicate. (Weekly Mail, January, 1993). During the same week, the SAP arrested 
seven men ·for stealing weapons from a SADF arsenal in Welkom.(ibid). Such incidents 
illustrate that rightwing groups are making a concerted effort to stockpile weapons to be used 
at a later stage in their struggle. 
Another factor of reference to this thesis is that during the first set of interviews conducted at 
the e-nd of 1988, none of the selected respondents mentioned self-defence units. At that stage 
tl1ese structures were relatively wlknown and unestablished and were thus not dealt with 
comprehensi\'ely in the question. By the end of 1990 the situation had changed, and everyone 
inten·iev,·ed knew of and /or belonged to such w1its. Para-military structures like· these 
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"neighbourhood watches·· mushroomed after February' 1990 and this is indicative of white 
fears and perceptions. Socio-economic factors like increased unemployment and subsequently 
crime and poverty contributed to their growth. This was reflected in the interviews and is 
collaborated by the opinions of rightwing observers and analysts. 
(b) Other fom1s of para-military organizations: 
Apart from the self-defence units formed in Welkom, the extreme right has established several 
other para-military type structures and organizations in recent years. These vigilante type self-
protection units that patrol the streets of white suburbia by night are a relatively new 
phenomenon. Escalating crime and violence has heightened their activities. As mentioned 
access to arms is clearly not a problem, nor is the willingness to take part in such activities. 
Most white males have experienced some form of military training and thus possess the 
expertise to conduct programmes of this nature. 
Political analyst Wim Booyse w~s that we shouldn't see these neighbourhood watches in a 
vacuum. On the contrary, the creation of such grass-roots organizatio~s could have far-
reaching implications and could constitute powerful forces in the future. (The Argus 23/7 /90) It 
is alleged that these "civil defence units" are' the brainchild of CP member Clive Derby Lewis. 2 
Derby Lewis is also President of the Western Goals Institute (WGI) and according to Andrew 
Smith, WGI's London leader, these units ,vere formed with the help of professional soldiers 
and mercenaries. (Argus 5/06/92) It is not only these "defence-units" that have obtained a 
measure of international support. The AWB's Iron. Brigade has apparently been trained by 
foreign professionals. The Iron Brigade is an elite unit '"'hich incorporated the cream of 
previous \Venkommando and Aquila units in April 1991. Camps have been set up where the 
art of covert war is taught. including assassination techniques. Law and order spokesman, 
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Captain Craig Kotze commented, "They are to the AWB what the SS was to the Nazi Party. '' 
(Argus 28/12/91 ). According to various studies conducted, the Iron Brigade and similar units 
comprise ex-policemen, foreign elite soldiers and ex-members of the SADF' s "special forces". 
Their programme includes partaking in certain rituals, the taking of a vow and vigorous 
training in combat techniques. The Iron Brigade is but one para-military unit, several others 
exist such as the Jakkals group, the Boer Kommando (which broke away from the A WB), 
the Afrikaner Bevrydigingsleer, and all of them are extremely well trained. 
A \VB units have sprung up in areas around the country wherever there is conflict among the 
black and ,vhite communities such as the clashes in \Velkom and regions where squatters have 
invaded white suburbs. Even the CP, has condoned the fonnation of "tuis-wagte" (home 
guards) to protect white life and property in the advent of a squatter or other threat. Grobbelaar 
(1992:105) comments on the fact that the CP has increasingly begun "to entertain the idea and 
the rhetoric of violence ". Whilst it is highly unlikely that the CP will abandon its respectable 
middle class parliamentary character and become a party of ''freedom.fighters", the "Calvinist 
right to protest" may be revised in the wake of further constitutional changes. The CP 
comprises the bulk of the nghtwing and Professor Albert Venter, a political scientist at RAU 
states that if we look at history we \\ill see the improbability of the CP becoming violent. He 
alludes to the historical example of Hertzog's National Party, which remained sympathetic to 
the 1914 rebellion without relinquishing its parliamentary position, unlike the Ossewa 
Brandwag. Although the CP may not directly take up anns, it is likely to actively encourage 
and promote the use of non-violent fonns of extra-parliamentary protest, and may indirectly 
condone Yiolence through its rhetoric. (Grobbelaar. 1992: 107). 
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Whilst it may be a consolation that the CP and the bulk of the white ultra right may not become 
actively involved in azmed resistance, we must not lose sight of the fact that splinter groups 
and individuals may not be deterred. TI1e fanaticism of some groups has been demonstrated on 
numerous occasions. Lood van Schalk\\1yk, leader of the Christen Vryheids Front (CVF) 
asked to be interviewed by the Vrye Weekblad in order to announce his "declaration of war 
against de Kl erk" (Cape Times 24/02/92) He boasted about the amount of blacks he'd killed 
and warned that several others \vould face a similar fate in order to prevent "a kaffir or Jewish 
government" taking over the country. He claimed to have links with international Nazi 
organizations. The incitement to violence on the part of radicals within the movement has 
triggered of several indiscriminate killings by whites. 
The Aji·ikaner Bewydigingsleer has been singled out by rightwing specialist Dr \Vim Booyse, 
as representative of the "absolute fanaticism" prevalent within the rightwing movement as a 
whole. He speculates that it is still at an infant stage in its development and comprises a single 
cell of white hardliners. Despite the fact that they are numerically small, he urges that threats 
made by them should be taken seriously, since small groups like this may constitute a 
component of the so-called "Thir<! Force" and can thus cause irrevocable damage and chaos. 
The individuals Booyse warns of do not. seem to discriminate in selecting victims and their 
identities are rarely disclosed. People chosen for a "cell" will already be azmed and trained. 
(Vrye Weekblad, September 1991) The existence of small "cells" \\1hich are not always 
centrally controlled and often ill-disciplined exacerbates the problem of trying to contain the 
right\\ing threat. It is extremely difficult to track down newly-formed, organizations 
comprising a fe\v or a single member. A recent court case against Terre'Blanche in relation to 
the part he played in attacking and intimidating the Goedgevonden squatters, illustrates this 
trend. Terre 'Blanche denied that he or the A \\,"B were involved and passed the blan1e onto an 
unk.110,\11 rightv,'ing organization. Passing the blame in this way negates the possibility of 
tracking d0\\11 the perpetrators and detracts from Terre'Blanches' role in the incident. The 
rightwing could conceivably employ this tactic in future in order to escape blan1e and hence 
penalties. The Wit \Volwe organization illustrates this tendency to fissure and there is 
disagreement as to whether such an organization even exists. It could possibly consist of a 
single individual or simply exist in nan1e as a kind of decoy. 
Terre'Blanche puts the issue of small nwnbers into perspective, "the boers are at their best 
when rheir numbers are few and we won't cany passengers into battle." In his view, "Histo,y 
is made by individuals and small groups of people. " (Ibid) The level of fragmentation that 
characterizes the rightwing movement renders it difficult to contain all groupings under a 
single un1brella-type body which is centrally co-ordinated and controlled. (Recent attempts at 
forging unity will be discussed later on in Chapter Three of this thesis). Fragmentation also 
makes it extremely difficult for the rightvv'ing to secure adequate representation in parliament. 
The size of some of these splinter groups mitigates against them obtaining seats in parliament, 
which makes the extra-parliamentary path even more attractive. 
Several of the more extreme militant groups have been forced to operate "underground" in 
small cells and often outside the parameters of the law. Attitudes expressed and action initiated 
by small cells or individual right ,vingers are alarming in the sense that they are more blatantly 
fascist and overtly violent than their predecessors. Actions taken by individuals like Barend 
Strydom and cells like the Wit Wohve, Jakkalse and the recently formed Afrikaner 
Benydigingsleer exemplify this tendency. Strydom's actions were thought to be that of an 
isolated madman. 
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Van Rooyen ( 1992 :480) states that; 
''the relative lull in rightwing riolence which followed this incident, gave 
credibility to this perception, but a few months' later eve,ything had changed for the 
worse. 
By mid-1989, the number of militant rightwing groups in existence had surged as, had the 
number of violent acts committed by them. During 1990 and 1991 several incidences of 
rightwing \1iolence were reported, most of which was directed against the government, the left 
and black South Africans. 
The A \VB and the BSP hold similar views on the issue of violence. They claim they will take 
action when an Ail\JC government comes into power. In this instance they would fight for the 
survival of Volk and Vaderland. Piet "Skier" Rudolph of the Orde Boerevolk has been linked 
to numerous acts of violence and sabotage. His justification of his willingness to resort to 
violence is based on this conviction, 
"I was involved the day I was born. This is the same struggle that my father and 
grandfather fought, and which my great grandfathers trekked for. I am fighting for 
those territories which we lost on the 3rd of May 1902. " (Cross Times 
interview, 1989) 
This perceived historical suffering is deep-rooted in the Afrikaner psyche and a historically 
grom1ded concern for "eie volk" provides the far right v.ith potential for mobilization. This 
perceived historical suffering and a belief in a divine sanction for their cause provides powerful 
moral justification for resorting to violent means to achieve political ends. The CP has been 
m1der increasing pressure to revise party policy and justify violence in political action as the 
'· Will of God". If this justification for ,,iolence is resolved, a notion of a·right\ving Holy \Var 
could be developed. The ideological and\or religious justification for anned resistance could go 
a long v,;ay towards providing the white right and its tacit sympathisers with the moral fuel for 
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persuing this path. Calvinist Christianity espouses the notion of the Elect and the damned, and 
in tem1s of this violence against the latter could be biblically justified. Far right splinter groups 
like the Israelites, who view blacks as inhuman could resort to violence ,vith little ideological 
justification needed. 
Members of the extreme Order of Death have been linked to deeds of terror like the murder of 
a black taxi driver to pledge allegiance to the cause and illustrate their level of commitment. 
Lottering and Goosen argue that the murder of the taxi driver was defensible on religious 
grounds and was done in aid of the survival of the volk. Eugene Marais, another member 
provides a similar defence for the murder of seven blacks. "Blacks were animals who looked 
like people ... It was therefore not a sin to kill blacks. "(Sunday Times 17/03/91) They have 
gone so far as to plan the assassination of high profile individuals like cabinet .ministers. 
(Sunday Times 18/11/90) and more recently the murder of ANC Youth leader Peter Mokaba. 
(\Veekly Mail October, 1993) 
Other e:x.1:reme groups include the Boereweerstandsbeweging who have their own self-defence 
structures and intelligence networks. Andrew Ford, the leader, says that the BWB has agents in 
all branches of the security forces. Another group, the White. Liberation Army claimed 
responsibility for a taxi rank blast in July 1990 and have since issued numerous threats, 
including assassinations. The Boer Republican Army (BRA) keep a hit list of enemies and 
openly express admiration for the IRA. TI1e bombing of a former white school building in 
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Pretoria to be used for the children of Ai~C retumed exiles was bombed by a group called the 
Boerkommando. Gawie Volschen.k, the leader claimed: 
··we are in. The process of preparing ourselves physically and mentally and are 
working out The finer details of the struggle ... we don't appear in public anymore . . , 
(Vrve \Veekblad 07/01/1992) 
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The activities of the \Vorld Apartheid Movement ,vere somewhat curtailed after members 
were arrested after a bombing incident in 1990. They too plan assassinations and advocate the 
use of biological and chemical weapons. They are suspected of forging links with other 
international rightwing movements like the notorious Klu Klux Klan. (Sunday Times, 
9/12/1990) 
It is interesting to note that most of the extreme organizations mentioned were either formed or 
initiated activities after February 1990. There was a marked shift away from peaceful means of 
protest and violence was increasingly embraced as a feasible option in political activity. At this 
stage· it is necessary to briefly recap the motivations behind heightened militancy and 
extremism on the part of the white ultra right. It appears that much of the violence committed 
by the ,vhite rightwing in South Africa is motivated by little other than fear and insecurity 
which translates into racism towards the "out-group". Attacks on black civilians have been 
reported ·with increased frequency, and the arbitary and random nature of these attacks are not 
always indicative of a clear-cut political strategy. These activities range from racial abuse to 
vandalism, injury and death. During 1990, the righnving claimed responsibility for several 
bomb blasts, more than previously recorded and the targets selected and methods employed 
resembled those used by the state and its agencies. (Back to the Laager, 1992) 
Unlike previous arbitary violence, recent incidents of rightwing violence tend to be overtly 
political as a planned operation aimed at specific strategic targets. Attacks on journalists at 
rallies could form part of this strategy. Journalists are perceived to generally be unsympathetic 
in their reporting of the rightwing and have thus been targeted for attack. Journalists attacked 
are \'iewed as enemies of the Yolk and are dealt with accordingly. (Sweepslag, February, 1993). 
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Van Rooyen (1992:4 70) is pessimistic and argues that all indications point to a further 
conflagration in this area of rightwing activity as the political system continues its transition to 
a more broadly-based democracy. van Rooyen's predictions are echoed by Welsh (1988) who 
alludes to Fromm's idea that "violence,insecurity and a strained economical circumstance 
bring out the fascist that lurks in each of us." (Patterns of Prejudice vol 22/4 1988) 
The structural conditions conducive to an upsurge in and a support for fascist ideas exist in 
contemporary South Africa. In an enviroment of economic recession and political uncertainty, 
fascist ideas seem extremely attractive to those perceived to be most affected by these 
conditions. White South Africans are painfully aware of the implications of po,1,1er-sharing in 
terms of loss of privilege and a potential loss of ethnic and racial identities, and many have 
come to identify with political groups who provide reassurances in this regard. 
This bleak scenario exists in contemporary South Africa and this pessimism for the short term 
future is not unwarranted. Racism is fostered by, amongst other things, a deep-rooted, socially 
inspired fear of the "out-group". In conservative white South African society this "out-group" 
is black and is seen to constitute a threat. White fear has taken on a specifically racial content 
and the historically created overlap between race and class is brought to the fore. As white 
material circumstances are threatened, racial animosity intensifies, since the black community 
becomes a competitor. Fear is a powerful emotion which easily translates into a hatred of the 
"out-group" which may lead to ~1iolent attacks on the "out-group". 
At this stage, I would just like to locate the allegations of the existence of a Third Force in the 
context of ultra right militancy. Even if the rightwing does not constitute this Third Force, and 
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even if a Third force doesn"t exist at all, the righn\'ing could conceivably become ftwolved in 
activities of this nature. For that reason alone, it is necessary to locate Third Force activities in 
the context of rightwing potential for violence. This is particularly relevant when estab!ishing 
who gains from Third Force activity. 
2.2.2. (a) The Third Force: 
A similar ,,,ar to that previously witnessed in Natal broke out in the Transvaal during July 
1990. The ANC claimed that there was involvement and manipulation by an unknown Third 
Force. Mandela accused agents of the state and military for being reponsible for "black on 
black" violence. (Cape Times 12/10/90) It is unclear who or what constitutes this Third Force 
or whether it even exists. Analysts speculate that it could comprise elements of both the 
rightwing and the state. Blaming the rightwing, detracts attention from the state. (Back to the 
Laager, 1991: 115) The South African state has historically been engaged in the systematic de-
stabilization of its opponents and it is in this conte>..1 that contemporary developments should 
be located. 
It is interesting to note that when violence flared on the Rand, it occurred after the ANC had 
suspended the anned struggle and was attempting to launch branches in the region. The ANC 
rejected the official government analysis which was supported by the rightwing, that the 
violence was essentially "black on black" ethnic rivalry. They claimed that a Third Force was 
responsible and its aim was to disrupt the peace process and discredit and subsequently weaken 
the ANC. Violence flared after the w1banning of the ANC and SACP in February 1990. This is 
not surprising when considering the consequent hardening of right\'.ing attitudes after this 
period. The heightened militancy witnessed on the part of the rightv.;ing occurred during this 
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time period. If the rightwing was to become invol\'ed in such activities, this \Vould be the time 
to do so. 
Reports of white involvement in tovmship violence ha,·e been widespread. The Human Rights 
Commission acknowledged a new trend in violence during 1990 as smaller groups of heavily 
am1ed men rather than big impis \\'ith traditional \veapons were reported. In other words, 
people v.ielded AK 47's as opposed to pangas. Suspicions about rightwing involvement in the 
so-called "Third Force" were confirmed in July 1991, when a fonner member of anny's 
special forces claimed that his unit was involved in the train massacre of September 1990, in 
which 26 people were killed. (Cape Times 19/07/91). The suspected activities of the CCB's 
death squads and alleged "Third Force" involvement in Natal and the Rand need to be 
included in an analysis of the incidences of rightwing violence. van Rooyen (1992) and other 
analysts claim that the activities of rightwing elements v,rithin the security forces, especially the 
Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB) and its death-squads form an important part of the analysis 
of rightvving militancy in South Africa. Booyse believe~ that elements of the CCB were still 
active during the early part of 1991. An ex-CCB member told the Weekly Mail that SADF 
members trained an elite unit of Inkatha in the Capri.vi Strip. This was confirmed by fernier 
Inkatha members, but denied by Buthelezi. He denied having any knowledge of this alleged 
"secret Zulu army". (Back to the Laager, 1991: 116) 
Rightwingers have been linked to providing military training for blacks opposed to the Ai'I\JC. 
Apparently this includes the transfonnation of trad_itional Zulu impis into a con,.ventional 
fighting force. (\Veekly Mail. October, 1993). Terre'Blanche has publically declared that the 
Boer and Zulu nations \Vere preparing for war. (Argus, 17/11/93). 
The police constantly deny favouring Inkatha in township violence. After numerous train and 
taxi massacres, the police conceded that the attacks were "military tJ,pe operations" and 
indicated that they were the work of highly trained people. The Institute of Contextual 
Theology (1992) claim that the special forces of the SADF like the CCB and of the SAP like 
the Askaris are the only ones with both the means and motive to execute such attacks. 
Although individual rightv.1ingers may be involved, special forces like Koevoet possess the 
ability to kill and destabilize. (ibid) 
Further evidence supporting claims of the existence of a Third Force and police impartiality 
came when prisoners at Leeukop prison claimed that a rightwing "armsfacto,y" existed inside 
the prison. Their claims were verified by nvo wardens who stated that spears and pangas for 
use in tO\l,nship violence were produced in the prison's workshop. These "traditional 
weapons" were hidden in an unused cell and some were stockpiled in a nearby veld for use and 
distribution in Reef tov.nships. The Department of Correctional Services denied this, but are 
investigating an incident where rightwing wardens were promoting political faction fighting 
among black inmates of Pietermaritzburg's mens prison. (Weekly Mail, July 1992) After the 
Boipatong massacre a secret Koevoet base was linked to the hostel where the fighting erupted 
from. (Weekly Mail, July, 1992). 
Further confirmation of a Third Force element operating in townships in the Transvaal was 
obtained after the death of the '' Vaal Monster" Victor "Khetisi ., K.hesv·,a who died in police 
custody on 10/07 /93. The World Preservatist Movement (WPM), formerly the World 
Apartheid Movement (\VAM) confirmed that Kheswa \\·as a member.3 Political analysts 
(including Wim Booyse) commented that the link between a kno\\11 black killer and a white 
supremacist movement was "sil1ister ·· and provided the first concrete e\·idence that rightwing 
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movement were sponsoring and fostering tov,nship Yiolence. Kheswa has been linked to 
several massacres and was also a member of Inkatha. (The Argus 13/7 /93) 
Third Force type activity has made its presence felt all over the country. Involvement during 
the "taxi-·war" in the Western Cape was also alleged and Third Force elements have been 
compared to the "balaclavas" who rob shops in Western Cape tovmships. Vigilante action in 
the KTC squatter camp in 1986 and present violence in crossroads has been linked to this 
elusive - Third Force. During an independent investigation conducted in Khayelitsha during 
1992, some of these issues were raised. Whilst probing the effect of violence and the taxi-war 
on informal, small business activity, several residents confirmed suspicions of external 
involvement in tovmship violence. 
2.2.2 (b) Who gains from "Third Force" activity? 
Any attempt to uncover the membership of the CCB or other Third Force hit squads needs to 
address the issue of who benefits from their activities. Activity of this nature serves to vviden 
divisions within communities and also between them. In other words it deepens divisions 
previously created by apartheid. Lloyd Vogelman from the Centre for the Study of Violence at 
Wits University, claims that the government, the far right, Inkatha, ANC and the legacy of 
apartheid all played a role in Reef violence. In his opinion, the righming and Inkatha 
benefitted the most, as did conservative elements within the government and its structures. He 
states that, 
'\dth the townships in a state of anarchy, one result v,,ould be increased difficulty 
for the government to continue its reform package." (Back to the Laager, 
1991: 121) 
Fear and insecurity is bred in the tO\\TIShips as a result of continued attacks by unkno,\11 
assailants. In the process the ANC is often discredited and is seen to represent the interests of a 
single etlmic group. The ANC is also internally pressurized to resume the am1ed struggle to 
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protect members and communities. Whites come to ,·iew Inkatha as a potential ally against the 
ANC. In_ a sense fighting in the townships is exploited by conservatives within the white 
conununity. Despite claims of the police stoking violence, in the final instance violence of this 
nature "proves to v.:hites that blacks are unable to govern." Vogelman claims that Inkatha's 
status is elevated in the process. Frightened whites may join rightv.1ing groups in response. The 
credibility of Inkatha as opposed to the ANC is highly signifacant ,vhen considered in terms of 
possible alliances between conservati\'es. It thus appears that continued fighting in the 
townships indirectly serves the interests of the ruling National Party and its allies, even more 
than it does the rightv.ring. The state comes out on top and appears like the voice of reason in 
the midst of chaos. 
Allegations of the state benefitting from the violence and instability that characterizes many 
tovvnships should be seen in the conte>..1: of state reaction to these activities. The international 
press has often mentioned the fact that the highly competent South African Police Force has a 
poor record of solving political crimes and assassinations (Newsweek; The Guardian) 1bis 
view is supported by local analysts who note that the rightwing has been charged for fewer 
crimes than anti-apartheid activists committing similar crimes. When convicted their penalties 
are considerably lov,,er. (Back to the Laager, 1991:114) claim that, 
"the state has not used the repressive laws at its disposal to smash the rightwing in 
the same way that it tried to destroy progressive organizations. It has failed to use 
the ordina,y criminal laws to act against the rightwing. .. " 
Rightv.ing "hit-squads" have also been linked to a number of assassinations of key activists on 
the left. Initially these accusations ,vere based purely on speculation, but since the uncovering 
. of the CCB and the confessions of its members this is no longer so. Victims of these attacks 
include human rights campaigners, anti-apartheid actiYists and the like. The attacks were ,ve 11 
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planned and the assailants \:Vere never apprehended. Statisti~s on politically motivated 
assassinations lent credibility to the confessions of Coetzee and other CCB members. 
Newsweek ( 13/11 /89) reports that at least 45 opponents of apartheid had been assassinated by 
1989. 
These include Rick Turner (1978), Matthew Goniwe (1985) and David Webster (1989). 
Newsweek commented that only one of these cases was solved in 12 years by the police. 
Compared to the outstanding success figures of between 50-80% for nonnal crimes, this is 
highly suspicious. Despite refonnist rhetoric, elements \\ithin the state are clearly sympathetic 
to the rightwing and are unwilling to act against them because the existence of the rightwing 
and its propensity to violence, serves the medium and long-term interest of the state. Terrorism 
on the part of the ultra-right adds to the overall climate of fear and violence that characterizes 
South African society and ultimately serves to strengthen the state's hand in negotiations. 
The white ultra right's potential for violence cannot be underestimated. The existence of 
structures aimed at · destabilizing the country, and those intended to protect white interests 
above all confirms these suspicions. A change in rightwing policy has undoubtably taken place 
and violence is increasingly being viewed as inevitable and even morally justifiable. This shift 
has dire consequences for the entire country and should be taken seriously. 
The follo\1,ing Chapter \1,ill highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the rightv.ring, by 
identifying common themes as well as divergences in opinion within the movement. The 
rightwing' s potential for growth will be assessed. Particular attention will be paid to the role 
played by the state in failing to recognize and contain the threat posed by the righn1,fog. The 
necessity and the ability of the rightwing to forge alliances will be also discussed. 
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER T\VO 
Jurgens White and Jurgens Grobbellaar, allegedly commit1ed sucide after being 
cornered by police in the Northern Cape. Both were fanatical CoC members. 
2 Derby-Lewis and co-conspirator Januz Walus were found guilty of murdering SACP 
leader Chris Hani in May 1993. 
3 This has susequently been denied. 
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CHAPTER 3 
This chapter focusses on the divisions and points of convergence within the rightwing movement. 
In the light of increased activity on the part of the ultra right in recent years, it is necessary to 
W1cover the strengths and weaknesses of the movement as a whole. Rightwing activity over the 
past few years reflects a hardening of white attitudes. A shift in loyalties has occured, and the 
National Party is losing a significant measure of support amongst the white electorate. A wide 
range of people, ranging from the Conservative Party to Zac de Beer of the Democratic Party and 
political analyst Willem KJeynhans and agree v.-ith this prognosis. (Daily Telegraph 31/1/91). van 
Rooyen (1992) draws similar conclusions and is in disagreement v..ith Swilling and Schlemmer 
who argue that a "liberalization of whites" has taken place. 
This alleged liberalization of whites has thus, in their opinion, contributed to the decline in support 
for the rightwing. The e>..'tent to which has taken place is debatable, but Swilling (1987); 
Schlemmer (1989),and Lipton (1986) are convinced of this. Swilling argues that there has been a 
swing to the left and not to the right in South African politics since 1982. In terms of his definition, 
rightwing does not include the ruling NP who has accepted the inevitability of power~sharing and 
black majority rule. 
A "liberalisation of whites" may have occured; people who voted for the DP ( or the PFP) may 
now vote A.1">\JC and those who previously voted NP may now vote DP. Hov,1ever it seems W1likely 
in the light of current socio-econmic circW11stances that those who previously supported the CP, 
A \VB or HNP are now votin2. DP or ANC. at most thev mav vote NP and even this is doubtful. 
- . ., .. 
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ln my opinion, the liberalization of whites identified by Swilling and Schlemmer is minimal. On 
the contrary, (as discussed in the previous Chapter of this thesis), the current social and political 
environment in this country is conducive to a growth in righn.ving support. Fieldwork, albeit 
limited, confirmed the hardening of attitudes argument. A significant shift in attitudes among 
respondents occurred between 1988 and 1990, which demonstrated the validity of this claim. 
\\lhen interviewed in 1987\8 certain respondents '"''ere reluctant to discontinue support for the NP 
despite policy changes, but by 1990, these views had changed. The same respondents, once loyal 
to the NP, were now looking to the right\ving for political guidance. Thus, when interviewed a 
second time in 1990, after the unbanning of the ANC and the SACP, and the opening of the NP to 
all races, several of them had joined the CP and/or the AWB. 
The upsurge in rightwing organizations and activity should be viewed in the contex't of white needs 
and interests. As white fears intensify, increasingly numbers of white voters can be expected to 
identify with rightwing policies which bolster insecurities. In order to assess the potential impact of 
the rightwing as a social movement, the strengths and weaknesses of the movement need to be 
detennined. This can only be accomplished if the shared attributes, as well as the divergences 
within the movement are outlined. 
3.1. POTENTIAL STRENGTHS OF THE RIGHTWING\ FACTORS CONTRIBUTING 
TO ITS GROWTH: 
3.1.1 Points of convergence\ Shared attributes: 
Despite the diversity of organi~tional and ideological fonns contained within the righn.ving 
movement, they do share certain socio-political and philosophical perceptions. van Rooyen 
(1992:72) argues that divisions within the rightwing are not differences as such and should rather 
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be seen as constituting different expressions of the demand for Afrikaner and white self-
detern1ination. 
Among these shared perceptions is the recognition that the NP has abandoned them and in this way 
has deviated from previous political and ideological formations and has "sold-out" to material 
considerations. The policy of the current government is thus integrally linked to the increase in 
support for the rightwing. In particular, it is the reform programme of the l\TP that has contributed 
to the gmwth of righrning parties. de K.lerks' reforms encountered resistance from the white right 
from the outset. According to Dr Dirk Kotze (SA Freedom Review, 1988, vol2(1):47); 
"many whites are certain that the NP won't fight for ·white rights. In their opinion, 
the NP had become estranged .ft-om the ideals and visions of the Afrikaners and 
other whites. " 
Righnvingers accuse the government of betraying white workers and of "creating a welfare state 
for blacks" and blame the government for the current economic recession. (Sweepslag, 1989/91 ). 
This attitude was expressed on several occasions during my field-work. A mine-worker 
interviewed claimed that the NP had sold them out to Anglo American. 
"n1e situation as it stands is like this ... blacks are allowed blasting certificates and 
are moving up in the mines. I mean, now they think they can use our canteens and 
toilets!. The English in Anglo don't care - they've always been the liberal kaffir-
boeties. As long as they make money they 're happy; and we have to take the chance 
of getting AIDS. Us Afrikaners have to stand together to avoid being completely 
swamped".(Welkom, December, 1990) 
This sentiment \\'as echoed by various respondents, including workers, churcn leaders, rank and 
file membership of political parties and trade un10n officials. A train-driver and Spoorbond 
member summed it up; 
"many whites are being replaced by blacks and this makes people afraid of losing 
their jobs. Before we were sure that being a driver was a white man's job, now it's 
different. Sometimes I think that they '1'al1! us out just to put blacks in. .. the economy 
H·ould impro,·e f they kept our jobs 11·hite ... now they have to spend money making 
1hejob easier so ,hat ,hey (the blacks) can do it . .. (Kimberley, December, 1990). 
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Workers belonging to another white union, Yster en Staal expressed similar opinions. 111e san1e 
fears relating to job security were apparent. The situation was no different an1ongst members of the 
MWU. Another respondent expressed his fears for the white youth; 
"It's the younger ones who are affected ... they must compete with blacks, who 
outnumber them,for ,rork" (Welkom, December, 1990). 
A miner claims that; 
"the blacks are being pushed in everywhere, once they 're in then they 're protected 
wildlife". (Kimberley, December, 1990) 
Many of the respondents felt that they had little stake in the future of this country, 
"the white man has no future - our kids even less. I won't see the real problems like 
they will. (Welkom, December, 1990) 
CJ Jooste of the Grootraad (Great Council) of the A WB, states that; 
"the Afrikaner working man and the farmer and the middle and lower classes 
generally feel that the government has deserted them. They believe that their 1-vork 
and status relative to blacks (in short their futures) are in jeopardy. They face 
unemployment and sequestration, have experienced black unionism first-hand and 
feel at a disadvantage when comparing their own situation to that of black 
workers." (SA Freedom Review, Vol 2(1), 1988).1 
The ultra right agrees on one thing, the N .P. has compromised itself irrevocably and has in a sense 
"sold out" to the black, communist onslaught. The pass laws, influ.x control, job reservation on the 
mines were all designed to favour and protect the white man in the labour market, hence the 
scrapping of these la\vs has led many whites (especially those directly affected, the working-class) 
to conclude that the NP has forgotten them and that they will no longer be favoured as they were in 
the past. 
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Although the lov,1er echelons of white society are extremely threatened by changes in the work-
place and in terms of the state's economic policy, these anxieties are not the only ones influencing 
white opinion. Psychological insecurities are crucial in moulding perceptions. (See Chapter Five). 
Undoubtedly whites will be adversely affected by black economic advancement and the various 
affirmative action progranunes being implemented, but their fears run much deeper than on a 
material level. The fear of integration with blacks is not a materially grounded fear, since the 
sharing of amenities will not threaten the survival of the \Vhite population group. It is 
understandable that those whites who have no skills and formal education are aware of the fact that 
in the future, it will be difficult for them to compete on the labour market \Vith blacks. However 
those whites who have secure jobs and experience, education and a high level of skill are also 
threatened, even though their position is not directly threatened. White fears extend beyond 
economics and relate to psychological insecurities, which cannot simply be eliminated by material 
I 
advancement. Many of these whites fear for their physical safety and for their continued existence 
as a distinct and separate ethnic group. 
The notion of white supremacy and the "culture of whiteness" espoused by the rightwing, have 
served to entice other like-minded non-Afrikaans speaking whites into the movement. The 
righnving has on several occasions expressed its willingness to compromise for the purpose of 
ensuring other white support and elements of Afrikaner Nationalism may have to sacrificed for this 
purpose. The issue of white survival has in a sense surpassed Afrikaner Nationalism in terms of 
importance. 
The white rightwing. despite cleavages and differences in policy has similar economic ideals. Most 
righnving parties favour some sort of dual-economy and are in favour of protection of minority 
(white) rights in the work-place. In this way they favour a type of "aparrheid capitalism·· with 
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,velfare benefits for ,vhites. A combination of capitalism and state socialism (not unlike national 
socialism) is favoured. 
At a BBB meeting, Cape Town, 1988, Professor Schabort divulged his organizations beliefs about 
the causes of the current economic recession. His conclusions were not unlike those drawn by 
Hitler and the Nazi Party during the Second World War. Members of the audience voiced their 
opinions in this regard and the general sentiment was that, 
"We must root out the Jewish controlled money capital and ensure that the white 
race group is able to enjoy the privileges it deserves. 1Ve cannot let the pro-black 
communists and the greedy Jewish capitalists control our economy; if they do only 
the white race will suffer. Our forefathers built this counny and contributed to its 
civilization and if we are to prosper, we need to institute measures to ensure that 
this is done. " (BBB speaker, Cape Town public meeting, 1988). 
When a heckler from the audience questioned this apparent contradiction, the speaker and Schabort 
pointed out that unlike communism, their form of socialism, National Socialism did not foster the 
economic aspirations of all people, only those deserving and biologically superior. These measures 
were necessary to ensure that the "superior races" survive in the midst of chaos and a huge 
"genetically irresponsible" black population. 
Righnving groups are generally aggressively anti-communist and anyone who disagrees with them 
is branded a "communist". Since they disapprove of any type of "foreign meddling" in the 
domestic policies of South Africa, foreign investment has to be "monitored and carefully 
. . 
controlled''.(Back to the Laager, 1991:41 ). Righnvingers in this country are very \\'ary of the 
"geld-mag" or the international money powers who are the enemies of nationalism. In tem1s of 
black labour, some rightwingers favour a policy of "guest-workers··, similar to the situation ,J..ith 
Turkish labour in Germany or the migrant labour system in this country before the repeal of the 
Pass Lav;s. Others argue that whites must be prepared to do their 0,,11 work and claim that it is a 
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"lie that the South African economy is permanently depende,;t on 11011-,rhite labour". (BBB 
publication, 1987 /8). 2 
Most of the rightwing groups in this country support the idea of establishing a "volkstaat ", even if 
they do not agree as to ,vhere the proposed homeland's boundaries should be drawn. (This will be 
discussed further on in this Chapter, where divisions within the movement are identified). 
Many of the above mentioned factors shared by most of the rightwing groups have indirectly 
contributed to the strength of the movement as a whole. The rightwing has in this way grown 
because of the shared perceptions of its supporters to circumstances, both internal and external. 
Whether or not the rightwing movement is "united" in terms of principles and policy objectives is 
debatable. The white rightwing has made several attempts in recent years to co-ordinate efforts and 
programmes of action. Membership of the \\'ide variety of rightwing organizations binds 
supporters together. In order to realize short-term goals, the rightwing may be able to reconcile -
ideological differences for political pw-poses. The extent of rightv.ing unity will be exposed once 
the TEC is instituted and the new govenunent assumes power. Those who favour "war" as 
opposed to negotiation and reconciliation 'will be separated from those unwilling to engage in 
violent confrontation. 
Afrikaner Nationalism, despite cleavages, did maintain a· sufficient measure of unity at particular 
stages in history in order to realize particular goals. On a parliamentary level, ri~htv.ring parties, the 
CP and the HNP have not managed to forge such a unity. The A WB attempted to smooth out 
difference between these t,vo parties, but to little avail. During the 1987 election, the A \VB 
supported the CP, in a "strategic move to promote [our] parties". (Zille, 1987:60) This led Terre' 
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Blanche to conclude that, "without our s1;pport, the CP would not have become the official 
opposition". (ibid). 
The CP is of the opinion that the ruling NP has no mandate to make decisions on behalf of the 
wrutes in trus country. The CP regional organizer for the Northern Cape interviewed in December, 
1990 claims; 
"I would estimate that 70% of whites are anti-reform and anti-communism. The NP 
do not have a mandate and they 01ily won because they were dishonest. The CP will 
be voted into power if an election was called today". 
Despite exaggerated claims like the above, the righnving was unable to secure little more than 30% 
of the total wrute vote during the 1992 election. The respondent may be correct in assuming that 
the majority of whites are anti-reform and anti-communism, but it does not follow that they will all 
necessarily vote for the rightwing parliamentary representatives. Rightwing activities, (outlined in 
Chapter Two), have generated negative publicity and their credibility has been questioned by many 
white South Africans, especially those who are yet undecided as who to vote for. 
One of the main reasons why the rightwing support has increased in recent years is due to the 
nature of the environment in which it operates. It is an undisputed fact that wrutes living in the 
1980/90's have much cause for fear and anxiety, since they are; 
"materially poorer, less secure in their middle class homes and their manager's 
offices at work, rejected by the outside world and increasingly without a clear 
vision of their future". (Indicator SA, 1989:5). 
In an environment characterized by unprecedented levels of unemployment, escalating crime and 
spiralling violence, it is not difficult to see ,,·hy people are uneasy and feel threatened. Insecurities 
at work and in society at large; and a fear for the future, were expressed by all the respondents 
inter,iewed. \\l1ite fear and anxiety have played an important part in securing support for the 
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rightwing. As these sentiments are exacerbated, this support can only be expected to increase, 
especially since parties situated to the left of the NP, (and to an extent, the NP itself), have failed to 
address white fears in any meaningful way. Despite reassurances by ANC President Nelson 
Mandela, very little has been done to contain white fears. 
Political groups who feed off the fear of their constituencies can thus be expected to grow. A wide 
variety of political groups exist, each with their ov.n agenda and favoured strategy. It is important 
to uncover some of the mechanisms employed and highlight the nature of the appeals made by 
groups situated on the far right of the political spectrum in order to determine to whom they are 
attempting to appeal and how successful they will be in this regard. Giliomee ( 1991: 79) claims that 
the A \\TB has gained a strong foothold amongst conservative white constituencies by "exploiting 
demonologies of race" and has appealed to whites to "think with their blood". The idea of racial 
purity and the preservation of the white race and culture is intrinsic to rightv,i.ng ideology and is 
expressed by all groups located on this stage of the political divide. The A WB and the BBB have 
both expressed the view that ,vhites would be "committing suicide" if they allowed racial mixing. 
According to van Rociyen (1992:351), the most significant finding of research conducted, was that 
violence was the single most important issue that affected the policies of all political parties. The 
rightwing blamed reform for the violence and felt that more repression would alleviate the 
problem. 
Throughout the by-elections and the general elections of the 1980\90' s, the rightwing used the 
theme of gro,,·ing black assertiveness. unrest crime and violence to canvass white support. The 
fear of having their farms and properties seized is a real one, and is grounded in the recognition 
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that at some stage redistribution and possibly a nationalization o'f assets will take place. It follov.·s 
that the costs of protecting lives and property has escalated dramatically. 3 
Whilst it cannot be denied that affluence has led to complacency on the part of the majority of 
\Vhite South Africans, as economic conditions deteriorate, rightwing protectionist policies may 
become extremely attractive to those most affected by the recession, working-class and 
unemployed whites. Whether or not whites are prepared to make economic sacrifices for the sake 
of preserving ethnic differences remains to be seen. Many whites identify reform as the cause of 
their deteriorating economic position. A railway worker claimed that; 
"it ims apartheid and separation that caused some of our problems, but 
integration will, in the long term, prove to be more expensive because of the 
destabilization and unrest that will follow. African history proves this point. T·Ve 
whites have already made economic sacrifices for the sake of integration, so of 
course we will make sacrifices for the sake of segregation." (Kimberley, 
December, 1990). 
It thus appears that white perceptions are all important here; and if they believe that unrest which 
coincides Vvith reform is a result of that reform then it follows that they will be anti this reform, 
which in the final instance is seen to mitigate against the realization of their interests. When 
apartheid was alive and well they benefited economically , riow that its demise is imminent they 
are under threat - its not difficult to see why they favour the former policy over reform initiatives. 
Up until now they have had no reason to develop any kind of "class c'onsciousness "; ideologies 
such as nationalism and notions of etlmicity have been more powerful and as conditions worsen 
v,ill provide far more security (economic and psychological) for this sector of the white electorate. 
This is in line \\.ith global developments; as economic conditions deteriorate and social institutions 
breakdovm, many people react by joining fundamentalist and extreme reactionary movements to 
articulate their fears and an.xieties. This \'iew is supported by arguments and e\'idence supplied by 
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seYeral analysts, including Pierre Hugo (1991), van Rooyen (1992), and is reinforced by the 
findings of numerous research surveys conducted. 
The maintenance of extra-parliamentary links and nenvorks established by the CP will influence 
the outcome of the 1994 election and also the role played by the rightwing in a future South Africa. 
The potential effects of these extra-parliamentary strategies have become increasingly apparent. 
Righnving activity during the past few years have ushered in a new dimension to political activity, 
and the full effects thereof will only be realized when white power is finally challenged and 
undern1ined. 
External factors, like the independence of neighbouring Namibia, has influenced white 
perceptions. The rightv,ing ·assumed that a similar model would be used for South Africa. Other 
external factors include the continued "interference" on the part of the international community 
and the growth of righnving movements world-v.ide, ,vhich serves to inspire local rightwingers. 
The righming, like the NP before it has on several occasions used the strategy of referring to 
"foreign meddling" to v.in support. van Rooyen (1992:364) claims; 
"that the philosophy behind this strategy is the Zaager, a term which denotes a 
small, but cohesive group of whites with a just cause, facing a hostile and 
J . Id" 4 unsympat 1etzc wor . 
. Clearly it is difficult to establish exactly how strong the rightwing is. The proliferation of 
righnving organizations makes it problematic to gauge exactly how much support the ,vhite right 
enjoys. Previous election results, opinion polls and expert opinions seem to indicate that a 
significant percentage of ,vhite opinion falls within this category. In other words a significant 
number of whites favour the re-implementation of apartheid. Whether their motivation is 
economical, political, ideological or psychological is irrekn.11t at this stage. \\'hat is important, is 
6 
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that many whites still refuse to accept the inevitability of a non-racial society. The rightv,ring has 
made concerted efforts to gain a foothold in these white communities, and a wide variety of 
strategies have! been employed for this purpose. (See Chapter Two). The concentration of military 
I 
power in v,fote hands and the ready availability of ,veapons to whites, makes the movement a 
formidable force to be reckoned with. Clandestine activities embarked on by the righming indicate 
that the white ultra right may be a lot bigger than is commonly realized. The pervasiveness of 
organizations attempting to protect white privileges in this country is indicative of rightwing 
strength within certain regions. 
In certain geographical regions, the rightwing has made significant inroads and has managed to 
infiltrate regional councils, agricultural co-operatives and school committees. The strength of 
movement thus needs to be assessed in light of CP links with grass-roots organizations. Links and 
nenvorks outside of parliament, extend into broader civil society and increase the potential support 
base of the CP in particular and the rightwing as a whole. 
I 
3.1.2. The necessity and ability of the rightwing to secure alliances: 
The rightwing's potential for securing alliances is integral to the strength of the movement. The 
righming has reconized that, due to the increasingly precarious position of the social groups it 
represents, it has to forge alliances and collaborate ·with groups other than ,vhite Afrikaners, if it is 
to realise its political aspirations. This new trend in rightwing policy needs to investigated, in the . 
light of the increased threat combined forces pose to the overall stability of the country. Even if 
one accepts the assumption that on its O\VD, the rightwing poses ~o major threat to democracy in 
South Africa, it is crucial to reassess the implications of the right-\ing forging al~iances with other 
political groups and players. In conjunction with other reactionary groups, the rightwing represents 
a potentially dangerous and destabilizing force. Elements within the rightv,fog have expressed a 
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willingness to collaborate with conservative whites who are not "Afrikaners" and also with 
conservative blacks. 
(a) Alliances with consen'ati\·e non-Afrikaans speaking whites: 
The CP has constantly expressed its eagerness to secure English support. van Rooyen (1992: 136) 
argues that even the English-speakers within righnving groups agree to the primacy of Afrikaner 
culture and ideals in their struggle. This is supported by Bekker et al (1989) who believe that 
English speakers will accept Afrikaner dominance as long as they are rewarded with white 
prosperity and security. Prominent English member of the CP, Clive Derby-Lewis claims that 
patriotism should be the main concern, as opposed to a specifically Afrikaner Nationalism. White 
survival is crucial to both groups and an alliance can be formed on the basis of fostering these 
common interests. A CP regional organiser interviewed, claimed that; 
"the Umlazi by-election was important because it indicates a sway in the attitudes 
of English voters and the rest of white South Africa for that matter, it is their 
change in voting pattern that ensured this outcome at the polls." (Kimberley, 
December 1990) 
English support for the rightwing in general has increased in recent years. (Market and Opinion 
Surveys, 1991). This implies an overall hardening of attitudes and increased conservatism and 
reluctance to change on the part of white South Africans. Not all righming Afrikaners are in 
favour of incorporating English and other language groups into their organizations. Within the 
A WB for instance there is disagreement over this issue. Terre' Blanche welcomes English support, 
whilst Alkmaar Swart (Chairn1an of the Grootraad) objects to it. He claims that it creates an 
opportunity for elements "foreign to our people" to penetrate the A WB. (SA Freedom Review Vol 
2 (1) 1988) Carel Boshoff, belieYes that "it is possible to assimilate up to 5% of foreign blood 
without affecting a nations identity.·· Groups like the BBB, who do not have a specifically pro-
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Afrikaner focus, obviously encourage English membership. Professor Scabort talks of racial 
superiority more than Afrikaner domination. He states, 
"We believe in the genetic superiority of the white race and we be'lieve it is the duty 
oft he white race to stop the natural increase and the decadence of the black races 
fi"om destroying this planet. " (In Zille, 1987 :61) 
The BBB boasts about the fact that it has international links and support and that many of its main 
financial contributors are not Afrikaners. (meeting, Cape Tovm, 1988) Whilst several rightwing 
groups are willing to forge alliances with like-minded whites, not all are as keen to negotiate with 
conservative blacks. CP organiser interviewed claimed that; 
"the English can be politically accommodated. They came fi·om a similar political 
culture to rhe Afi·ika.ner, Western Europe civilization. There are thus cultural 
similarities. It is not a big problem to include the English because unlike the blacks 
there is no statuto,y granted English land as opposed to Afi·i'kaner land " 
(Kimberley, December 1990) 
An alliance of conservative whites is not v.ithout complications, but the majority of righnving 
parties have recognised the importance of attracting broader white support for their policies. 
Alliances with English and other non-Afrikaans speaking white conservatives have been actively 
sought by several rightwing groups in recent years. 
As members of the white race, they all share similar fears and dilenunas, (relating to their minority 
status), and a united effort aimed at maintaining collective \Vhite privileges seems probable. 
(b) Alliances with Consen·ative blacks: 
Despite the racially exclusive overtone of rightwing political agendas, individuals \~·ithin the 
movement have expressed a \Villingness to collaborate v,ith conservative b.lack organizations, like 
Inkatha. Forging an alliance with conservative blacks, presents another strategy aimed at the goal 
,, 
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of self-detern1ination. At this stage it appears that only a small number of pragmatists within the 
CP and "righrn:ing think-tanks" favour this approach. (\'an Rooyen, 1992:501) 
TI1e Afrikaner Volksunie (A VU) is painfully av,1are of the fact that it needs the support of other 
parties at the negotiating table if the goal of self-detennination is to be reached. Their chief 
negotiator Chris de Jager claims that discussions are already underway "in the Natal area" and 
include Buthelezi. (Weekly Mail, February, 1993) Blanke Veiligheid (BV) leader in Welkom, 
Hennie Muller openly admitted to being an Inkatha member. He has on numerous occassions 
proposed an alliance of conservative black and white South Africans to counteract the communist 
onslaught. (Back to the Laager, 1991) The way in which racist ideas are to be reconciled with such 
actions remains to be seen. At this stage, it seems as if elements within the rightwing movement 
are v.,jJJing to temporarily shelve racist ideas for the sake of forging political alliances which could 
prove useful in terms of posing a threat to the ~tate. An alliance of conservative ethnic nationalists, 
including the white rightwing, Inkatha, homeland leaders and other blacks opposed to the A.'t\JC 
would constitute a formidable force to be reckoned v,,ith by the new government. 
This sentiment has been echoed by the CP which has campaigned for forging alliances v,,ith blacks 
opposed to the ANC. 
It ,,,as reported in the Weekly Mail (1990) that both the PAC and the CP have made continuous 
efforts to "court Inkatha." It thus appears that in the long term, the interests of conservative 
groupings overlap more than they diverge. It is not a far off possibility that conservative whites 
would, despite racist attitudes, enter alliances with conservative black groups if they felt this would 
further their aims. (Back to the Laager, 1991:138) As Robert van Tonder, leader of the Boerestaat 
Party (BSP) put it, "politics makes strange bed-fello)\'s. For this [boerestaat] aim, ,1·e would co-
operate H·irh rhe de,·il. ., (Indicator, 1989) 
.-·.: .......... ~.,.-i..,;·· ...... 
' 
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Apart from alliances with organiz.ations like Inkatha, other black individuals or groupings could be 
persuaded to rally behind the conservative banner. Blacks who stand to lose their power bases such 
as homeland leaders, councillors and vigilantes could be lured into the conservative fold. The 
formation of Cosag should be seen in the light of this. Black homeland leaders have entered into 
this alliance with elements of the white rightvving in order to protect their interests and maintain 
the privileges accorded to them during the apartheid era. Homeland and other local armies could be 
utilised to gain control of specific regions or to create terror and division within designated areas in 
the advent of a transition to a non-racial society taking place. Networks of this nature will prove 
crucial to the success of the rightwing over the ne>..1 few years. In the same vein, the establishment 
of grass-roots structures ,vill play a key role in defining the rightwing's programme of action in the 
near future. 
Securocrats ,vithin the existing state formation could be co-opted and this would further strengthen 
the position of the rightwing. Militant rightwingers (including those stationed within the armed 
forces) have the means at their disposal to sabotage key installations and possibly the negotiation 
process as a whole. (Back to the Laager, 1991) Elements of the rightwing movement have made 
continuous efforts to secure links ·with international groups. Van Tonder speaks of a "contact list" 
of overseas people and organizations from ,vhom volkstaat groups will be able to obtain support in 
the advent of an armed struggle and/or in~urrection. A measure of both financial and moral support 
from rightv,ing groups globally greatly assist rightwing campaigns. Support from Namibia, South 
America, Europe, Australia and the USA is forthcoming. Of these groups and organizations 
supporting the ultra right in SA, a significant sector consists of church and religious movements. 
(Crisis News, November 1988) (The upsurge in rightwing religious organizations has been 
discussed in Chapter One.) 
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The whole ,vorld seems to be experiencing a revival of rightwing and fundamentalist ideas, and 
many of the events currently taking place in this country have been witnessed elsewhere in 
countries like Algeria and Mozambique. SVv'illing observes that prior to independence, groups of 
rightwing militants emerged, consisting of people v,,ho felt they were entitled to use violence to 
maintain the status quo. They had often been "brutalized by the experience of violence in fighting 
insurgents" (Sunday Star 20/11/88) 
The strength of the righnving should not be assessed in tenns of numbers or in terms of its ability 
to 'Nin elections. Although the CP didn't fare as well as expected in the previous election, the role 
it plays in dictating the nature and pace of reform in contemporary South African society cannot be 
ignored. Analysts like S·willing and Schlemmer refute these assumptions and Schlemmer claims 
that " .... a dramatic resurgence of extreme rightwing activity is not likely and/or possible at this 
stage, they are ,,.•eaker than the media claims." (Indicator SA vol 2, July 1984). He goes on to say 
that organizationally the rightwing is extremely divided and we thus cannot expect an effective 
conservative influence on our society. Schlemmer's observations are not entirely correct and he has 
underestimated the potential strengths of the rightwing since he has chosen to ignore· the 
movements potential to secure alliances and engage in de-stabilizing activities. 
Professor Janis Grobbelaar ofUNISA (1992) states that; 
"it is foolish to suggest that the referendum result has shown for once and for all 
that the ultra rightvdng is a negligible force in South African poli1ics ", 
to do so, 
·.· ·would be to discount the impressive track record, historical role and resilience of 
Ajdkaner nationalism in Sourh Aj1"ica. ''(Indicator SA vol 9 (3), 1992: 17) 
,, 
Her views are supported by Phillip Frankel who states that 
" ... observers of the right are not supposed to concentrate on the movements ability 
to win parliamenta,y elections, but rather to focus on its deep and intangible 
successes in penetrating the psychology, symbols and systems of meaning which 
make up the ethnic ingredient of A.fi'ikanerdom." (SA Freedom Review, Vol 2(1), 
1988:42). 
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Since the 1989 election, tensions within the CP have worsened and division into a "volkstater" 
and a "restanter" camp are visible. In Grobbelaar' s opinion, the former rebel camp ·will split from 
the core if unable to take control or make headway to realise its goals. If that happens, the party 
will be damaged and may even ''fade away" or decline in importance. Those individuals v.~thin 
the rightwing who are already alienated will be further alienated and those on the fringes would be 
freed. (ibid) She believes that an increase in militancy and politically destabilising action on the 
part of the rightwing can be expected. An upsurge in militancy and instability is a direct 
consequence of the above scenario. Her predictions are echoed by a range of analysts including 
Giliomee (1991), Booyse (1992), van Rooyen (1991) and Welsh (1988). In the wake of 
Treurnicht's death, individuals within the rightwing movement have attempted to forge alliances 
and prevent divisions from tearing the movement apart. 
The rightvving has made numerous attempts at establishing a measure of unity in .the past few 
months. Events on the political front like the mass gathering of farmers in Potchefstroom on the 5 
May 1993 are indicative of the movements determination to develop and unite .. Historically the 
farming community has supported the NP, which. was -the torch-bearer of Afrikaner Nationalism. 
Now that the NP has changed its course of action and the CP has taken over this role, farmer 
support of the NP has dwindled. Crop failures due to drought and the reduction in state susidies for 
farmers have left many disgruntled and they have turned elsev,.,here for political support. The role 
played by the white fanning community in South African politics was crucial in ensuring the 
,, 
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electoral triumph by the National Party in 1948. Fam1ers continue to play a significant part in 
white politics and it appears that a dose co.rrelation exists between support for the CP and areas of 
the worst agrarian disaster. Declining economic conditions thus contribute to support for the 
rightv.ring in this instance. (Welsh, 1988). Welsh observes how the rightwing has exploited socio-
economic grievances of this nature for political ends. 
In addition to this, many fanners are dissatisfied vvith the failure on the part of the present 
government to protect them against attacks from Apia and other insurgents. The role to be played 
by fanners in the near future is crucial, especially in the light of certain inflammatory statements 
made by both \Vinnie Mandela and ANC Youth leader Peter Mokaba. The chant "kill the boer, kill 
the farmer" is highly controversial and has along \\-1th the recent spate of attacks on fanners played 
a role in mobilizing this sector of the white population. Fanners have always opted for political 
groups and opinions that emphasize security, due to their perceived vulnerability to insurgents. The 
A WB has taken it upon itself to set up "border patrols" in regions prone to attack by Apla and 
other political groups. (SABC news 30/09/1992) Apla attacks motivated many fanners to join self 
- defence units and the A WB set up a Reprisal Unit (RU) after the attacks. The Israelite 
Liberation Army (ILA) was also formed to further this purpose. (Weekly Mail April, 1993) 
This historic meeting of the farmers which aimed at mobilizing the rightwing, ,vas preceded by the 
formation of a "Committee of Genera.ls". General Constand Viljoen, a former SADF chief and 
now a key member of the recently fonned "Committee of Generals" was the hero of the day at 
the farmers' meeting. (Sunday Times 9/5/93). The meeting of this committee took place in a 
building belonging to the TransYaal Agricultural Union (TAU). The outcome and implications 
of this meeting warrant further discussion. It was inspired by the belief that in times of crisis, 
Afrikaners haYe traditionally been led by generals. (Weekly Mail, April, 1993) Their ultimate aim 
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1s to establish a Afrikaner volkstaat. They encourage the rightwing to shift away from 
parliamentary politics to acts of defiance ranging from passive resistance to armed struggle. These 
ex-generals head a group known as the Afrikaner Volksfront (AVF) which was launchep to 
clinch unity for the rightwing movement as a whole. The A VF is determined to advance toward the 
goal of Afrikaner self-determination. Differences of opinion as to where the boundaries of the 
"volkstaat" should be drawn and also as to the role to be played by the ex-generals have yet to be 
ironed out.31 Despite these disagreements, the A VF could still consolidate itself in the near future 
as a major power bloc situated to the right of the present NP government. 
It thus appears that, apart from the obvious destabilization that would occur in the wake of 
increased levels of violence, extra-parliamentary activity on the part of the rightwing could have 
far reaching effects. Rightvving activity could affect the outcome of the election as well as the role 
played by the white ultra right in a future South Africa. The maintenance of e:x"tra-parliamentary 
--
links and networks established by parliamentary parties like the CP needs to be understood in 
terms of this. In a sense it is links and operations like these that have allowed the rightwing to 
partake in illegal activities without too much interference by the state. The proliferation of 
righnving activitiy in recent years has aided their infiltration of the state. 
3.1.3. Rightwing infitration of the state: 
The role played by the state in failing to curb righN,fog activities has indire~tly strengthened the 
movement. The white rightwing derives much of its ideological in-put from the same source as the 
NP, and sympathy for the former exists ,vithin the present state and its agencies. Splits that have 
occurred between the rightv,ing and the ruling National Party, should be viewed in the context of 
.. broedertwis ··. 
78 
• 
At this stage it is necessary to investigate the role played by the South African state in fostering 
and failing to curb righnving activities (which do not always fall within the ambit of the Jaw). Anti-
apartheid organizations, allied to the ANC, international pressure and heightened militancy on the 
part of the rightwing have done little to persuade the government to effectively probe right\ving 
operations. Up until now, no rightwinger has ever been charged with treason, even when publically 
declaring the intention to launch an insurrection. 
Prior to Chris Hani's assassination in April 1993,' the government had done little, despite token 
gestures like banning the BBB after the Strydom Square massacre, to control the right\\i.ng. Hani' s 
murderer and other prominent rightwingers were arrested and have recently been convicted of this 
crime. Gaye Derby-Lewis ,vas acquitted on all charges. One of the reasons why the state has been 
reluctant to react could be related to a recognition that the rightwing could provide a potential 
support base in an election, or that sectors of the white electorate not yet allied to the righnving 
may come to support them in the advent of the state clamping do\\'11 on their operations. 
Alternatively the state may be reluctant to curb rightwing activities because of the NP's historical 
determination to prevent further "broedertwis ". The formation of the CP and the HNP was rather 
traumatic for Afrikanerdom and exemplified a new phase in "broedertwis ". The rightwing is like a · 
''prodigal son" to the NP and this partly explains why the NP is so affected by the challenge posed 
by tne righming, even though the left constitutes a far greater threat to its rule. Adam and 
Giliornee ( 1979:70), argue alqng similar lines, and in their opinion, it is 
''the intraethnic structural constraints, more than intellectual rigidity, [that] 
explain why the National Party leadership is so h;pnotized by its rightv.iing . 
challenge, while it ignores its far stronger liberal opposition. ., 
Conf orrnity pressure is rather intense an1.ongst the Afrikaner group, and dissidents like the ultra · 
right contest the very foundations of the ethnic group. The state· s reluctance to take action against 
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the ultra right should be seen in the light of this. Then there is the more pressing problem of using 
white anned forces to quell white resistance. Righnving sympathisers exist within the anned forces 
and this could prove to be problematic in the advent of white insurrection. Division within the 
anned forces is the last thing any state wants to contend with and South Africa is no exception. 
As mentioned, the verligte/verkrampte ideological divisions ·within the ruling NP have existed 
from the outset. Certain of theses verkrampte elements have broken a\l-lay to form vital political 
groups like the HNP and the CP, but some have remained within the NP. The assumption that 
conservative elements exist ,i..•ithin the ruling National Party is shared by various analysts (Lipton, 
1986); (Giliomee, 1989); ( de Klerk, 1989), and (van Rooyen, 1992). It is virtually impossible to 
assess the scope and extent of these verkrampte elements within the :NP, although elements within 
the civil service have been shown to display their conservative leanings. Adam and Moodley 
(1986) and Lipton (1986) provide evidence for their claim that the civil service and the 
predominantly white state bureaucracy can indeed play a significant role in obstructing reforms. 
Civil servants in this country have historically benefited from the apartheid system and the 
dismantling thereof could jeopardize-their once sheltered positions. Civil servants' loyalty to the 
NP is questionable and Bekker and Grobbelaar (1987) claim that sectors of the civil service 
support the righming. It is difficult to ascertain the extent to ,vhich bureaucrats have interfered 
with reform initiatives, but ~ey are clearly in a position to slow down the process should they so 
desire. 
Apart from rightwing support within the state bureaucracy, the armed forces have also been 
infiltrated by rightwing sympathizers. Several fonner and present members of the SAP and SADF 
are members of righnving organizations. The government has repeatedly been embarassed by 
allegatio1:s in the media that senior officers within the am1ed forces have been involved in 
, 
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clandestine operations. Fom1er SAP Conunissioner General Johan Coetzee was apparently 
involved in "death-squad" activities, most of which were condoned by his colleagues. Only after 
considerable pressure did President de Klerk appoint Judge Harms to head an independent 
conunission of inquiry to investigate such allegations. The Harms Commission report proved the 
existence of approximately 140 CCB members ,vho were involved in at least 200 operations 
against government opponents. The disbanding of the CCB in June 1990 didn't lead to the end of 
its activities. (Vrye Weekblad, 17/11/89) This is not to say that the CCB was essentially a 
rightwing organization, but that the nature of its operations implied that members held sentiments 
and views of this nature. 
The CP has often claimed that the police are one with them and allude to the higher level of 
support they enjoy within the armed forces. (Zille, 1988) The Guardian newspaper (19/9/89) 
summed it up, "lll disciplined, badly paid and recruited.from the lov11er levels of white society, the 
police are considerably to the right of the government which is meant to control them. " Vvan 
Rooyen (1992:133) claims that: 
" ... the CP enjoys the support of approximately one third of the Defence Force, a 
large percentage of the semi-government sector anp possibly,. by implication, more 
than half the [white} police force." 
The government itself has expressed concern about members of the am1ed forces supporting the 
righni,ing. Minister Vlok specifically stipulated that members of the police are not allowed to join 
. 
political parties. During my research, a policeman interviewed claimed, 
"Its hard to say who the guys support, but many admire the AT-VB. The AWB protect 
life and property. In the next election I'll definitely consider voting CP and so will 
many others in I he force . . , 
He went on to say, 
"Some oft he guys still have faith in the NP, but most are unhappy, especially when 
our lives are endangered eve1y day and we 're not allowed to defend ourselves 
properly. "(interview, November 1990) 
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Another policeman interviewed refused outright to ans\ver any questions relating to his political 
affiliations. He stated that as a policeman he \Vas not allowed to divulge such infonnation. _(ibid) 
The issue of righnving infiltration in the anned forces is undoubtedly a sensitive matter and there is 
little available information relating to this concern. Whilst analysts agree that righmri.ng parties and 
groups do indeed enjoy support they doubt whether a coup d'etat is possible. This view is echoed 
by General Bob Rogers a fonner Air-Force Chief who acknowledges support for the CP, but 
doubts whether a coup could be considered. In his opinion support is too scattered and in the 
advent of such action, only a few officers would participate. (van Rooyen, 1992:497) Clearly the 
rightwing must ·wield some influence ·within the anned forces, since it was these "contacts" that 
enabled the notorious Piet "Ski et" Rudolph to steal a vast assortment of weapons from a Pretoria 
air-force base over the Easter weekend in 1990. Respondents interviewed admitted (although they 
may have been "boasting") to stealing explosives, tear-gas and weapons from their work-place, 
the armed forces or the mines. One miner claimed, 
"Eve1y day I remove a little bit of this and a little bit of that, and at the end of the 
month, I have quite a lot of stuff'. (interview, ]\Tovember 1990) 
It must also be borne in mind that especially in small towns and rural areas, the criminal justice 
system, the police, the courts and civil defence structures work closely together. It is not unlikely 
that elements from each may socialize together and thus be reluctant to act against one another. 
\\'hen conducting research in small tov.ns, this issue ca.n1e to the fore. Several respondents made 
reference to the fact that they knew policemen and people in legal office. !\fost seemed certain that 
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local police ,vould not take action against them in the advent of protest action on their part. A 
miner claimed that "they (the police) ate one of us. We are the white race group and stick 
together in times of trouble. " (Welkom, November, 1990) This optimism is shared by many 
rightwingers ,vho believe that the security forces .would stand by them in times of need. They feel 
certain that the police will not shoot them. The Battle of Ventersdorp in August 1991 shattered 
some of these illusions as the police reacted against rightwing demonstrators. The rightvving do 
enjoy a measure of support from the anned forces, but do tend to exaggerate the extent of it.(van 
Rooyen, 1992:498) 
The ANC has repeatedly expressed its concern about the "broadening netvvork of tighni'ing 
involvement. " (Argus 24/04/93). ANC spokesman Carl Niehaus stated that the arrest of Januz 
Walus, 
"has serious implications, since it cannot any longer be said that only a fringe 
element of the rightwing is involved It is clearly a central part of the rightwing 
establishment. " 
He added that the government must take some, responsibility since they created a climate in which 
the rightwing felt it could act with impunity.(ibid) The total lack of police .reaction when 
rightwingers burst into the World Trade Centre on 25 June, 1993 in a deliberate attempt to disrupt 
talks undef\vay further illustrated the State's reluctance to control rightwing activities. The State 
justified the lack of police action, by saying that they "were flying to avert a bloodbath. " Mandela 
. 
threatened that if de K.Jerk did not react against the righnving he would be forced to send anned 
members ofUmkhonto ,ve Sizwe to the World Trade Centre. (Argus 25/6/93) 
Another issue which may blur the distinctions benveen friend and foe is due to the fact that many 
whites who were once fim1Jy ensconced v,ithin the State, now operate outside of it, though they 
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may still wield some power within the state. These include ex-servicemen, ex-policemen and 
retired government personnel. The recently fonned Committee of Generals set up under the 
auspices of fonner SADF chief General Constant Viljoen exemplifies this. Rightwing sources have 
boasted that up to 12 senior policemen (high ranking and strategically placed) identify \\~th their 
struggle and will in the near future declare their allegiance to Viljoen's Afrikaner Volksfront 
(A VF). This public announcement has been delayed for "strategic reasons". (Weekly Mail, 
October, 1993). These high-ranking supporters have either retired recently or will be doing so in 
the near future. They will pass on inside information to the righnving intelligence networks and 
v,~11, in so doing, aid the righming struggle. 
Apart from the support enjoyed from the armed forces, certain key individuals in strategic 
positions of power strengthen the rightwing's position. Over the years, numerous conservative 
magistrates, judges, civil servants and the like have been promoted into powerful positions due to 
Broederbond tactics. Securocrats within the existing state. formation, have the necessary skills, 
resources and access to intelligence to help co-ordinate a potentiel programme of de-stabilization. 
It is no longer far fetched to talk of a carefully planned and orchestrated programme of de-
stabilization that would ultimately not only serve rightwing interests, but those of the state as well. 
It is in this contex1 that the spate of so-called "black on black" violence should be. seen and the 
"Third Force" activities should be contextualised. (See Chapter Two). The state thus has a poor 
record of acting against righnving violence and in a sense this type of violence follows in the 
tradition of apartheid policy and previous state action. It is in accordance ,vith the policy of "divide 
and rule". Ultimately black and ,vhite reactionary"violence strengthens the hand of the government 
which appears rational and moderate in comparison. 
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Rightwing influence within existing state structures are a source of strength for the movement. As 
discussed, there are other factors bolstering the movement. At this stage it is necessary to turn to 
those factors which serve to \Veaken the impact of the righting movement. 
3.2 DISAGREEMENT, DIVISIONS AND WEAKNESSES\ FACTORS INHIBITING 
THE GROWTH OF THE RIGHTWING: 
Despite the fact that rightwing support has increased in recent years; certain factors mitigate 
against such support. These include the lack of consensus on key issues and general ideological 
differences, the economic risk associated with implementing policy proposals, the lack of funds 
for campaigns and finally the unworkability of certain policies. The impracticality of realizing 
policy aims, such as the establislunent of a volkstaat in particular could severely debilitate the 
rightwing cause. Another divisive factor is related to leadership struggles and conflicts. The 
contemporary rightwing movement remains divided on contentious issues relating to strategy; 
whether to employ partition or secession, violence or non-violence. Other considerations relate to 
the question of whether to include non-Afrikaner whites into their struggle. 
In terms of ideological differences, it appears that the cultural and intellectual components of th~ 
movement have become inclined to question the morality of apartheid. This contradicts previous 
dominant ideological assumptions that apartheid was in fact God-given and thus condoned by the 
ultimate moral authority, the Christian church. Disagreement as to whether to negotiate continue to 
exist, with elements of the rightwing refusing to be pragmatic and reconsider their position.· The 
activities of the recently fonned Freedom Alliance are crucial here. This alliance of conservatives 
has reiterated its position and continues to refuse to negotiate the future of this country, despite 
anempts on the part of all other political groups to include them. 
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The overall costs of maintaining the apartheid system has in a sense weakened the rightwing 
cause; since pragmatists have counted the costs and on the basis of these calculations recognized 
the unfeasibility of retaining a system of separate development. Domestic reactions to segregation 
policies in the form of organized consumer boycotts as well as other aspects of "mass action" have 
taken their toll on the financial coffers of both the state and industry. 
By 1988 black consumers represented half the country's buying power. (Newsweek 12/12/88) This 
meant that the interests of this huge sector of the market had to be accommodated. In tovms where 
CP controlled city councils attempted to reintroduce petty apartheid measures, consumer boycotts 
cut into profit margins. For instance, in Boksburg, retail food-chain, Checkers reported a 50% 
reduction in business during the boycott. (Sunday Tribune 7/5/89). 
Van Rooyen (1992) conducted a case study to illustrate the effect such boycotts had on businesses: 
his study indicated that consumer boycotts of this nature had dire consequences which had a 
potentially devastating effect on targeted businesses. He quotes Boksburg businessmen, who claim 
that they are willing to make sacrifices of an economic nature in order to ensure the survival of the 
white community. Subsequent surveys conducted in Boksburg reflected a shift away from the CP 
after the effects of the consumer boycott were fully realized by the white residents in the town. It 
appeared that racial segregation was an unaffordable expense. The lesson of Boksburg was not 
learned by white inhabitants of tov,ns like Nigel; Mossel Bay; Warrenton; Bloemhof and Villiers. 
(van Rooyen, 1991 :377). 
A white businessman interviewed in Kimberley (December, 1990), who also owned a business in 
Warrenton, initially expressed a willingness to suffer economic losses for the purpose of white 
suf\·ival, but when intef\'iewed at a later stage he seemed unsure of his previous conviction. He 
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claimed that he was unsure of what to do, since his livelihood depended on the small store he 
operated and doubted whether political organizations would be able to assist him in the advent of 
bankruptcy. He stated that; 
"they [the CP} cannot take responsibility for everyone whose business fails 
because of the blacks ... they 're a political party, not an economic support group." 
(Kimberley, December, 1990) 
The issue of funding is crucial, since an inability to secure financial support for it's policies could 
hamper the progress of the righnving in realizing its policy aims. Attempts have been made to 
obtain financial support from overseas, but little is known about the success of these fund-raising 
missions. Terre' Blanche recently ,vent on a fund-raising trip to Britain and Belgium. He was not 
entirely successful and the National Front (England) suggested that the A WB take a course in 
public relations. (Weekly Mail, February 1993). The visit formed part of a campaign to solicit 
funds from rightwing organizations in Europe. Since last year the A \VB has corresponded ·with 
more than 200 overseas bodies in an attempt to obtain funding, with seemingly little success. 
However on the local scene A WB coffers seem to be filling up, since the organization has gwwn at 
a rate faster than ever since 1988. (ibid) Recent action by fanners and their increased organization 
may aid this process, as fanners decide to contribute financially in order to promote security. 
(SABC News, 5/5/93) The recently launched rightwing radio station, Radio Pretoria may accrue 
advertising money, which may revive ailing rightwing financial coffers. 
~ 
Another factor mitigating against the growth of the rightwing as a social movement, is the 
unworkability and impracticality of many of their proposed policies and programmes of action. 
Some of the policies aimed at structuring the volkstaat are virtually impossible to implement. 
Proposals range from offering financial incentives to "rolksvreemdes ., (aliens\blacks), to their 
forced removal and repatriation to designated homelands. Separate Development has historically 
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proved unfeasible to implement and maintain, and any attempt to re-institute it in the future is 
doomed to failure. Even if rightwingers are able to recognize the inherent weaknesses in the 
. system, they will become increasingly apparent in the future. 
Whilst the righming as a whole is broadly committed to the creation of a volkstaat, there is little 
agreement to the proposed boundaries, geographical location and constitutional policy for this 
white homeland. 5 Another issue is whether the volkstaat should be obtained via peaceful means or 
not. Boshoff favours the peaceful option, whilst the A WB and others see violence as inevitable. 
The CP's "hardliners" under the leadership ofFerdi Hartzenberg are detem1ined to ensure that the 
size ofthis proposed white homeland be in accordance with Verwoerd's grand plan. (van Rooyen, 
1992:437). (see Figure 1) It seems that negotiating for a much reduced volkstaat has acquired 
increased support within the CP. (Weekly Mail, July/August, 1992). It appears that the rightwing's 
territorial demands have had to be reduced and made more realistic, since the government and 
other significant parties involved in negotiations have failed to take them seriously. So, although 
there is much dispute as to where this fatherland should be situated and who will be allowed 
residence, most rightwing groups share this common objective. The demand for such a homeland 
or volkstaat must be placed on the agenda of the negotiation process, since failure to do so· could 
have far-reaching potentially destabilizing implications for a future South Africa. The volkstaat 
component of the ,vhite right need not constitue a serious threat to stability, as Jong as co.mprornise 
can be reached and their demands can be met. This view is supported by analysts \Vim Booyse 
(1992) and BM du Toit (1991), Grobbelaar (1992), van Rooyen (1992). 
The most significant factor inhibiting the grov,1h and apparent strength of the righting movement is 
related to the Jack of unity and also leadership diYisions in the movement. Factionalism, 
cleavages and a Jack of leadership in the wake of ex-CP leader Andries Treurnichf s death 
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indicates the extent of the Jack of unity. A crisis in leadership in the A \VB was also experienced 
and Terre' Blanche's reputation was somewhat tarnished after the Jani Allen affair. Terre' Blanche 
,vas not a key player in the fom1ation of the Conunittee of Generals or the recently formed, but 
highly significant Freedom Alliance. The A \VB realises that despite these setbacks, the 
organization still needs Terre'Blanche as a drawcard. (Weekly Mail, February 1993). Cultural and 
political leaders. have both claimed the right to lead the Afrikaner Nationalist cause. Grobbelaar 
( 1992: 110) states that, 
"traditionally, Afrikaner Nationalism has been characterized by extreme tensions 
between culture and politics ... these historical tensions are perhaps best reflected in 
the growing strain betv.:een Treurnicht and Bos ho.ff" 
Disunity among rightwing organizations has occurred mainly at electoral level between the CP and 
the HNP, and this rivalry has cost the rightwing as a whole, a number of seats. 
This Chapter has shown that, despite divisions v.ithin the rightwing movement, certain common 
them~s can \)e traced. Rightwing groups in some way or another espouse and promote a "culture of 
whiteness" and are overly concerned about "white survival" in a future non-racial society. The 
rightwing has become far less passive and there has been a proliferation of rightwing 
organizations. Common perceptions about the innocuous nature of right\\ling groups need to be 
reassessed in the light of these developments. This Chapter attempted to outline both the strengths 
and ,veaknesses of the movement in contemporary South Africa. The next Chapter sets out to 
discuss the historical and ideological roots of the present rightwing movement. 
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ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER THREE 
Increasing numbers of whites, specifically though not exclu.sively the working-class are 
feeling threatened by black economic advancement. Even white university graduates are 
finding themselves in adverse economic circun1stances and are bearing the brunt of 
affirmative action policies. (Weekly Mail, September, 1993). 
2 Volkstaat pioneers in both Orania and Morgenzon have tried to reduce their dependency on 
black labour with differing measures of success. 
3 The rapid increase in gun sales and the gro-wih of the security industry in general illustrates 
this. 
4 The symbolic significance of the laager, which is evoked in times of uncertainty and crisis 
is discussed in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
5 The volkstaat issue remains unresolved. Despite consensus that the volk needs its ovm 
place in the sun if it is to survive, dispute rages as to which land is to be the destined 
homeland. The Afrikaner Volkswag, the Blanke Bevrydigingsbeweging and the 
Vereniging van Oranjewerkers want to inconvenience as few people as possible, and opt 
foe desolate parts of the country, like Orania in the Northern Cape to establish this 
proposed homeland. , 
CHAPTER FOUR 
4.1 HISTORICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE CONTEMPORARY 
RIGHTWING MOVEMENT: 
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The previous Chapter exposed the potential strengths and the inherent weaknesses of the rightvving 
movement in contemporary South Africa A profile of the rightvving has been provided, and the 
extent of their support and the changing nature of groups and strategies in the present context 
identified. In order to understand the why the rightwing has taken on new forms of struggle and 
has undergone shifts in ideology, a historical analysis is needed. The existence of the rightwing 
movement in modem South African society can be traced to two sources; Afrikaner Nationalism 
and European fascism. Right\ving discourse in contemporary South Africa comprises a fusion of 
these two ideological forms, Afrikaner Nationalism which emphasizes ethnicity and group 
solidarity and fascist discourse which broadens linguistic boundaries so as to include all whites. 
Comparative insights can be gained by using the fascist analogy and this will extend the theoretical 
understanding of contemporary South African society as a whole and the contemporary rightwing 
movement in particular. 
During the post 1934 period, the Afrikaner Broederbond played an important role in mobilizing the 
volk and ultimately ensuring the electoral victory of 1948. The ideological orientation, class basis 
and organizational structure of the Afrikaner Nationalist doctrine after 1934 differed slightly from 
its predecessor. The NP split ii:to "smelters" and "gesuiwerdes" and it was during this post 1934 
period, that Afrikaner identity was actively defined and soyght. The foundations for these 
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sentiments, were built in the years following colonization and the attitudes of both Africans and the 
English served to reinforce exclusivist Nationalist ideas. 
4.1.1. The development and appeal of Afrikaner Nationalism during the Apartheid period: 
The first Purified and then Reunited National Party ,von the general election of 1948 with a small 
majority. Mediation by the Bond produced a shaky "hereniging" of the followers of Hertzog and 
Malan into the Herenigde Nationale Party (HNP). (O'Meara, 1983:122). This unexpected 
triumph at the polls has been hailed as a number of things: Moodie (1975) viewed it as a "triumph 
for volkseenheid and the civil religion of A.fi"ikanerdom," for O'Meara (1983) "it represented the 
victo1y of a class alliance organized for the pwposes of securing electoral victo,y ". Malan, the 
newly elected Prime Minister saw this as "evident proof of God's role as the independent variable 
in South Aji-ican histo1y and the protector of the chosen volk" (Rand Daily Mail, 2/6/48). 
The most widely held viewpoint at the time was one that claimed that the political slogan of 
Apartheid ensured the Nationalist victory. In a sense all these sentiments and observations were 
correct, although none of the factors mentioned are mutually exclusive. It was a culmination of 
political, historical, economic, cultural, ideological and psychological determinants which made 
the 1948 electoral victory possible. The power of the civil religion promoted by the Nationalist 
ideology and the direct practical intervention of the Bond played a major role in ensuring ,~ctory at 
the polls. 
"The roots of the l'iP vict01y thus extended back into the final years of the war, 
when the Broederbonders in the party,in churches, in cultural organizations, began 
to heal the disastrous schism of 1941 by lending their e,?ergies to common goals.'' 
(Moodie, 1975:256) 
Afrikaner Nationalism was successful in its overtures, because, like other nationalisms, it met the 
psychological needs of its target audience. The need to escape the total isolation and aloneness that 
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characterizes the modem social system is addressed by nationalism in its various guises. Afrikaner 
Nationalism effectively dealt with the psychological needs of the Afrikaner people during a 
particular period in history, ,vhen their position was threatened and when they were feeling alien in 
their own country. All nationalisms purpprt to unite people on the basis of culture, shared history 
and language, and in so doing inject meaning into the lives of adherents. Afrikaner Nationalism 
represents an attempt, not only to achieve material rewards for the volk [although these were 
advanced], but to meet their psychological and existential needs as well. The development of 
etlmic consciousness depended on "favourable" social conditions in which people could be 
persuaded to shelve individual or class differences for the sake of group mobilizations. 
Afrikaner Nationalism grew out of the dissatisfaction of the Afrikaner people brought about by 
British colonialism. The Afrikaners were discriminated against and they evolved an appropriate 
response to their position, that of national self-awareness. A belief in their divinely ordained 
specific purpose provided the rationalization for perceived "suffering". In an environment 
characterized by uncertainty, the nationalist myth makers were able to obtain support for their 
cause. They drew on several ideological sources to formulate the doctrine of Afrikaner 
Nationalism. (One of these is fascism, which is discussed in this Chapter). Civil religion provided 
· the basis for the religious dimension of the state. Apartheid represented the most lasting effect of 
the civil faith and in the post 1948 period heralded the start of a new Afrikaner revolution in South 
Africa. (Moodie; 1975:259). 
, 
Moodie observes that once the Afrikaner had won power, 
"the civil religion came to lose its bite ... was blunted by pragmatic priorities and 
rhe development of a bureaucratic party machine, these pragmatic priorities 
included the perceived need on the part of the ruling bloc to broaden its support 
base. "(ibid) 
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In a sense 1948 represented a turning point in the development of Afrikaner Nationalism. Social 
and political conflict on all levels in ensuing years, led to a situation where it became unavoidable 
to collaborate with capital and the rival English group. It was only once their political domination 
became firmly entrenched, that Afrikaner feelings of inferiority vis a vis the English subsided. It 
was not until the NP had been in power for a while, not until Afrikaner business had developed a 
measure of economic strength, that it became psychologically possible for them to encourage 
English support and collaboration. The concept of a Republic had the effect of bringing together 
whites of different language groups, which in tum affected the composition, structure and policies 
of the ruling NP. Verwoerd favoured establishing a Republic in which the interests of all whites 
would be promoted. Elements v.,ithin Afrikanerdom recognized the necessity of broadening its 
attitudes regarding politics, religion and most of all, business. 
The 1960's were characterized by economic boom and was also marked by widespread· and 
intensive social and political unrest. After the Sharpeville massacre, it became increasingly 
apparent, that to ensure white domination, the collaboration vvith other white ethnic groups was 
nfeded to counteract th~ threat posed by the heightened militancy of the disenfranchised black 
majority. Verwoerd came to agree ,vith Hertzog that "all whites must stick together." To preserve 
capitalist domination and ensure white hegemony, it was essential to collaborate and find common 
ground with the one time arch enemy, the English. The despised "Hoggenheimers" 1 ,vere needed 
and this collaboration once again prompted realignments with the dominant bloc. 
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A situation developed where the dictates of capital accumulation came to override the interests of 
\Vhite workers and agricultural capital (\vhose support was crucial in ensuring the 1948 victory). 
The NP had come to power by fostering the interests of agricultural capital, but it soon came to 
favour industry. In a climate of political and social instability, it became part of a wider security 
strategy to ensure the permanence of a stable black proletariat. The sustained economic boom 
which continued until the early l 970's, created favourable conditions for political and economic 
expansion. Capitalist co-operation and English/Afrikaner collaboration was to give rise to a whole 
new set of problems \vhich resul.ted in further splits and realignments. Afrikanerdom was never a 
monolithic bloc, but it managed to secure sufficient unity to enable it to win the 1948 election. The 
splits and fissures became increasingly apparent in the decades that followed. 
Afrikaner Nationalist ideology was not immune from these developments and the splits which 
ensued had profound effects on subsequent political movements. The verligte element encouraged 
English support, capitalist development and an overall pragmatic approach to all affairs, including 
racial issues. In the next two decades, these realignments took shape and the division between the 
two camps within the ruling hegemonic Afrikaner bloc widened and eventually became 
irreconcilable. 
The changing politics· of the NP have .to a large extent been, responsible for fuelling the fires of 
white revolt. This view is echoed by several authors including van Rooyen, (1992); Back to the 
Laager, (1991 ); Indicator (1987). The scrapping of Job Reservation, the repeal of the Group Areas 
Act and increased unemployment amongst whites,· coupled with the reduction of state support for 
social sen·ices and agriculture undoubtedly influenced the gro,\1h of the right-wing. On the ,,._·hole 
the political and the econon'lic position of whites has declined and much dissatisfaction has 
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accompanied it. Increased st~ggles within the Nationalist alliance led to a "failure of 
volkseenheid " 
Divisions within the party in terms of verligte and verkrampte elements came to a head and the 
latter broke away in 1969 to form a new party based on "pure Afrikaner prindples" of the old 
Gesuiwerde Party. These elements desired the old party principles which favoured the white 
working-class and agricultural capital as opposed to industry.(O'Meara, 1983). The verligtes on the 
other hand pushed for policy reforms and for the easing of restrictions of the use and flow of labour 
and for the limiting of state control over the economy. Volkseenheid withered away in favour of 
industrial development. Afrikaner business emerged as the dominant force in the alliance and this 
indicated a transformation of both the ideological and class basis of Afrikaner Nationalism. The 
sacred history and ethno-cultural consciousness was underplayed in favour of this nascent 
predominantly bourgeois class consciousness. 
Moodie (197 5) argues that class interest alone doesn't, account for the extent to which the 
principles of separate development are rooted in the Afrikaner's own struggle for ethnic equality 
vis-a-vis the English. Even if class alliances are re-arranged and rendered obsolete, notions of 
ethnic exclusivity and dominance remain. These ideas are not dependent upon class boundaries for 
their existence. On the contrary they are rooted in the consciousness of many white South Africans 
r:gardless of class position. · 
These cultural and ethnic beliefs did not disappear entirely and elements were retaine~ for future 
mobilizat.ions. The growth of revivalist movements in contemporary South Africa can be partly 
explained in terms of this. The ideas provided the foundation for the revival of pro-Afrikaner 
racially exclusive programmes of action in modem day South Africa. A revival of ethnic ideas in 
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the modem context has taken place, and this helps explain why rightwing politics have become 
popular amongst significant sectors of the white population. 
The NP has changed in tem1s of its class base and language composition. Ideological shifts have 
taken place and at present the NP is the vanguard of the reformist or verligte wing of the broader 
Afrikaner Nationalist movement. de Klerk's reform initiatives has served to widen the gulf 
benveen reformists and reactionaries (verligtes and verkramptes) within the NP in particular and 
within white politics in general. (Griffin, 1991: 160) The most traumatic experiences for 
Afrikanerdom were the splits within the NP which culminated in the formation of the HNP in 1969 
and the CP in 1982, which subsequently divided the Bond as well. (The political, social I 
psychological and ideological determinants which gave rise to the formation of rightwing political 
parties warrant investigation, and will be dealt Vvith at length in the next Chapter.) 
It is necessary to discuss the other ideological form which made an impact on white nationalist 
discourse in South Africa An understanding of Afrikaner Nationalism can only be advanced, if all 
its influences are taken into account. Fascism entered the mainstream of Afrikaner Nationalist 
thought and action during the 1930's and the 1940's and this has had a profound effect on the 
nature of ethnic nationalism in the modem era. 
4.2 WHAT IS FASCISM? 
At this stage it is imperative to discuss fascist ideas which penetrated mainstream Afrikaner 
Nationalist thought. In order to do this, a definition for the term is needed, so that it may become 
apparent which particular usage of the tem1 is employed for this discussion and so that the analogy 
can be effectively applied. As with most political concepts the tem1 'fascist'' is difficult to define. 
Laclau (1979) comments on the deficiency in the literature relating to fascism ,vhich remains for 
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the most part "empirico-descriptive" or else an understanding of the tennis reduced to a relatively 
simple contradiction. 
An analysis of fascism is essential to an analysis of social movements in this country situated to 
the right of the present NP government. This can only be achieved if a psychological/subjective 
dimension is added to socio-economic and political thought. In tenns of such a definition, fascism 
is a consequence of human alienation in a modem world and is a channel through which people 
express their fears and anxieties. Fromm's claim that authoritarianism was part of the search for 
secondary bonds to replace primary bonds which have been lost through modernization needs to be 
combined with political and economic categories of analysis. (Kitchen, 1976: 15) 
Kitchen argues that explaining fascism in terms of psychology alone serves to obscure its true roots 
and makes it difficult to learn from history. (ibid:16) He states that there are objective reasons for 
fascist policies and an understanding of them will help in understanding the dynamics · of 
prejudice.(ibid:21) Kitchen defines fascism as a phenomenon of developed industrial states that is 
triggered off by severe socio-economic crises which bring about fear and anxiety. Fascism is a 
modem political ideology which appears to desire to impose uniformity on the population within a 
nation-state under the auspices of a powerful leader figure. Individual rights are compromised in 
favour of dedication to the aims of the state personified by the leader. A strong state apparatus is 
favoured which protects the "unity" of the nation. The mythical, anti-intellectual character of 
certain political ideologies is enthusiastically embraced.(ibid). 
According to Kitchen, the social function of fascism is to stabilize and strengthen capitalism, and 
in this sense is comparable to conservatism. The use of ideology to deliberately manipulate and 
divert the frustrations and an.xieties of the masses av,,ay from their objective source 1s 
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central.(ibid:87) Kitchen is concerned about the term 'fascist., being used merely as a form of 
abuse. He argues that fascism is not produced by the 
"peculiarities of national character, it is not simply the manifestation of the 
activities of sinister plotters or sexual deviants; instead it is a social product which 
potentially blocks the development of .freedom of humanity as a whole ".(1976: 10). 
In my opinion, Kitchen's view of fascism is rather limited in that he ties it to a particular mode of 
production, capitalism, and ignores the fact that fascism, like any other political ideology can 
mutate and exist in different fon11s. Changes in circumstances are likely to produce changes v .. ithin 
fascist movements and a type of neo-fascism may develop. Furlong (1991 :239) applies this to 
South Africa, 
"the apartheid state would not, however be a pale imitation of an imported fascist 
model, but v.,ould draw on the lifeblood of a much older, indigenous tradition, that 
of Krugerism. The new state would be both republican and autocratic, both 
populist and despotic, both radically modern-indeed revolutionary in its massive 
social engineering - yet incorrigibly, even passionately reactionary in its 
determination to re-create the simple world of the old Boer republics." 
The apartheid state did not replicate fascist models from industrialized Europe; instead elements of 
the fascist doctrine were borrowed, re-interpreted and finally harnessed to the Afrikaner Nationalist 
mo.vement in South Africa To deny the fascist influence is to lose sight of the complexity of 
modem rightwing thought and action and obscures the historical basis for its development. Whilst 
it is inappropriate to simply apply the European model of fascism in its original form, it is equally 
inappropriate to reject it completely. 
Griffin (1991 :26) attempts to provide a concise definition of fascism, and states that; 
'fascism is a genus of political ideology whose mythic core in its various 
permutations is a palingeneticfonn o_f populist nationalism". 
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Griffin elaborates that by combining the tern1 palingenetic with ultra-nationalism a new genus of 
political activity is created, one whose, 
''mobilizing vision is that of the national community rising phoenix-like after a 
period of encroaching decadence which all but destroyed it". (1991 :38). 
Rightwingers believe that in the South African conte>..1 rival political ideologies of a decadent 
nature exist, and can only be eradicated by resorting to organized violence. These decadent 
ideologies include non-racialism, class consciousness, materialism etc. The rightwing in this 
country has clearly been inspired by fascist ideas since much of their energies are focussed on 
salvaging the remnants of the [white] "nation" from the decadence into which it has fallen. In 
order to combat rival political ideologies and the decadence they allegedly host, fascist activists 
develop programmes of action aimed at rooting them out. The recourse to organized violence as 
both necessary and healthy. (Griffin, 1991 :44). The fascist mentality is characterized by the sense 
ofliving through an imminent turning-point in contemporary history. In the words of Griffin, 
"when . the dominance of the allegedly bankrupt or degenerate forces of 
conse1iJatism, individualistic liberalism and materialist socialism finally give way 
to a new era in which vitalistic nationalism will triumph. "(1991 :44). 
The decadent features of modernity are being attacked in order to outline the prospect of a totally 
different type of society. 
The opinions of O'Meara and Adam (who reject the fascist analogy in relation to contemporary 
rightvving groups in this country) are dated and in the light of new groups emerging, like the 
Church of the Creator (CoC), the Blanke Bevrydigingsbeweging (BBB), the Afrikaner 
Nasionaal-Sosialiste (ANS), and the Israelites (Israel Vision Sect) their assumptions need to be 
reassessed. The growth of righmfog church movements in South Africa, is indicative of the 
infiltration of fascist type ideas amongst sectors of the right\\ing movement in this country. 
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Britain's anti-racism watchdog, "Searchlight" is of the opinion that the CoC is nothing more than 
a pseudo-Christian front for a Nazi inspired organisation. (Weekend Argus, July 17 /8, 1993). The 
BBB and other nee-fascist sects, like the CoC are open about their international links and their 
nee-fascist agenda. One of their most significant links is with the Swedish White Rebel Group, 
which is notorious for publicising its unrelenting hatred of Jews and blacks. (ibid). Both the BBB 
and the ANS openly declare their admiration for Hitler and his policies. 
I feel that valuable insights can be gained by using this analogy. Adam argues that the differences 
between contemporary South Africa and · fascist Gennany for instance far ounveigh the 
similarities.(1979:25) Both Adam and O'Meara believe that this analogy fails to shed any light on 
the matter and may even obscure a proper understanding of the South African system. Adam 
acknowledges on the one hand that a strong affinity existed between National Socialism and 
sectors of Afrikanerdom during the Second World War, culminating in the Ossewa Brandwag 
activities, but on the other hand claims that fascism has been so discredited that it no longer 
influences policy. He adds that "only lunatic fringe groups can now afford to adhere to fascist 
ideologies. " (ibid:28) Perhaps it is these "fringe lunatic groups" that have resuscitated fascist 
tendencies in contemporary South Africa. Adam's claim is dangerous because this label suggests 
that certain extremist groups are ineffectual and harmless, when in fact they may constitute a threat 
to peace and stability in this country. Both the BBB and the CoC may conceivably fall within the 
ambit of this definition.2 
It is important to realize that fascism has .the capacity for adaptation to its environment. The 
argument that fascism has been so discredited as to render it impotent as a political force, ignores 
"its almost Dandnian capacity for adaptation· to its environment". (Griffin, 1991: 146). 
Griffin warns that, 
"despite the failure and inhumanity associated with Fascism and Nazism, mimetic 
and new varieties of palingenelic ultra-nationalism continue to be cultivated in 
highly marginalized but vigorous sub-cultures in Europe and the United States and 
still play an active role in South African politics. "(ibid:45). 
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The strain of fascism which is prevalent amongst local rightwing groups has modified and mutated 
in accordance with social conditions. It is unreasonable to expect fascism to exist in its original 
fonn, as witnessed in Second World War Europe. It cannot simply be equated with the regimes of 
Hitler and Mussolini. The unique ethnic and political situation in South Africa has influenced the 
form in ,vhich fascist ideas permeate rightwing organisations. 
Fascism is thus not intrinsically a European phenomenon, nor did the fascist era end in 1945. Ultra 
nationalism can draw on a number of sources, local or imported, religious or secular. (Griffin, 
1991:156) The "seed-bed which South Aji-ica provides for fascism has become more, not less 
fertile since 1945 ". (ibid: 158). South Africa is seen as a potential home for many migrating 
rightwingers and for fascists and racists the world over, this country is seen as the frontline of 
conflict between "healthy" nationalism and the forces undermining it. (Griffin, 1991:160). 
A strain of fascism, dating back to the 1930's had been resuscitated in modem South Africa and 
negates any real need to import European fascism. In other words South Africa has an indigenous 
ultra nationalism which was historically reflected in the Broederbond and the Ossewa 
Brandwag. South Africa has historically proved permeable to fascist ideas, and the ideological 
dynamics of fascism ,vere revealed in the activities of the Ossewa Brandwag. The OBB was one of 
the most important groups to surface in inter-,var South Africa and drew heavily on indigenous 
ultra-nationalism. (Griffin, 1991: 159). 
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Bunting (1969:58) refers to Hertzog Prime Minister between 1925-29, who became increasingly 
convinced that Nazism was 
"suited to the moral and religious outlook of the Afrikaner" and that a "new world 
order ivas on the way''. 
The Afrikaner version of volks nationalism was incorporated into the law of the state by means of 
a political party, the National Party, which shifted to the right under the influence of the Afrikaner 
Broederbond and the Ossewa Brandwag. It is interesting to note that both Prime Ministers Botha 
and Vorster were members of both these organizations and after the Second World War, the Nazi 
inspired greyhirts merged with the NP. (Griffin, 1991: 159) 
Griffin argues that the Society of Orange \Vorkers who pledge to salvage the Afrikaner nation by 
establishing a whites only homeland, Orania, exemplify the purest expression of Afrikaner 
fascism.3 The idea of establishing a whites only "'homeland" \'Vithin the borders of the country, in 
which the decadence of the rest of the country could be eliminated, gives practical expression to 
fascist ideals. He notes that the more familiar guise of Afrikaner fascism is expressed in the 
activities of the A WB, in which fundamentalist Christian Socialism is laced with imitations of 
Nazism especially in relation to its anti-Semitism and ritual. It is no coincidence that the 777 
insignia adopted by the A \\iB resembles the swastika. In his opinion the A \VB is the best known 
product of post \\Torld War Two fascism. (ibid: 160) Griffin's notion of populist ultra nationalism 
desc~bes the particular variant of fascism manifest in South Africa. Jonathan Hyslop argues along 
similar lines; in his view the A WB, 
/ 
"displays distinctively fascist political characteristics, placjng it in 1he tradition of 
politics descended from the Ossewa Brandwag" (1987:399). 
He adds that; 
"the AWE bears a strong resemblance to movements such as the National Front in 
France or the MSJ in Jraly, which managed to translate a message fi·om the 1930 's 
into a revival of the ultra-right in contempora,y style." (ibid) 
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At this stage it is necessary to note that the persistence and intensification of the same structural 
contradictions, the same economic, social, cultural, political and psychological conditions which 
mrrtured this ideological form during the Second World War has led to a situation in which these 
ideas have continued to exist as a significant force in South African politics. Once again this 
reflects the readiness of fascism to mutate and keep in step with the times. 
An example of how fascist ideas have been modified to keep in step with the times and take a 
stand on contemporary issues in this country is illustrated by the extreme rightwings attitude 
towards AIDS and AIDS sufferers. In the minds of rightvvingers, AIDS typifies the decadence and 
moral decay that has come to characterize modem South Afiican society. Political movements 
overly concerned v.ith salvaging the last remnants of "purity" for the purposes of constructing a 
new social order have targeted this modem disease as an enemy of and a threat to the survival of 
the white race. A key slogan of the BBB states that "we'!/ all die of old-aids" [if racial mixing is 
allowed to continue]. AIDS is seen as God-given, it shows God's disapproval of the blacks and of 
inter-racial sexual relations. In this sense it is believed that the blacks are responsible for the spread 
of AIDS. A drav.ing in the Cape Rebel (published by the BBB, Volume 2(1), September, 1988) is 
headed "Rise above decay" and a skull with AJDS \\Titten above it features alongside other 
images, including a black man and a white woman kissing on a television screen representing the 
SABC. Opinions expressed in the publication also reflect this condemnation of AIDS and its 
. . .; \·1ct1ms. 
''The government has nearly destroyed the H11i1e nation by making deals ,1·i1h the 
communists and the blacks. The .'l\:p has let the ]e'1'S, like Oppenheimer take control 
of our economy. The liberals hare caused AIDS To spread by sleeping with rhe 
blach; this vdll destroy us and our culture, unless we do somerhing about it. That 
is why eve,y white person in this counlly shouldjoin the AWB and go for milita,y 
training; if we don't we will be wiped out complerely. "(intervie~, Welkom, 1990). 
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Fascism has shovm its tenacity and resilience and also its ability to adapt in response to changing 
circumstances and we thus need to take the fascist analogy, (despite its weaknesses) seriously. 
Although it is problematic to establish the class basis of fascism, there is agreement that it draws a 
large measure of support from the lower and working-classes. [Kitchen, (1976); Fromm, (1964); 
Wilkinson, (1987)]. Fascism is not synonymous ,vith racism or anti-Semitism, although both these 
ideological forms often feature prominently in fasc~st thought and programmes of action. 
4.2.1. The Fascist influence: 
It was thus during the post 1934 period that fascist ideas became popular amongst certain sectors 
of Afrikanerdom. These ideas permeated mainstream Afrikaner political thought and have made a 
lasting impact upon it. The 1930's and early 1940's saw the emergence of groups, like the various 
shirt movements which influenced Afrikaner Nationalism. (Furlong, 1991: 16). In Furlong's 
opinion Nationalists did on some occasions enter alliances with self-identified fascists. (1991:45)5 
For instance, elements ·within the nascent Nationalist movement who were sympathetic towarp 
Germany during the Second World War strongly identified with fascist ideology. Fascism clearly 
made inroads into South Africa and influenced the political life and thought peculiar to this 
. 
country. Similarities betv.•een European fascism and the South Afiican variant which penetrated 
the Afrikaner Nationalist movement can be identified. 
Patrick Furlong (1991 :47) notes that during the 1930's, .Tews came to be regarded as a threat to the 
economic well-being of the poor white classes. furlong claims that the "Hoggenheimer" 
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caricature symbolized these anti-Semitic sentiments. He goes on to argue that, in the 'years that 
followed, anti-capitalism faded almost imperceptibly into anti-Semitism, particularly in the new 
ideological climate. Furlong (1991 :54) gives nwnerous examples of anti-Jewish sentiment which 
followed Je,vish immigration. In a sense these years saw the birth of concerted efforts on the part 
of elements within the white group to contain the expansion of Jewish interests. These attitudes 
and ideas were carried through into the next decade and translated into virulent anti-Semitism 
which found expression in the various shirt movements. Furlong claims that in the years (1937-39) · 
a rapid assimilation of open anti-Semitism into mainstream Nationalist policies was witnessed and 
this led to co-operation between the NP and the shirt movements. During the l 930's there were 
clear indications that fascism had made significant inroads into other areas of Nationalist political 
life and thought in South Africa. 
According to Griffin (1991 :218), South Africa is one of four countries where fascism briefly grew 
into a significant opposition movement within a liberal democracy in a vulnerable transitional state 
· in the years 1939-43. He notes that 1945 did not mark the "effective end of fascism as a significant 
force in South Afi·ican politics. " The reasons for this are attributable to the persistence and more 
recently the intensification of the same structural conditions which nurtured it in the inter-war 
period. (1991: 160). Furlong (1991 :100) notes that; 
"the linking of Swartgevaar politics to anti-Semitism provides an important clue to 
the nature of the atmosphere in right-wing South African politics at the time. Jews, 
Communists, Liberals and Blacks were regarded as a single web of interlinked 
conspirators against the volk, a treaty strikingly reminiscent of theories then 
prevalent in European fascist order." 
The "one world" ideology put forward by Marxists is considered to be a force undem1ining 
"healrhy nationalism". The "subversiw·,, liberal, Jewish and communist web of conspirators fuel 
/ 
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the dissatisfactions of the oppressed black majority and tolerance of them mitigates against the 
realization of the interests of the "chosen volk". 
It is my contention that fascist ideas penetrated and irrevocably altered the nature of Afrikaner 
politics. Furlong ( 1991: 136) states that the outbreak of World War Two was instrumental in 
bringing to the surface currents of Afrikaner Nationalist politics that had remained submerged. 
The dramatic growth of the largest pro-fascist Afrikaner group in South African history, the 
Ossewa Brandwag, provided evidence for the claim that fascist ideas ,vere prevalent amongst 
Afiikaner groups at the time. Furlong (143) claims that; 
"the Osse1-va Brandwag was a South African symptom of a universal tendency in 
the J930/40's to distrust professional politicians and parliaments, as was 
expressed in the varieties of fascism and semijascism in Europe and Latin 
America." 
The doctrines of the European radical right made far reaching inroads into Afrikaner Nationalist 
values and this impact further reduced the chances for democracy in an already troubled 
society.(ibid:180) Fascism was able to make an inroad into South African politics as it was able to 
build on the presence of an existing native tradition. Afrikaner· Nationalism in South Africa 
provided a ready-made foreign example on which to model the ideological prograrnrne, 
organization, style and tactics of the local variant. (Griffin, 1991 :219). In other words the necessary 
pre-conditions and building-blocks upon which to construct fascism already existed in South 
Africa. 
Furlong compares the German attempt at social engineering in terms of rooting out undesirables 
to saYe the "pure·· Aryan race to the policy of Apartheid. This analogy has been criticized on the 
basis that the historical specificity of the South African social formation doesn't simply fit into a 
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model of fascism. In my opinion, the doctrine of Apartheid is comparable to fascist models of 
social engineering since they both attempt to restructure the world according to some "Grand 
Plan" and both attempt to root out the "undesirables" \\ithin their respective societies. However, 
these two ideological forms are not identical, huge differences between them exist. 
The modem mentality has spawned a number of ideological and political forms aimed at 
establishing firm boundaries between nations and nation-states and the events in Nazi Germany are 
not unique although they represent an e>.ireme manifestation of this tendency. In the case of Nazi 
Germany the Jews were scapegoated by the anti-modernist movement because of their incongruent 
location. (Batunan, 1991 :40) In the words of Hannah Arendt, the Jews were "a non-national 
element in a world of growing or existing nations. "(in Baumann, 1991 :48) The Jews were the 
"opacity of the worldfightingfor clarity, the ambiguity of the world lusting for certainty" (ibid) 
Apartheid in South Africa exemplified the modernity of racism and the attempt to reorganize a 
society in terms of absolute categories; in this case the damned and the elect, the in-group and the 
undesirable out-group or more simply put the Whites and the Blacks. Modernity threatened the 
solidity of old boundaries and the counter reaction was to try and re-establish those "boundaries". 
According to Batunan, "under rhe conditions of modernity, segregation required a modern method 
of bounda,y-building". (1991':59) 
Racism ,,.,as instrumental in the mobilization of anti-modernist sentiments and anxieties. In this 
sense modernity made -racism, as we know it today, possible. The Nazi Grand Plan and the 
Apartheid system (despite' considerable differences) can both be viewed in the context of 
modernity and its accompanying racism. Goldberg (1993:6) in his reYiew of Batunan's book 
compares the Apartheid "Grand Plan·· to that of the holocaust. 
, 
In his words, 
"Bauman forces us to reconsider the nature of Apartheid, its architecture -
redesigning the social order, the dehumanization of its victims, the deployment of 
the bureaucratic machine,y driven by instrumental rationality in pursuit of 
Apartheid's goals, the distancing between indfriduals planning the new society 
from those implementing it and those subject to Apartheid's policies, and the 
divorce of rationality and ethics. "(ibid). 
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In the case of both, racism can be seen as a type of ''social engineering". Modern racism and anti-
Semitism is part of the history of modernity in general and the modern state in particular. The 
modern mentality and modern social organization have fostered the development of extremely 
anti-social political and ideological responses to the insecurity and anxiety that has been brought 
about by modern social conditions. Racism and anti-Semitism can only be understood if they are 
located within a framework of analysis that deals with their modem source. 
The negative aspect of modern society, the unintended consequences of the pursuit of reason and 
rationality have manifest themselves in the various social and political movements popular during 
the 20th Century. The growth of ultra-nationalism and its more extreme forms, fascism and 
Naziism can only be understood in the contex1: of the modem era. At this stage it must be noted 
that some strands of fascism seem to embrace modem technology are anti-traditionalist arid are not 
essentially anti-urban and this may cause confusion. In this instance it is not the modem world as 
such that is being attacked, but rather the "decadent" features of modernity. 
Fascism in this sense represents an alternative modernism. It intends to restructure the world in 
accordance with tJ:lis proposed alternative, and in this way can be revolutionary. The restructuring 
of the existing racially stratified South African society in terms of the Apartheid Grand Plan 
exemplifies the tendency to ''modernize·· society. Whilst it may appear that the implemen.tation of 
the Apartheid doctrine represented a revi\'a} of antiquated ideas, quite the reverse was true. 
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Apartheid and the policy of separate development was revolutionary in that it restructured South 
African society according to this Grand Plan, even though it drew on existing and essentially 
conservative ideologies. The political energies of the nation, including the conservative and 
capitalist ones were co-ordinated by the ideologues. A new social formation "with a new ethos was 
born by drawing on existing patterns and restructuring these into a revolutionary programme of 
action. This is not to say that the Apartheid pioneers were 'fascists., as such, although they 
represented a form of "ultra-nationalism" 
Permutations of. fascist thought can be located within several righnving political parties in 
contemporary South African society. The origin of this strain of ideology dates back to the 1930's 
and the 1940's; the same formative period when Afrikaner Nationalist ideas became prominent 
within the South African social formation. These two forn1s of political thought form part of the 
discourse of the rightwing movement in this country. An understanding of both these ideological 
forms will serve to improve our understanding of the nature of rightwing groups and could also 
assist in assessing why these groups have grovm and whether they will continue to grow. 
The structural conditions and circumstances whlch fostered both these ideologies in the past are 
persisting and "will thus continue to promote the spread of these ideas in the future. Even though 
Afrikaner Nationalism has in some instances been diluted in order to achieve a measure of "white" 
unity, elements of this doctrine continue to exist. They only do so because in some ways they 
constitute an appropriate response to present circumstances on the part of this sector of the white 
electorate .. 
In the same way, neo-fascist ideas have resurfaced, and in some instances have increased in 
popularity. Fascist inspired ideas of this nature, can only be expected to increase in prominence as 
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we move toward a new non-racial social order. de Klerk's attempts to remove the structural 
contradictions which have characterized this society historically, could serve as the catalyst 
responsible for reviving and resuscitating fascism in this country. 
As more reforms take place anti-reform lobbies vvill react accordingly and this could result in the 
transfom1ation of \vhat presently constitutes a minority within white politics to a mass movement. 
This is not to suggest that a potential white "mass movement" could achieve its long-term goals, 
but rather that it could become a formidable force obstructing a smooth transition to a non-racial 
society. 
The next Chapter will outline the nature of ideology in general and nationalism in particular, in 
order to understand the appeal of such ideologies. The appeal of an ideology is directly linked to its 
ability to provide "meaning" for the people to whom it is addressed. The extent to which it can 
provide security and address the needs and fears of its target audience, ultimately determines its 
success in obtaining support. In order to assess the appeal of Afrikaner Nationalism and other 
ideological forms, embraced by the white ultra rightwing in contemporary South Africa, white 
fears need to be identified. The use of symbols to mobilize support is crucial, and the symbols of 
the white right v,.ri.11 be discussed in the light of this. 
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ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER FOUR 
1 Hoggenheimer was the anti-Semitic caricature of Die Burgers' cartoons. It was the symbol 
of monopoly capitalism in all its guises, and was thus also used to refer to English capital. 
2 The BBB re-emerged as the Blanke Nationale Beweging (White National Movement) after 
it was banned in 1988. Professor Schabert, ex-BBB leader has since joined the CP as a 
"scientific advisor". 
3 Orania is situated in the Northern Cape and forms part of the great scheme to create an 
Afrikaner\white homeland. It was previously owned by the Department of Water Affairs 
and is presently ov,711ed by the Afrikaner Volkswag. 
4 Tilis attitude was expressed in the movie, "The Leader, the Driver and the Driver's \Vife" 
( 1989), where righnvingers shared racist jokes about the spread of AIDS by blacks. 
5 Furlong (1991) provides a convincing argument in support of his claims. He is concerned 
about the tendency to reject the fascist analogy in much of the literature dealing with 
Afrikaner Nationalism. 
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CHAPTERS 
In order to understand why rightwing parties emerged in South Africa, it is necessary to uncover 
the social, political, ideological and psychological detem1inants that prompted the fom1ation of 
these parties. The previous Chapter set out to outline the link bet\veen nvo distinct ideological 
fom1s, fascism and Afrikaner Nationalism, both of which were instrumental in shaping the 
doctrine of apartheid or "separate development". Mutations of both these ideological forms can be 
detected within contemporary rightvving organizations. An understanding of the appeal of these 
ideological forms assists in uncovering the motivation behind rightwing ideas and sentiments in 
modem South Africa. Ideas are popular to the extent that they provide "meaning" for the people to 
whom they are addressed. Rightwing politics feed on the fears of supporters and in the process 
offers them hope and security. These fears are not always material or even rational. This Chapter 
sets out to uncover the nature of these white fears. White fears are extensive and relate to a 
perceived loss of power and economic privilege as well as a loss of identity in a post-apartheid 
South Africa. These widespread fears underlie the opinions of whites identifying with rightwing 
policies and programmes of action. In order to understand why a particular type of ideology is 
favoured by the white rightwing, these fears need to be investigated. 
The Chapter also dicusses the concept of ideology and sets out to understand why rightwing 
ideology is favoured in South Africa. \Vhy ,vas the ideology of Afrikaner Nationalism appealing? 
In order to ansv,,er this question the nature of the ideology and the needs and anxieties of the group 
to whom it appeals needs to be U11c0Yered. Afrikaner Nationalism has historically been influenced 
by fascist ideology (see Chapter Four) and is integrally linked to the apartheid system of 
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government. An understandtng off ascist ideology and the socio-economic, political, psychological 
appeal of apartheid helps in understanding the appeal of contemporary rightwing ideology. 
The symbols of the rightwing need to be identified, since it is often through the manipulation of 
these symbols that individuals are inspired and mobilized into action. Many of the symbols used 
by the rightwing today have their origins in Afrikaner myth and folklore and fom1 part of the civil 
religion. The extent to which they appeal to conservative white South Africans in the modem era 
varies. Most of these symbols have more meaning for the Afrikaners than the English, and thus if 
the latter are to incorporated into the rightwing, a revision and reinterpretation of these symbols 
may be necessary. For the moment, it appears that the rightVving is content to continue using 
symbols, with clear Afrikaner roots for the purpose of white/ethnic mobilization. 
5.1 WHAT IS IDEOLOGY? 
At this stage it is imperative to briefly summarize the particular conception of ideology assumed in 
this dissertation. Psychological mechanisms in some instances closely resemble ideological 
phenomena and an unders1:211ding of psychology can thus contribute to an overall understanding of 
the nature of ideology. Larrain (1979:4) in his discussion on the nature of ideology notes that, 
"it is possible to understand individual psychological mechanisms as having a 
collective impact which could be crucial/or the production of ideology." 
Although psychological mechanisms operate predominantly on an individual level, they can 
nevertheless have a collective impact which could prove crucial for the production of ideology. 
Jung argued that the; 
"neurosis of the indiridual can become the neurosis of society." (I 964) 
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Authors such as Reich,(1970); Fromm,(1942)~ Adorno et al,(1969) have attempted to explain the 
emergence of political ideologies such as fascism in terms of psychological processes and have 
tried to integrate such an understanding ,vith certain tenets of the materially grounded Marxian 
doctrine. Faber, (1987) attempts to do something similar in regard to the ideology of Afrikaner 
Nationalism. In his opinion, 
"there is a relationship between ideology and psychological functioning", 
and. . .Jungian theo,y in particular is relevant to the understanding of collective 
socio-political phenomena, mainly because of the role of transpersonal, archetypal 
factors in structuring human experience." (1987:48). 
Despite crucial methodological and theoretical differences, they agree that the determinations of 
the material structure of society are not sufficient to provide an adequate understanding of 
ideology. Ideology not only reflects the economic processes in society, but has also imprinted upon 
it the psychic structure of individuals. Ideology thus becomes an active force, a material power in 
humanity; it becomes the character structure of human beings, and the basic traits of that character 
are formed in early childhood (Reich, 1970). It reflects the material processes corresponding to the 
childhood experiences of people and becomes identified v,ith the human psychic structure. 
The same connections benveen psychological mechanisms and social institutions which have a 
bearing on the concept of ideology operate in the realm of religion.1 Religion is viewed as an 
attempt on the part of humanity to overcome feelings of helplessness and alienation and in this way 
it performs a similar function to that of ideology. Ideology cannot simply be overcome by changes 
in the material conditions of existence, since its roots extend deep into the human psyche. No 
change in society based exclusively on material considerations can ensure the demise of ideology. 
In order to understand the operations of the social process; both the conscious and unconscious 
forces that shape it need to be considered. A dialectical relationship exists benveen subjective and 
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objective reality. History is not purely a result of psychological forces \Vhich are not socially 
conditioned. Psychological changes cannot be reduced to an adaptation of cultural patterns, a 
dynamic active dimension is at play and this warrants consideration. 
There is no fixed human nature, although there are limits to its adaptations. Human nature is a 
product of human evolution and contains inherent mechanisms and laws. Once these are 
understood, only then can the implications of ideological phenomena as manifest by social 
movements such as nationalism be understood. 
Fromm (1942) argues that irrational, violent, sadistic impulses are an example of humanity's 
dynamic adaptation to social conditions which are in a state of flux. 1nis type of adaptation occurs 
even though it is essentially harmful to the overall development of the human species and 
jeopardizes the attainment of human happiness and spiritual development. Once these traits, which 
initially developed as an adaptation to social reality become entrenched in the character structure of 
' 
a particular group, they don't easily disappear. Human needs comprise both a physiological and a 
psychological dimension. In Fromm's words (1942:15), 
"to feel completely alone and isolated leads to mental disintegration, just as 
physical starvation leads to death. " 
Religion, nationalism, customs and beliefs all serve to connect humans \vith one another and 
provide a refuge from humanity's greatest fear, total isolation. · 
-
This view elaborated for the purposes of this dissertation is grounded on the assumption that th_e 
basis of all ideology is located in the psychological drive to find a sense of belonging. According 
to Griffin (1991: 194) this drive is fulfilled through the mediun1 of myths \vhich provide an 
experience of self-transcendence which immunizes people from the sense of isolation and 
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absurdity that otherwise engulfs them. In modem (secularized and pluralistic) culture there no 
longer exists any central all-pervasive source of transcendent myth. The individuals need for self-
transcendent myth under favorable historic circumstances is satisfied by a mythical form centred 
upon the reborn nation. (ibid) If the appeal of secular ideologies such as nationalism are to be 
W1derstood, the socio-economic, political, cultural and also the psychological determinants need to 
be investigated. 
5.2 THE CURRENT APPEAL OF AFRIKANER NATIONALIST IDEOLOGY: 
The appeal of the ideology of Afrikaner Nationalism needs to assessed, if its success in modem 
South African society is to be determined. Leonard Thompson (1985) comments on the 
exiraordinary flexibility of Afrikaner Nationalist myth makers and questions whether todays 
Nationalist mythology can adapt and be further modified into one that legitimates a policy of white 
sun'ival, since this issue is paramount under the present circumstances.2 Rightwing groups have 
redefined traditional ethnic exclusive boW1daries and encourage other white language groups to 
join them in the battle to ensure the sun1ival of the white race. The extent to which they will be 
successful, depends largely on their ability to provide a sense of security for white South Africans 
who are finding their culture, identity and hence their "survival" threatened by reform and 
integration. 
The political and ideological realignment ,vhich has characterized contemporary South African 
society has led to a situation where the state is finding it increasingly difficult to capture broad 
based support The "civil theology", an ideology which was popular for a significant period in 
modem South African history, can no longer fulfil the task it had previously. (Adam and Giliomee, 
1979:128). The exclusivist symbols of the past and the corresponding "civil theology" are too 
narro,v to provide the ideological fran1ework for a broader white sunival politics. 
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The language of pragmatism, reform and realism was developed by the ruling National Party to 
replace apanheid ideology, but this new discourse has alienated the sector of the white population 
selected for this study.::.Bozzoli (1987) views these new ideological overtures as an attempt by the 
state to refurbish ruling ideology in order to fill the "intellectual vacuum" left by the failure of old-
style Afrikaner Nationalism (civil religion) to sustain any kind of legitimacy in times of "reform". 
The new ideology cannot completely substitute for Afrikaner Nationalism and the corresponding 
apartheid system of government. The language of technocratic reform does not constitute an 
effective ideological form and groups situated to the right of the government have continued to 
attach importance to traditional symbols. 
The "new language of legitimation" 3 based primarily on rationally motivated concerns fails to 
incorporate the subjective component of human experience into its discourse. This "new language 
of legitimacy" has not been entirely successful and Verwoerdian discourse has, in many instances 
demonstrated its tenacity. (Posel, 1987). It is difficult for the new legitimation ideology to draw on 
identity-shaping factors, such as a shared culture, language or national origin, since there is no 
common South African "culture" (as manifest through religion, language or race) to draw on. 
Political culture in this country, has historically emphasized factors which serve to divide people 
on the basis of ethnic differences. Ideologies ,,,hich emphasize ethnic differences are thus more 
attractive to many whites in this country, especially those overly concerned with preserving their 
separate ethnic identities. 
The gro,\th of what Bozzoli (1987) terms "revivalist religion·· an1ongst sectors of the v.-hite 
population needs to be contextualized historically and is indicative of the determination of 
conservative ,,.,fates to incorporate traditional beliefs and symbols into modem discourse. The 
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rightv,'ing has continued to use these ideological remnants in the modem context and have 
J 
managed to attract a measure of white support in this way. Symbols of the past have been 
harnessed to the rightwing cause and have enjoyed a measure of success within these 
constituencies despite being virtually obselete. They have been successful partly because they have 
been re-interpreted and redefined and fused v..rith broader ethnic ideas. 
The appeal of Afrikaner Nationalism, like any ideology, depends on favourable socio-economic 
and political circumstances, which render the ideology able to provide meaning for its target 
audience. Afrikaner Nationalism in modem South Africa needs to provide security for whites and 
address their needs and reassure their fears in order to be successful in its overtures. Exclusivist 
ethnic nationalism and pragmatic reformism are both competing for white support, and the success 
of either depends on their ability to address security issues. It is questionable whether either can 
lobby white support in the long-term, but the former has demonstrated both its tenacity and 
appropriateness in terms of addressing white needs and fears. In order to deal effectively with 
current demands, this ideological form needs to adapt to changing social reality. 1bis purist, 
exclusionist culture which is contending for hegemony, needs to be revised if it is to play a role in 
promoting the interests of those sectors of the white population who favour segregation. The e>..'tent 
to which it \\ill be successful in their overtures depends on its ability to provide "meaning" for 
people, to cater for their needs and reassure their fears. 
Ideologies generally, through sets of symbols and practices enter and transform individual 
consciousness and in so doing secure legitimacy for the state. The current ideological discourse 
espoused by the ruling National Party concentrates purely on rational considerations and in so 
doing fails to take into account the irrational dimension of the human psyche. For this reason it is 
unable to broaden its support base to include white South Africans who favour more 
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fundamentalist emotive political organizations. Talk of integration and a non-racial soc."iety evokes 
fear on the part of the righnving who favour separation and a racially stratified society. This fear is 
not entirely objectively grounded and will thus not be contained unless prescriptive political 
ideologies recognize the unconscious source of it. Ideological changes on the part of the NP foster 
insecurities among those sectors of the white population who require social and cultural separation 
in order to attain a measure of security. The perceived political and economic insecurity of whites 
has cost the NP a considerable number of votes. 
Several of the respondents alluded to the lack of security provided for whites by the government. 
(These insecurities were diverse and will be dealt with at length further on in this Chapter). One 
respondent explained: 
"how can we [whites} be expected to vote for a party {the NP] which caters for 
black aspirations? We can't even feel safe in our homes, or at ·work. nor can we be 
sure that our child.rens 'futures will be any better. 
They {the rightwing] assure us that the security we knew in the past can be 
experienced in the future. It's obvious to us who looks after our interests" 
(Welk.om, 1990) 
All ideologies must to some degree, provide· a measure of security (material, 
emotional/psychological) for its supporters if they are to internalize it. In order to understand under 
\\1hich conditions collectives of people come together under the banner of one ideology or another, 
it is necessary to unravel and demystify the symbols and meanings peculiar to that particular 
ideological form and also the processes whereby this is rendered acceptable by its target audience. 
The use of ideology to deliberately manipulate and divert the frustrations and anxieties of social 
groups away from their objective source, is central to both Conservatism and Fascism. (Kitchen, 
1976) In times of socio-economic crisis, which bring about fear on the part of sectors of the 
population, ideological overtures of this nature are often successful in capturing popular support. In 
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a sense the same structural conditions that nurtured the development of exclusivist white 
nationalism, and even fascism during the 1930's\40's, are present in contemporary South Africa. 
The ideology of Afrikaner Nationalism wruch emphasized the unique and special destiny of the 
Elect was embraced because (amongst other trungs), it met the specific needs of the Afrikaner 
people. Likewise the injection of fascist ideas into mainstream Afrikaner thought during the 1930's 
and the 1940's was facilitated by commonly held perceptions that the wrute race group was 
superior and the interests of this group had to advanced at the expense of those who did not qualify 
for membersrup. 
Afrikaner Nationalism was designed to salvage the remnants of the nation and mobilize the nation 
into action in order to "rise phoenix-like" in the wake of decadence. This decadence related to 
growing urbaniz.ation and the racial integration that came with it. Similarly fascism contains a 
vision of the new nation growing out of the destruction of the old order. This vision captures the 
imagination of those who are dissatisfied with the old system. Ideologies which have an emotional 
matrix are seductive, since they provide reassurances and outlets for those fears and anxieties, 
which develop as society is subject to change. The notion of the reborn nation can, in the "right" 
historical circumstances satisfy the universal human need for self-transcendent myth. (Griffin, 
1991: 196). In contemporary South African society, a revival of ethnic nationalism is taking place 
in th~ midst of integration initiatives and in a sense constitutes a reaction against "modernization". 
(Adam and Giliomee, 1979:34). 
Sewral academics, including Fromm,(1942); Jung,(1969); Reich,(1977); Griffin,(1991 ), agree that 
psychological mechanisms, ,vhether healthy or not continue td operate just under the surface of 
modem consciousness to supply the affecting Yitality and dynamics of all political cultures, 
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ho\vever rational or progressive they might seem. The high level of secularization and 
fragmentation that the modem world generates has brought about waves of collective commitment 
to ideology in which some individuals get caught up in a kind of group mentality. 
The decay of religion and the rise of science has not resulted in all human beings enjoying a more 
rational, integrated relationship with society, on the contrary, in certain instances quite the opposite 
has occurred. An overemphasis on rationalism and individualism which is characteristic of secular 
culture has rendered modem human beings vulnerable to epidemics of psychic energy channelled 
no longer into religious, but into secular cults based on cultural and political ideology or what Jung 
simply called "isms". (Griffin, 1991:189). In Jung's words, "our fearsome Gods have only 
changed their names, now they rhyme with "ism". (Jung, 1988:81) Jung explained the rise of 
ideologies such as Nazism specifically in terms of the mobilization of irrational drives that had 
once been channelled into religion, but which have been dangerously repressed by the forces of 
rationalism and individualism. He was concerned about the susceptibility of modem human beings 
to archaic mythic forces, he claimed that; 
"when the mass psyche feels threatened, psychic inflation takes place." (ibid). 
The collective psyche of the white right\ving in South Africa is currently feeling extremely 
threatened, due to attempts at integrating society. Those political ideologies \vhich provide secunty 
and reassurances for these fears \\-ill obtain support. Integration and non-racialism symbolize the 
"decadence" from \vhich the group/nation must transcend. Right\ving parties are constantly 
issuing dire warnings about the proposed new order and fuel white fears associated with the 
perceived "loss of identity'' that will take place. Those groups desiring to preserve their identity 
and survive as a separate nation, are attracted to political parties and organizations which 
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emphasize ethnic concerns and who provide reassurances for their widespread fears and 
insecurities. 
The ''marriage" of exclusivist nationalism and nee-fascism in modem South African society can 
only be understood in the context of the needs both these ideological forms meet. These needs are 
contained within the specific "character structure" of the Afrikaner people in particular and the 
white race group as a whole. Despite the resurgence of Afrikaner Nationalist sentiments, the fears 
common to all whites has paved the way for a collective white effort. Exclusively Afrikaner 
concerns may have to compromised in favour of a broader unity of interests focussing on white 
survival and identity. 
A significant sector of the white population in contemporary South Africa are virtually consumed 
'i 
by fear and are increasingly looking to parties who provide reassurances for those fears for support. 
The growth of rightwing parties must be seen in the contex1 of these fears and anxieties. In the 
midst of uncertainty, modem myth makers are drav-.ring on a number of sources for ideological 
input, in order to mobilize people on the basis of those insecurities. Favourable conditions exist for 
the growth nationalist-type ideas in modem South African society and the increase in support for 
rightv-.ring organizations must be understood in the contex1 of white fears and anxieties.4 Zille 
(1987:76) claims that 'fear is the driving force of white politics". 
5.3 THE NATURE OF WHITE FEARS: 
The fears, needs and anxieties of white (and in particular Afrikaans sp~aking South Africans, who 
are most under threat), need to be identified to understand why certain ideologies are favoured 
above others. Cultural and ideological factors play an important role in shaping responses and 
material interests can be realized in the process of securing cultural and ethnic identities. Apartheid 
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was the concrete manifestation of Afrikaner fears in particular, and white fears in general. Whites 
in this country have historically felt threatened because they constituted a minority group, and the 
demise of apartheid has once again brought about these anxieties. Feel in gs of isolation, doubt and 
powerlessness prevail and ideologies and political doctrines that address these concerns have 
popular appeal among these groups. Undeniably the rightwing in South Africa have some very 
real fears based primarily on anticipated sacrifices of a political and economic nature, but 
underlying these are fears and anxieties of a psychological nature, relating to anticipated loss of 
identity. 
\Vhite images of black people are often negative and the widespread notion of the impending 
"swart-gevaar " (black danger/peril) is fuelled by the media, which thrives on reporting on violent 
deeds perpetrated by black South Africans. This is inscribed into the collective psyche of whites 
and feeds their fears. "Swartgevaar" (black peril/danger) contains negative imagery pertaining to 
black people who are seen as "terrorists" or "communists". White South Africans who are overly 
fearful that they ·will lose their identity when apartheid laws are scrapped view blacks in an 
unfavorable light. 
The psychological mechanism, "projection" helps in our understanding of the relationship 
between the in and the out-groups and helps explain why the latter is so feared and despised. In the 
case of the "in-group", frustration ~rings about aggression, which can be repressed or projected 
onto the "out-group ''.In this way, the undesirable qualities in ones own character structure are 
ignored and projected onto members of the "out-group" instead. Whites in this country, who in. 
tem1s of their definitions, constitute the "in-group" are perpetually frustrated by the dissolution of 
the apartheid system. This frustration, coupled with an.xiety translates into aggression. White 
aggression is eYident, but some of this aggression is projected onto blacks. 
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In an environment of extreme confusion and uncertainty many white South Africans, \vho have 
been alienated by the States new approach have flocked to organizations situated to the right of the 
govenunent, in search of old-style segregationist ideas which bolster not only political and 
economic security, but also psychological security. Psychological security is obtained by ensuring 
clear boundaries between the "in-group" and the "out-group", in the case of South Africa, the 
dra-wing up of clear boundaries between blacks and whites bolsters the psychological security of 
the latter. "Segregation" and "separateness" is synonymous with "survival" and hence security. 
Apartheid legislation like the Mixed Marriages Act (1949), the Immorality Act (1950), the 
Population Registration Act(l950) and the Group Areas Act (1950) were specifically designed 
to ensure segregation between black and white South African at all levels and in so doing ensure 
the survival of the white race and Christian values and civilization. Faber, like van Rooyen (1992), 
albeit for different reasons, claims that apartheid and Afrikaner Nationalism are inextricably 
linked. Faber draws this link on the basis that segregation implied the continued existence and 
preservation of the Afrikaner volk. 
The rightwing in contemporary South Africa have refused to abolish apartheid, since this would, in 
their minds imply self-destruction. 5 The contemporary rightwing movement is thus continuing 
\\~th the struggle to maintain separate ethnic identities and establish separate social and cultural 
boundaries for the South African population in general, and for whites in particular. 
\Vhite fears are vast; they fear not only for their Joss of minority privileges, but also their physical 
safety and group sun·ival. (Manyoni, Indicator 10(4), 1993). \'Vhites fear that blacks \vill take 
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revenge for years of suffering. According to Patriot ( 17 /08/90), many blacks saw crimes against 
whites, not as crimes, but as acts of revenge." 
Manyoni notes that these white fears are; 
"now being given impetus by the random but sporadic slaughter of whites by 
elusive terror gangs in both rural and urban areas. "(ibid). 6 
Studies conducted by political analyst Pierre Hugo over the past ten years point to the fact that tv.10 
main types of fears are prevalent an1ongst ,vhile South Africans, fears related to a loss of 
privileges, assets and identity and these related to violence and corresponding horror scenarios 
strongly reminiscent of images conjured up by experiences in other parts of Africa like the Mau 
Mau uprising. Hugo's 1987 study indicated that 79% of Afrikaners and 70% of English speakers 
believed that their physical safety would be threatened under black rule; 85% and 60% 
respectively agreed that white women would be molested by blacks and 84% and 73% did not 
think law and order could or would be upheld in the advent of majority rule. (Giliomee, 1991:80) 
During my field-work, similar findings were made; all respondents indicated that they felt the 
present NP government could not ensure the maintenance of "law and order" in this country. All 
of them were concerned about their safety in the future. Some of the respondents feared the worst, 
that their homes and properties would automatically be nationalized under an ANC government 
and that they would lose their jobs to blacks. They felt that their physical safety ,,,ould increasingly 
come under threat, and the majority had already, or -were in the process of undergoing military and 
self-defence training. With the exception of t\vo people, all respondents already ovmed fire-arms. 
When first interviewed in 1988, only half the respondents ov.ned fire-arms. A significant increase 
in ownership of guns occurred benveen 1988-1990 among respondents. This reflected a hardening 
of attitudes. brou£ht about bv hei1:1.htened fear and an.xietv about reform and their increasin1:1.ly 
• - .; ..... ,I - -
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precarious position. Similar findings ,vere made regarding ;upport of or membership of self-
defence units and neighbourhood watches. 
Rightv.·-ingers often express their desire to protect white women from the evils of non-racialism, 
they claim that they won't tolerate any interference on the part of blacks towards white women. 
Their threats allude to instances of black men socializing with ,vhite women and Lonering of the 
notorious "Order of Death" was especially horrified by the fact that black taxis were allo,ved to 
transport white girls. (Argus 29\8\91) 
"In the course of 1990, the far right sent out a message that if white women were 
attacked during a public march, the moment would arrive for massive 
indiscriminate retribution. " (Giliomee; 1991 :82) 
An independent poll conducted by the American based Joint Centre for Economic Studies, as 
part of the South African election support project, found that the majority of whites for fearful 
about the aftermath of the election. Whilst blacks were generally optimistic and felt that their lives 
would improve after the 1994 elections, whites were less enthusiastic. (SABC TV 1 News 
06/11/93). 
Whites feel that their culture and way of life would cease to exist once the ANC was in power. 
Several respondents indicated that they feared the demise of their right to religious worship after 
the transition to a new South Africa. 
A miner claimed that, 
"once they [the ANC] are in power, we [whites] can forget about going to 
church. .. next thing we JI all be dancing around fires and consulting sangomas ". 
(Carltom·il!e, I 990) 
Another added; 
"We cannot allow the liberals and foreigners among us to dictate to us, we must 
continue to live in accordance wi1h God's law We must stand our ground and 
resist (in whatever way 11ecessa1J1 the attempts to dismantle apartheid Failure to 
, 
curb this tendency ·will spell disaster and will mean the end of the white race and 
Christian values". (Kimberley, 1990). 
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Fear is integral component of the socio-psych9logical make-up of rightwing ethno-nationalists. 
Fears relating to the domination and suppression of whites under a new black government are 
widespread. White South Africans are extremely anxious about the future and in some instances 
they feel that their very survival is at stake. The white right has taken it upon itself to provide 
reassurances for these ,vhites on the basis of such ,vi despread fears. The popularity of rightwing 
groups and parties must thus be understood in the context of the fears and anxieties that spawned 
them. 
5.4 THE SYMBOLS OF THE RIGHTWING: 
In order to understand why there has been an upsurge in rightv.ing activity and an increase in 
support for the many right\\ing groups in this country, it is necessary to uncover the symbols 
evoked for this purpose. An understanding of the symbolic meaning of apartheid and separate 
development is useful, since similar symbols used by the contemporary rightwing movement were 
evoked by Afrikaner Nationalist ideologues during the apartheid era. Apartheid and Afrikaner 
Nationalism are integrally linked, and· central to this is Calvinist Christianity. The apartheid 
doctrine which emanated from the Afrikaner Nationalist struggle was central to the whole process 
of ensuring ideological hegemony. Apartheid and separate development can be understood 
politically, socially and economically, but most of all it can also be understood ideologically and 
symbolically. 
Separation and survival are synonymous and through division and isolation will it be possible to 
maintain one's group identity. The blurring of boundaries implies a Joss of identity and constitutes 
a threat to survival. Segregation in South Africa is seen to be a necessary measure to ensure the 
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"survival" of the white race, Christian values and Western civilization. (Faber, '1989:54). The 
Afrikaner (and to a certain extent the white) struggle is aimed at ensuring these objectives. 
Interaction with blacks for Afrikaner Nationalists and also contemporary rightwingers has a 
profound symbolic meaning. In order for whites to survive, it is deemed necessary to dissociate 
from their black counterparts. 
The notion of negative c01motations attached to "blackness" is supported by several authors, 
Cirlot, (1952); Jung, (1938); Neumann, (1963); Campbell, (1956\9); von Franz, (1972). In the 
Western European mythological traditions, the colour black has often been accorded inferior 
connotations as opposed to white. 7 Myth, folk-lore and fairy-tales often lead to a type of 
projection where white comes to be associated \\1th categories such as good, light, holy, superior, 
above/heaven, masculine, aggressive and symbolized by the sun. The moon on the other hand 
lights the way for man during darkness and is said to be synonymous with the emotional, 
irrational, feminine, evil, dark, passive components ofrealio/. 
In the case of white Afrikaners, the availability of myth making material, and a history rich with 
imagery and folklore, aided this process. Nationaiism in this instance serves as a basis for 
connecting people in ways they would not otherwise be connected. A sense of community develops 
and this aids the nationalist cause. This sense of belonging to a community is developed 
consciously and unconsciously. Self-conscious groups and individuals "deliberately create" 
communities and feelings of belonging to a group and identifying with it also develop naturally, 
independent of the actions of community creators. 
Gellner (1983) claims that "nationalism is not rhe awakening of nations to self-consciousness; it 
invents narions ,d1ere rhey do not exist". Self-conscious groups thus try to deliberately "create 
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communities" and a corresponding conmmnity spirit and ethos. Anderson (1983) notes' that these 
communities may become imbued with emotional connotations which serve to mobilize people. 
Ethnic identities are often reinvented, manipulated and mobilized in order to serve political ends. 
Ethnicity helps people identify with a collective plight, on the basis of the emotional connotations 
attached to the group. Apartheid represents an attempt to deliberately engineer society on the basis 
of ethnicity. Members of the elect ethnic group are encouraged to believe in their uniqueness and 
distinctiveness, and this depends on the existence of an opposing group. The opposing group is 
essential in order for the elect group to distinguish itself from it. 
Community creation takes place both deliberately and spontaneously through both conscious and 
unconscious determinants and as a result of both innate and derived ideas. Human beings are not 
"intellectual blank slates" receptive to all overtures of intellectuals, nor do they posses "false 
consciousness." They posses a complex set of inherent ideas. Rude' (in Anderson, 1983:79) sums 
it up, 
"this inherent, traditional element is a sort of mothers-milk ideology, based on 
direct experience, oral tradition or folk memory and is not learnt by listening to 
sermons or reading books. " 
Derived ideas are combined with inherent ideas in order to evoke certain responses. The 
unconscious component of the human psyche responds more readily to emotional situations and on 
this level symbols operate effectively since they are able to evoke emotional responses based on a 
recognition of its meaning rooted deep in the unconscious memory. This "psychic blue-print" 
basically an1ounts to a common awareness shared by the human species as a whole or elements 
thereof. Notwithstanding the universality of many psychic processes and symbols, material 
originating in the deep archetypal realm and emptying into consciousness \\ill shape itself 
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according to the culture in \l,hich it operates. M:y1hs and symbols are thus appropriate to history, 
family lineage, national roots, etc. 
The success of a national movement is inextricably linked to its ability to evoke responses on a 
shared unconscious level through the skillful manipulation of certain shared symbols. Leaders are 
not ahvays consciously a\vare of the efficacy of their techniques and do not always realize how 
certain symbols, once evoked, are capable of stirring the deepest reaches of human emotion. The 
righming movement in contemporary South Africa, has to an extent recognized that certain 
symbols are effective in mobilizing people since they evoke emotional responses which have roots 
deep within the unconscious realm of the human psyche. Symbols are effective in the context of 
ethnic conflict because, 
"[they] clothe ethnic claims in ideas and associations that have aclmowledged 
moral force beyond the particular conflict, thereby masking that would other.vise 
be controversial". (Horowitz, quoted in van Rooyen, 1985 :218) 
In terms of the Afrikaners, symbols of their past shared by ancestry, history and shaped by 
experience have their source located in the realm of the psyche where symbols form and are 
housed, the unconscious. When evoked, they permeate consciousness and the particular form in 
which they manifest themselves is influenced and shaped by factors mentioned above. Although 
certain symbols are cross-cultural and universal, culture, nationalism and socio-economic 
circumstances all affect the form a particular symbol takes. 
Afrikaner "sacred symbols" were intended to inspire the volk and capture the imagination_of its 
target audience. 
Many of these symbols are used by the contemporary rightwing movement. The average individual 
is not consciously aware of why a particular symbol is able to evoke feelings of a mystical nature. 
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Political leaders are sometimes aware of the effect symbols have on the human psyche and may try 
to shape symbols in accordance with national or cultural heritage to evoke desired emotive 
responses. For example, the use of the swastika by Hitler's Nazi Party.8 Modem day nee-fascist 
and rightwing groups use the swastika or similar derivatives for political purposes. (See Figure 3). 
Colour imagery often follows that of the Nazi\fascist parties, for example, red and black drapery at 
meetings. Terre' Blanches greeting of the volk is alarmingly similar to Hitlers salute. He also relies 
on poetic, emotional speeches and his personal charisma is central to the entire operation. 
Rightwi.ngers and political observers often claim that Terre'Blanche's oratory style contributes to 
the overall success of the organization and he is often compared to Hitler. (du Toit, BM 1991 :646). 
Ivor Powell in the \Veekly Mail, February 1990 states, 
"his style of blood and iron orat01y, his appeal to divinely ordained racial 
destinies, his Wagnerian poetry, is what the rightwing wants and needs to hear. It 
is not inconceivable that the man, despite the rhetoric, may be rehabilitated and 
lead his volk into greater and more irrational militancy". 
According to Jonathan Hyslop, 
"Terre 'Blanche taps directly into such [symbolic} thinking. The AWE banner 
comprises three 7's which counters the biblical number of the beast viz, 666. "(SA 
review IV, 1987:399), 
The psychological strivings of the target audience are evoked to elicit support. Symbolic meanings 
are attributed to many components of the ideology in question and since supporters are prone to 
. 
operating on an emotional level, they react on the basis of these symbols. Although the AWB flag 
looks like a swastika, they insist that it is in fact biblical and pro-Christ. (du Toit, BM; 1991 :646). 
Regardless of the origin of this insignia, it resembles the symbols historically used by fascists, and 
is used precisely because of its efficacy in evoking emotional responses on the part of its target 
audience. 
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It must be recognized that history and folklore are not enough to sustain the emotional fervor and 
moral cohesiveness required by a group in transit, thus symbols and the re-enactment of culturally 
and historically significant events take on that function. As Durkheim (1965 :465) put it, 
"moral remaking cannot be achieved except by the means of reunions, assemblies 
and meetings where the individuals, being collectively united with one another, 
reaffirm their common sentiments ... " 
The Afrikaner Nationalist pioneers and contemporary rightwing movements are aware of this and 
often rely on mass meetings, emotional memorial services and the like to reaffirm their allegiance 
to the cause. Numerous shrines and monuments have been erected in order to pay tribute to their 
"sacred past" and the ritual re-enactment of the Great Trek and pilgrimages to historically 
significant sites all serve this purpose. Rituals unite social groups and reaffirm the individuals 
sense of belonging and emphasize their distinctiveness and separateness from others in a given 
society. So although these civil rituals may fulfil certain "positive" functions, such as uniting 
groups on the basis of a common identity, the flip-side to such nationalist strivings is not always 
conductive to harmonious social relations. The "in-group" "out-group" dichotomy is widened. 
The ritual re-enactment of significant events in Afrikaner history thus reaffirms beliefs and ensures 
their efficacy. The "holy" Day of the Covenant is piously celebrated on December 16 every year 
to remind white (and especially Afrikaner) South Africans of their victory over the forces of 
darkness. Prayers on this day are aimed at thanking the patriarchal Father-God for saving the volk 
from their black enemy. On this day, pilgrimages are made to historic sites such as the 
"Voortrekker :Monument" in Pretoria. The 64 encircling ox-wagons form a protective laager, 
wruch haYe historically shielded the volk from attack and subsequent annihilation. 
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The laager is a common symbol evoked by several Afrikaner Nationalist rightwing groups. 
Historically the formation of the laager, by means of ox-wagons served to protect them and hence 
ensure their survival as a separate nation. It is hardly surprising, that when threatened by outsiders, 
the retreat to the laager is advocated. Rightwing secessionist policies are devised for this purpose. 
The creation of a protected volkstaat is aimed at ensuring the separateness and survival of the 
threatened volk. It is no wonder that in times of reform, when integration is promoted, those most 
threatened by this, call for a retreat to the laager or volkstaat. Jung (1967) notes that; 
"such symbols of cenn·ality, order and containment often appear in conditions of 
great psychic turmoil and chaos, where they function as a compensation for a crisis 
of individuation. " 
In situations where the ''out-group" increasingly poses a threat to the security of the designated 
"in-group", anxiety and fear can easily translate into anger and hatred. Anger and hatred in tum 
are extremely powerful emotions which contribute to destructive and anti-social behavior by those 
who experience these emotions. 
"In times of crisis or in critical situations people become suggestible to slogans 
and symbols which are short-cut rationalizations which fire the 
imagination ... ".(BM du Toft, 1991:639). 
Erich Fromm ( 1942) advances a similar explanation; in his opinion, periods of crisis make it 
psychologically vital for people to take refuge in a higher order of reality in which they are relieved 
of the pain of being themselves in a mythless, private time. 
Modern secularized culture no longer contains any central all pervasive sources of transcendent 
myth. Nationalism and related ideological forms satisfy the need for self-transcendent Il)Yth under 
suitable historical circumstances. 
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In the Fear of Freedom, (1960), Fromm argues that hwnans possess a built-in dread of isolation 
and have an overwhelming need to belong. Sadomasochistic relations with the outside world may 
develop in order for them to be absolved from the personal responsibility of their acts and they 
may identify with an authoritarian-type leader whose orders they willingly obey. Periods of crisis 
I 
make it psychologically vital to find refuge in the illusion of a higher order ofreality. 
Koestler sums it up, 
"religious wars vvere superseded by patriotic, then by ideological wars, fought 
with the same self-immolating loyalty and fervor. The opium of revealed religions 
was replaced by the heroin of secular religions, which co'.mmanded the same 
bemused surrender of the individuality to their doctrines, and the same worshipful 
love offered by their prophets. The devils and succubi were replaced by a new 
demonology: sub-human Jews plotting world dominions; bourgeois capitalists 
promoting starvation. .. " (1970, 273). 
In the South African context, the "devils" in terms ofrightv.ing white perceptions, are blacks who 
pose a threat to the existence of whites. The new war is defined in terms of the new enemy, but 
ultimately the same fear of losing an identity and being forced to merge with that which is rendered 
undesirable, provides the impetus for mobilization against the enemy. 
The symbolic forms that characterize "Afrikaner myth" and depict emotional strivings is inherent 
in their -character structure. The notion that Africa is a dark, primitive continent in which whites 
have to fight in order to preserve civilization has infiltrated the consciousness of many white South 
Africans and subsequently has had a profound effect on both their attitudes towards and 
relationships Vvith black people. (Insig, July 1989). Powerful symbolism is abundant even in school 
te:x.1 books and according to Insig, the major symbols can be identified as ; 
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(i) the importance attached to: obeying and not questioning established authority structures 
such as the father, ordained leaders, God etc. Along with this comes an intolerance of 
criticism \Vhich is seen as mitigating against the group as a whole, 
(ii) comparing the Afrikaners strife and ordeal to that oflsrael and their "special" relationship 
,vith God. The Bible and the Sabbath being totally revered.9 
(iii) the imagery of being a "boerevolk" and corresponding notions of South Africa being 
essentially an agricultural land. Despite urbanization and declining numbers of people 
being farmers, "hoer" has a special meaning for the Afrikaner people. (The individual can 
only realize his/her full potential on a farm, the city is alien and tests one's faith). 
(iv) along with this goes the imagery of suffering and hardship in a "strawwe" or harsh land. 
Geographical and climatic factors such as water shortages and droughts are exaggerated to 
depict the suffering that goes along with tiying to subsist in South Africa. Unlike their 
English counterparts the Afrikaners are "tough" and can withstand great toil and pain 
because they are used to suffering. 
(v) isolation, geographical, psychological and political exacerbates these perceptions. The 
Afrikaner is viewed as an "independent, isolated person who is physically strong and 
traditional ... " (ibid). The pioneer in the wilderness image is apparent here and for South 
Africans (and the Afrikaner in particular) isolation is seen as a source of strength and can 
be used to justify minority rule and racism. 
(vi) the Afrikaner is perceived to have been (and in certain instances still are) very threatened, 
by the land itself, the black inhabitants, the English enemy, immigrants, urbanization, 
poverty, rinderpest, overseas pressures, the communist onslaught and the future. 
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According to Dr H du Preez (ibid), these "master symbols" are so deeply entrencned in the value 
system of the individuals who come to view them as constituting objective facts. These "master 
symbols'' penneate the various facets of school life, ranging from history to youth preparedness 
and cadets. The rightwing movement in contemporary South Africa has taken it upon themselves 
to try and protect and uphold these "traditional" values. According to du Preez, like the 
unemployed in Hitler's Gennany they often look for security in meetings where these twisted 
symbols are elevated to an untouchable/sacred level. 
In this type of emotive setting, it is easy to understand how someone like Barend Strydom did what 
he did. Du Preez implies that because of this, all Afrikaners are partly responsible for this heinous 
crime. Strydom allegedly belonged to an organization known as the "Wit Wolwe ". The A WB's 
military elite, Aquila is represented by an eagle and it is no coincidence that both images or animal 
motifs are hunters. 
According to Jung (1969), the animal motif is normally symbolic of the human being's primitive 
instinctual nature. Humans often.use animal symbols in times of crisis and may react by resorting 
to offerings/rituals or sacrifices ("bloed-geoffer"). In a sense the Strydom Square massacre can be 
vie\ved as such an offering. Our animal instincts can be the cause of our self-destruction. If we are 
not aware of them and fail to integrate them into our overall psyche. If we suppress these instincts, 
they can control or even destroy humanity, says Jung. (ibid). It is up to the Afrikaner volk to 
question \Vhether they ate nurturing a ''wolf pup" in their collective unconscious. du Preez 
believes that we need to question whether there are factors in South Africa that \\ill awaken a 
"wolf' or "tiger., in the Afrikaner. (lnsig, July 1989). In terms of an incident such as the Strydom 
square killings, the Afrikaner community may be guilty for helping to foster such a situation. (ibid) 
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The history of the 20th Century has shovm that such archetypes can permeate the consciousness of 
people and self-destruction may follow. Humans are able to control their instincts to an extent by 
simply suppressing them. In so doing they wound themselves, and as with any animal, are most 
dangerous when wounded. So long as the "animal" is projected onto others and not realized and 
integrated into our consciousness~ it cannot effectively be dealt with or contained - the ego may 
weaken and the individual is ripe for the influence of the collective unconscious - the realm where 
archetypes \\rith their corresponding symbols and often destructive images prosper. Under such 
conditions the emergence of a "Wit-Wolf' becomes a real possibility. History has shown how the 
visions of an individual can become part of the collective unconscious of a nation as well as visa 
versa. 
Certain authors, van der Spuy, (1978); Lambley, (1980); Manyoni, (1981) attempt to address the 
psychological bases and consequences of apartheid. They fail however, to present a balanced 
picture which doesn't simply condemn the Afrikaners and integrate a socio-economic analysis into 
their discussion. The other extreme is the structuralist paradigm which focuses primarily on the 
material determinants. Racial animosity, destructive urges and the like are not solely dependent 
upon material conditions for their existence, although material reality may well affect the 
manifestations of such phenomena once they have become part of consciousness. As previously 
mentioned, the psychology of apartheid has often been neglected and according to Faber (1990:4 7) 
this tendency may be related to the widely held assumption that psychology primarily studies 
· individuals and is thus not relevant to an analysis of collective socio-political phenomena and that 
this corresponds to the traditional positivist distinction benveen "ralues" and "science". 
\ 
.. 
llis area of ideology, in which: 
"individual consciousness interacts with supra-personal structures to produce 
mass mobilizing causes to fight for, however irrational they may seem to an 
outsider" has repeatedly demonstrated its resilience. (Griffin, 1991: 182). 
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The craving for authority as irrational as it may seem, has a long history which the advent of 
fascism has highlighted. Nationalism is essentially a consequence of modernity and has illustrated 
enonnous tenacity. It is one of the pervasive ideological forces in the shaping of modem history, 
and if anything its virulence shows every sign of increasing rather than diminishing. (Griffin, 
1991:36). It is the historical failure of materialist ideologies such as Marxism and in Reich's 
words, 
"Marx failed to take into account the character of the masses and the social effect 
of mysticism ... " (1970: 39). 
Fascism and other forms of ultra nationalism are often appealing precisely because they offer a 
"mystical unity" with the group or nation. The ideology of every social fonnation has the function, 
not only of reflecting the economic processes of society, but embedding this economic process in 
the psychic structure of the people constituting that society. Psychic structures may lag behind the 
changing social conditions from which they are derived and may well come into conflict with new 
ways of life. The contradiction between the old and the new social formation exists and doesn't 
always disappear as readily as we might hope. 
At this stage it must be noted that the emergence of a movement such as fascism is not solely 
rooted in individual psychological structures but also in the social, economic, cultural and political 
circumstances \Vhich fostered it. In other words certain factors external to the individual are 
conducive to the establishment of particular ideological structures. The contemporary relevance of. 
understanding the dynamics of fascism is exacerbated by the fact that it shows no sign of becoming 
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extinct. The ongoing need to keep fascism in any of its pennutations under surveillance means that 
it is still crucial in contemporary reality to establish the factors \vhich produce it. (Griffin, 
1991: 182). South Africa illustrates the tendency of elements within a society to revert to older 
traditional modes of existence and belief \vhich have long since been rendered obsolete. Any 
attempt to understand or contain the threats posed by such contradictions needs to address the 
importance of irrational factors in the social process and specifically in the realm of ideas. 
Similarly any attempt to espouse a broader integrative South Africanism needs to come to terms 
with the unconscious levels at which people operate. All current national symbols embody more 
j 
meaning for the Afrikaner people and allude to historical events pertinent to Afrikaner identity and 
are part and parcel of their so-called "sacred past". All symbols fulfil certain needs within the 
human psyche and it is imperative to ensure that the symbols selected for a post-Apartheid South 
Africa are integrative and not divisive as they have been in the past. 
On the political and cultural front a battle is being waged on two fronts; on the one hand the move 
toward non-racialism is competing with separatist and exclusivist racially inspired movements and 
both are attempting to achieve a measure of ideological legitimacy. In terms of the former, 
Calvinist Christianity has historically been of profound importance in providing legitimacy for 
secular ideology. The contemporary righrnring has harnessed similar Christian-inspired beliefs to 
their cause, and in some instances reinterpreted Christianity to provide justification for changes in 
policy. 
. . 
5.5 THE ROLE OF CHRISTIAN RELIGIOUS IDEAS IN PROVIDING LEGITI-
MATION FOR RACIAL SUPERIORITY AND SEPARATION: 
Christian religious symbols and ideas have historically been used to provide justification for 
white racial superiority and segregation. Rightwing ideology, like the exclusivist nationalism that 
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preceded it, reserves a special place and fate for the "chosen people". (van Jaarsveld, 1964; de 
Klerk, 1975; Moodie, 1975). Manyoni, (Indicator, 10(3), 1993) states that; 
"an ideologized rheology also helped to underpin a self-defined identity of 
biblical pretensions as a chosen-people and a community of the Elect." 
The suffering endured by the "chosen people" is rationalized so that it is understood to be entirely 
due to unchangeable circumstances or fate. 
The role played by Christian religious forms in legitimizing notions of ethnic superiority and 
forging ethnic identities warrants further discussion. Whether the "chosen people" include only 
the Afrikaners or members from other language groups within the white race, their destiny has 
been pre-ordained and their separate identity ( defined in terms of culture, language, shared history 
or other variables) must be conserved and promoted. This notion of divine intervention in the fate 
of nations embodies the Nationalist mythology. In the words ofO'Meara (1983:4) 
"like the prophets of Israel, the ideologists have elevated Afrikanerdom to the 
special instrument in Africa of their Calvinist God Divine Will explains Afrikaner 
history". 
The notion of Divine Will assumes a new meaning in the modem context, especially in relation to 
the use of violence to achieve political ends. Grobbelaar states that; 
"crossing the threshold to violence, and justifying the action as the will of God, 
would immediately take the CP out of the constitutional arena and give it the guise 
of a liberation movement engaged in a holy war. ·· (1992: 107) 
Religious legitimation for the use of violence could have far-reaching implications for the society 
as a whole. Historically Calvinist Christianity has been used to provid.e legitimation for the policies 
and actions of the minority white state, and the resolution to this is thus not without precedent. If 
religion is used to condone violence, which it can be, the security of the entire society is under 
threat. Christian symbols fused with exclusivist ethnicity have provided a powerful impetus for the 
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upsurge of nationalism, and could conceivably continue to provide a rich breeding ground for these 
sentiments in the future. The potential to use Christianity once again to legitimate political action 
exists, and the activities and policies of the rightwing should be understood in the light ofthis. 
This Chapter outlined the nature of ideology and assessed the potential appeal of Afrikaner 
Nationalism in contemporary South Africa. In order to accomplish this, the factors motivating 
allegiance to exclusivist nationalist causes and the symbols peculiar to the social group under 
investigation were identified. It is only through an understanding of the symbols meaningful to a 
particular ethruc group or nation, that the appeal of an ideology can be gauged. Ideologies which 
evoke symbols that are meaningful to the white right, in terms of history, territory or culture, which 
trigger emotional reponses on the basis of shared experiences and beliefs, are the ones that can be 
expected to increase in popularity. 
J 
142 
, 
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER FIVE 
1 Religion can function to create a sense of solidarity and social cohesion. 
2 Survival could conceivably mean aligning ·with non-Afrikaans speaking whites, or even 
blacks. For the purpose of this study, alliances with blacks will only be discussed in so far 
as they contribute to the development of rightwing groups and policies in South Africa. 
3 The emergence of a "new language of legitimation" is attributable to historical 
circumstances, and represents an attempt on the part of the state to capture a wider 
audience, without sacrificing its economic aspirations. (Posel, 1987). 
4 Although there has been an increase in the growth of black nationalist and ethnically-based 
groups and parties, this does not fall within the scope of this study. 
5 This is a state of mind that is not based on objective reality, since the scrapping of these 
laws v..ill in no way mitigate against the survival of the voile or the white race as a whole. 
Similarly, the maintenance of this legislation cannot guarantee their survival in the way 
they desire. 
6 The attack on white homes outside the FNB stadium during Chris Hani 's funeral, April 
199 3, reinforced these types of perceptions whites, have blacks. The various Apia attacks, 
the Saint James church massacre and the murder of American exchange student Amy 
Biehl, brought home the reality to most whites. Events of this nature have had a profound 
effect and have imprinted on the collective psyche of white South Africans. 
\ 
7 The same stereo-types used for blacks are sometimes used for women. Both are seen to be 
child-like, incapable of logical thought and rational descision-making, and lacking in 
intelligence. 
8 The s,,,astika predates Naziism and its origin can be traced to ancient teutonic myth. (See 
Figure 3). 
9 Historically the Afrikaners have compared their plight to that of the Jews. Both ,vere 
selected by God to preform a specific function. Contemporary rightwing groups continue to 
make this comparison and one extremist sect even calls itself the Israelites. 
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis attempted to identify and discuss the key developments within rightwing politics, ·with 
speciai attention paid to the 1988-1993 period. A profile of the rightwing was presented and the 
nature and dimensions of rightwing organization outlined. In contrast to many explanations that 
dismiss the rightwing as the "lunatic fringe", I have argued that the rightwing in its present form is 
a formidable force that poses a significant threat to national unity and peaceful transition. Its 
strength lies in the increase and diversity of its membership. Its position is enhanced by the fact 
that the majority of \Vhites either own or have relatively easy access to weapons and have 
undergone some form of military training. The strategic location of supporters within state 
structures and the high level of emotional intensity underpinning the movement increases its 
potency as a potentially disruptive force. 
The rightwing invasion of the World Trade Centre, and various other incidents of rightwing 
confrontation illustrated that it was time get to rid off the misconception that the rightwing is a 
easily containable force. Although militant rightwing groups may be viewed as "paper tigers", their 
existence is indicative of a symbolic hardening of attitudes. This assumption was confirmed by the 
empirical findings of this study, \Vhich is essentially a comparative one. The sentiments and 
attitudes of targeted respondents were compared over a period of time. The first spate of interviews 
took place before "Rooi Vrydag", 2 February 1990, and the sec9nd thereafter. 
Responses confim1 that a hardening of attitudes has taken place, and this is in line with the 
opinions and empirical investigations of several rightwing analysts and observers. Events that have 
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taken place during the past few years, following "Rooi Vrydag" provide further confirmation for 
this claim. 
It is in terms of this that the threat posed by the rightwing should be seen. The rightwing has 
become increasingly organized and has shov.n a marked propensity for violence. It must be noted 
that many of the threats made by the rightv,fog are based on certain assumptions. For instance, 
Terre' Blanche states that the A \VB will take direct action once certain events transpire: an ANC 
government comes into power and immediately nationalize white property. 
Zille (1987:94) claims that, 
"it is only when white power is directly threatened that we will be able to elaborate 
an accurate assessment of the rightwing 's capacity for violent resistance. As the 
country prepares for a general election, rightwing potential will reveal itself'. 
Whilst a military coup or seizure of power through legislative means on the part of the right\ving is 
unlikely, secession cannot be ruled out as a possibility. On the basis of existing information, there 
is broad consensus that "rogue-army units" supporting localized attempts at secession in certain 
regions is unlikely. (van Rooyen, 1992:499). It is in the light of this that alliances with 
·conservative blacks should be seen. Homeland armies could aid secessionist initiatives. Major 
"Tienie" Groene\vald warns of the possibility of a rightwing secession in the near future backed by 
an army of approximately 500 000 white servicemen. He adds that if white security forces were 
called in to curb the rise of a \\'bite Afrikaner state, they would refuse. "I dent think that the South 
African security forces will fight against their oVvn". (Argus 5\5\93). 
The v,"hite right '"·ill continue to commit isolated acts of violence and terrorism against blacks in 
- . -
this country. The high level of fragmentation that characterizes the movement exacerbates an 
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already tense and volatile. situation, as supporters may act in their individual capacity, without the 
sanction of Jeadershlp. However this is a temporary situation, as the rightwing becomes more 
marginalized, it will become more tightly controlled and centrally co-ordinated. Events of the past 
few months have reflected a tendency toward more organized methods of resistance. 
Although extremist splinter groups remain small and autonomous, Booyse argues they are "well 
organized and worked in cells of 2-4 members". He estimates that about 5 7 such cell exist. ( 1990). 
Smaller grass-roots organizations, like neighbourhood watches provide the basis for a broader 
organizational framework for a possible social movement. Booyse speculates that "strategists" 
keeping a low profile have the skills and expertise ~o provide superb organization and logistics. 
(Back to the Laager, 1991 :53). He speaks of an "unknown rightwing entity", comprising ex-CCB 
members. The Afrikaner Bevrydigingsleer could conceivably constitute a 1bird Force component. 
lb.is leadershlp could unite the rightwing into a powerful force in the future and these grass-roots 
organizations could be activated at a later stage. (Ibid). Factors such the potential for an alliance of 
conservatives is further cause for concern. Observers from broad spectrum of political 
organizations regard possibility of whlte right forming a reactionary rebel army as plausible: South 
newspaper, November 1991, observed that rightwing attacks in l 980/90's far more sophlsticated 
and large-scale than before and reflect more than rudimentary knowledge of explosives on the part 
of perpetrators. Giliomee states that a "small number of ruthless and determined men can create 
havoc" (1991 :80) He alludes to the IRA \:Vhose armed operations are carried out by at most 250 
activists. This is supported by Welsh, who says that; 
"obviously a thwarted frustrated right, who are prepared to take up arms could do 
untold damage" (Sunday Times 20\12\90). · 
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He also compares the future fom1 rightwing groups operating "underground" could take, to the 
IRA. Hyslop (SAR 4, 1987:401) echoes these sentiments and refers to, "the case of the OAS in 
Algeria, which demonstrates how a small core of reactionaries can slow dov.11 the end of the old 
order and make it far more costly in terms of lives". 
It is thus the level of emotional intensity, determination and allegiance to the cause that determines 
the strength of a political movement, not simply the number of people supporting it. Cross Times 
journalist Lesley Fordred, who has vvTitten several articles on the rightwing, remarked that; 
"we should not measure strength in terms of figures, but the level of emotional 
intensity. Highly charged meetings reflect this combination of anger, fear and 
belief in the divine inspiration of the ca~se, which is one of the strongest forces in 
history." 
Contemporary South African society is conducive to the resurgence of reactionary ideas. In a 
context of racial polarization, economic recession, extreme intolerance and spiralling violence, 
social dysfunctions can be expected to continue to exist. The uncertainty brought about during 
periods of social transformation, unleashes a conservative backlash. 
Although this does not fall within the scope of this study, a class base for support of rightwing can 
be identified. Frankel (SA Freedom Review, 1988), identified the "dovmwardly mobile" as the 
social power base of the right. The working-class in South Africa is a permanent feature and 
transition to non-racial society v.ill not be able to stabilize until it learns to talk a political language 
to which white workers can respond (Hyslop, SAR 4, 1987:401). Van Rooyen (1992:508) agrees 
tl:iat a strong-working class support for the. rightwing is discemable, and that the implications 
thereof were obvious; as state subsidization of ,vhites decreases and the number of poor whites 
increases, support for the righnving can only be expected to grow. 
147 
, 
Failure to incorporate white right in negotiation process and reach settlement will have 'Bire 
consequences for country as a whole. Giliomee (1991 :82), puts it simply, 
"given the country's divided state, nothing less than a government of national unity 
comprised of leaders of all the majority parties will suffice. " 
Any new government will have to find ways to incorporate politically, the majority of whites. This 
\>.;ill involve, "detaching the social base of the far right from the hard-core of nee-Nazis and 
terrorists." 
Dissension within the ran.ks of the CP may lead to a situation, where unless "rebels" or volkstaters 
who favour negotiation, are unable to take control or make headway, they Vvill be forced to leave 
the CP fold. This will alienate many on the right and CP will be rendered incapable of providing 
the necessary framework to keep things together. (Grobbelaar, 1992). 
Rightwingers on the "fringes" may in advent of CP disintegrating, become even more militant. 
Thus a failure to secure their participation in talks, vvill result in increased alienation and their 
retreat "underground". This Vlrill serve to polarize white politics even further. In order to 
comprehend and hence contain the threat posed by of the rightwing, a certain level of 
responsibility must assumed. The greatest responsibility lies Vlrith the state, who refuses to accept 
its "prodigal son". The attitudes of the general South African public needs to be moderated and 
only media sensibility and responsibility will ensure this. In his review of the publication, Back to 
the Laager, Hyslop (1991 ), states that academic responsibility is crucial and it is not satisfactory to 
simply condemn and enumerate crimes. Is 'is necessary to try and gain insight into the· psyche of 
supporters. This can only be accomplished through the conducting of interviews, surveys, 
observations at meetings, and an analysis of publications. 
It is imperative to uncover the motivations behind righnving action, and for this purpose it is 
imperative to include a psychological understanding. Rightv-,fog ideology remains popular because 
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it fulfils a 'fundamental human need (the need to belong and identify with a specific group), is 
appropriate to socio-economic circumstances and is able to effectively utilize emotionally-laden 
myths and symbols to mobilize supporters. In contemporary South Africa, the success of an 
ideology amongst whites depends on its ability to address white fears. The rightwing has realized 
that a counter-ideology which draws heavily on the past can provide powerful mobilizing force. 
The powerful and emotional nature of ethnicity, has been ,vitnessed once again in modem South 
Africa. The ,vhite right has placed ethnicity firmly on the agenda. The dynamic inherent in 
ethnicity overpowers rational (political and economic) interests. Material interests are in this 
instance rendered sub-ordinate to issues of "identity". Bozzolli (1987:36), argues that at all times 
the forces promoting non-class forms of ideology more powerful than those promoting class 
awareness. In the case of conservative white South Africans, this is definitely true. The white 
rightwing appeals to a "culture of whiteness", and this new formula based on the notion of the 
survival of the white race, strikes a chord with many whites, under threat from black advancement. 
Adam and Giliomee (1986:133) 
Despite its impracticality, the notion of a volkstaat has become increasingly popular. However this 
component of rightwing strategy poses the least threat, assuming compromise on this demand can 
be reached. A \Veekly Mail editorial, 14 May 1993, sums it up; 
"the dominant rightwing view of the moment is support for a volkstaat - an idea so 
impractical that it is difficult to take it seriously. It is impossible to see how you ca,i 
mobilize farmers to sell their precious land and move to a precarious homeland, -
which is why their proposed homeland borders differ according 10 the location of 
the farm of the person who draws them. The real potential for disruption lies in 
small groups with a penchant for violence, assassination and Third Force type 
activity. There. are hundreds of individuals whom the government has allowed to 
leave the intelligence community, with skills in violence a11d dirty tricks and access 
to resources, v.ho are willing to involve themselves in incidents like the Hani 
assassination. .. this is the enemy we need to know . . , 
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APPENDIX A 
METHODOLOGICAL CONCERNS: 
Sociological research is in one way or another concerned with the study of social behaviour 
from a particular perspective or focus. Research of this nature often purp9rts to be "scientific" in 
its method. (Phillips, 1971: 10 l) Although, "value-free" social science is neither possible or even 
desirable, an attempt should be made to eradicate some of the pitfalls associated with subjective 
research methods. 
The perceptions, prejudices and personal values of the researcher should be checked and 
eliminated wherever possible so that the research understanding can constitute more than simply 
a personal statement. (ibid) 
Any discussion relating to the reliability or validity of a particular research undertaking warrants 
a discussion of sociological knowledge; the means employed in gathering it as well as the ever 
present hazard of "errors". Phillips (1971:53) sums it up, 
"what we know about social behaviour is dependent upon our methods for studying it, 
while our methods for studying it are dependent upon what we know about social 
behaviour. " 
Social scientists are confronted ·with a serious methodological problem precisely because of the 
nature of social reality with which they are concerned. They focus on observing behaviour and 
the conclusions reached and generalization made are based on information obtained by asking 
people to reveal their feelings, beliefs and attitudes regarding certain issues and events. In other 
words, the information is secondary and is usually about past happenings. The researcher is not 
concerned with the responses so much as with the implications these have on past or future 
actions. Research interests constantly change and as social situations change, the researcher 
needs to acknowledge the validity of alternative approaches. 
It is not my intention to produce tangible uncontested ''facts" and scientifically testable 
hypotheses, although certain economic indicators and statistics will be used to back up claims 
and arguments. Through the combined use of theory and select research methods, I will attempt 
to explain and provide an analysis of the culture, consciousness and ideology peculiar to a sector 
of the white population in South Africa. 
This extreme ultra-right sector of the population will be investigated by focusing on the 
attitudes expressed and activities initiated by the group through the mechanism of various 
affiliated and sympathetic organizations and also individual initiatives. For this purpose, I made 
use of interviews, questionnaires and a participant observation exercise, during my fieldwork. 
ACTUAL METHODS USED AND PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED: 
Since all research methods contain inherent short-comings. researchers cannot limit themselves 
to a single approach. This may impinge upon the reliability, validity and overall quality of their 
research. With this in mind questionnaires were drav,n up and a conscious effort was made to 
ensure that the questions were as unambiguous as possible. 
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The next step was to distribute questionnaires among the "target-group". They were posted, 
delivered personally by hand or through key "contacts" to several right-wing organizations (and 
individuals), ranging from Trade Unions to cultural and religious groups. The initial response 
was rather unenthusiastic, but in the end persistence paid off. Initially I distributed 150 
questionnaires, of which only a single response was received. A second batch was distributed 
and finally more responses were received. These responses generated interviews and a wealth of 
relevant information. Interviews were set up with the assistance of previously established 
"contacts" and these helped generate further information through questionnaires. A total of 25 
in-depth interviews were conducted, and 35 completed questionnaires were returned. (This 
excludes informal discussions, during which a wealth of information was obtained). 
Selecting a target group was problematic since the groups and individuals ,vho were, in my mind 
key political players like A WB leader Eugene Terre'Blanche were not always willing to 
cooperate and grant interviews. The same problem was experienced when trying to interview 
MWU officials. Rank and file members however, were far more cooperative. 
From the outset, I was painfully aware that interviewee access would be a problem. 
Consequently I had to interview anyone who was prepared to co-operate. As a result, my sample 
is unrepresentative. This is understandable since the initial attempt to select a representative 
sample proved impossible to meet in the light of the difficulties encountered. In spite of this, the 
actual sample included a significant portion of white respondents representing a range of white 
attitudes in contemporary South Africa during the 19~8-1992 period. 
This study is a comparative time-based one, since the majority of respondents selected were 
interviewed more than once. The first set of interviews took place towards the end of 1988. The 
next set of interviews were scheduled for the period following the 2nd of February 1990. This 
day, dubbed "Black Friday" by the right-wing, was a significant one in this country's history. 
Undeniably the research undertaking is limited in scope, but this was compensated by lengthy 
interviews. Interviews were "in-depth" and a number of individuals agreed to be interviev-,1ed 
more than once. They were often willing to engage in telephone conversations when clarification 
of certain issues was sought. This was thus a qualitative and not a quantitative study. A 
quantitative study would not have been feasible in terms of time and other constraints. It was 
also felt that it was necessary to "get to know" the respondents, to gain insight into their beliefs 
and mind-sets. To accomplish this it was necessary to establish a good rapport and build a 
measure of trust. This could only be done through in-depth interviews. Questions related to the 
respondents opinions on the use of violence in political action, the feasibility and desireability of 
establishing a volkstaat and the willingness to make economic sacrifices to realize goals. Fears 
relating to a wide range of concerns were also probed. 
The study was concentrated in certain geographical regions and focussed on particular 
organizations and communities. Most of the empirical research was conducted in traditionally 
conservative communities in the Transvaal (Stilfontein, Carltonville, Johannesburg and 
Pretoria), the OFS, (\\'elkom) and my home-town, Kimberley, in the Northern Cape. In the case 
of the latter, access was easier and "contacts" helped secure interviews in Welkom and other 
mining tovms. I desperately tried to speak to officials at the Mine \Vorkers Union (M\VU) 
headquarters in the Transvaal, but they failed to respond to my letters and incessant phone-calls. 
Fortunately, I was able to speak to Mine Workers Union officials and rank and file members of 
the union in other mining towns such as Kimberley, Welkom, Carltonville and Stilfontein. 
Another white union, Yster en Staal was far more willing to co-operate and in both Cape Town 
and Pretoria I was able to conduct interviews with the leadership and ordinary members. They 
assisted with the distribution and completion of questionnaires. I had previously made contact 
,vith Spoorbond (during my Honours thesis) and I was once again able to interview officials 
and members in Kimberley and Pretoria. 
ReleYant information obtained during mv Honours. and contacts made during 1987 were 
beneficial in tern1s of rescheduling inte'rvie{vs in 1988 and again in 1990. 
' ' 
161 
Church groups, specifically the Afrikaanse Protestante Kerk (APK) and cultural organizations 
were included in the sample. 
A few ex-Broederbonders ,vere encountered along the ,i..•ay. These ranged from teachers to a 
school-master and businessmen and they were willing to be interviewed. People not specifically 
affiliated to organizations, were met at meetings and rallies and their vievv·s solicited. 
Political groups such as the Afrikaner \Veerstandsbeweging (A WB), the Blanke 
Bevrydigingsbeweging (BBB) and the Nuwe A WB were extremely evasive, but I managed to 
track down a few willing regional co-ordinators and members. Assistance was received from 
journalist friends who through their media connections managed to interview the leadership. 
They lent me their recordings and other useful information. The ConservatiYe Party (CP) ,..-as 
willing to be interviewed and officials in Kimberley and Welkom assisted me enormously. 
There is a strong male bias in my research, and this poses certain problems. Virtually no women 
are in positions of authority in organizations and unions and it was made quite clear by the 
respondents that they would have taken offence had I spoken to their wives. I interviewed 
mainly white predominantly Christian and Afrikaans speaking white males. 
Respondents were drawn from the working and lower middle classes and some were 
unemployed, although this was not deliberately intended. Those who worked were employed in 
the civil service and other government agencies and also miners and railway workers. 
Unfortunately I was unable to select the sample according to the proportion of employed to 
unemployed respondents. This was largely due to the issue of access since I was forced to 
interview anyone who would speak to me. The same holds true for questionnaires returned. 
Most of the respondents were literate and had obtained some formal education. Both the 
leadership and rank and file members of the various selected organizations were interviewed. 
Respondents also included policeman Inkatha members Broederbond members and church 
ministers. Several of the respondents were young, under 25. 
I did conduct a pilot study, but the response was rather apathetic. It did however prepare me for 
the road ahead and prompted me to send out a substantial number of questionnaires and follow 
up all available leads. Once the interview had been agreed to and a measure of rapport 
established people were basically co-operative. However, enthusiasm soon petered out and 
suspicion prevented further contact. It took quite a lot of reassuring before any meaningful 
exchange occurred. Once a first interview had been granted, the respondents were generally 
willing to be interviewed a second time. The white right-wing is constantly defensive and 
favours conspiratorial theories when dealing with relative outsiders. Not all their suspicions are 
completely unfounded or devoid of truth. 
Throughout my research, one study, by Crapanzano, was frequently mentioned. The right is not 
very popular amongst the rest of the country's population and they are conscious of this. Since 
the righnving is overly concerned about their opinions not been taken seriously and their ideas 
being misquoted or misrepresented, once interviews were agreed to, they were keen to vent their 
frustrations and articulate their political aims and policies. Respondents often seemed willing to 
talk because they felt that they have been,neglected and ignored. 
Introducing myself as an English UCT student didn't help and I had to rely on the fact that I was 
a fully bilingual female to obtain interview access. My background assisted me since it curbed 
any preconceived notions of Afrikaners and from the outset I was familiar with the language, 
customs and life-styles of my respondents. This definitely made conununication easier. 
The process of seeking information is essentially a subjective experience and scientific methods 
cannot provide us with an adequate understanding of the world since they can not capture or 
explain subjective experiences. 
Science and reason can only gi\'e us a relative and fragmented knowledge and intuitive 
understanding needs to supplement one's overall approach. This crucial ingredient is fostered by 
an understanding of the people under investigation from the outset. My experience was that it is 
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initially very difficult to get conservative right-wing respondents to speak openly and frankly 
about their experiences. Crapanzano (1987:59) attributes this to their "Calvinist upbringing". 
Whether or not this is the case, the current environment of suspicion and deception doesn't 
exactly improve the situation. 
After initial interviews, respondents opened up somewhat and in many instances were extremely 
frank about their opinions and sentiments. Admittedly I did .not ask many questions of a personal 
nature, since these responses ,vere not fundamental to my investigation. If I had decided to 
question respondents about issues pertaining to sexuality etc, I would have anticipated little 
response. Respondents were rather outspoken in terms of their political views, yet were reluctant 
to address personal issues in the same manner. 
This was not entirely unexpected, and since the study is not aimed at uncovering the personal 
lives of individual respondents, they were not probed. By phrasing questions indirectly, I was 
able to obtain most of this information I needed. 
The use of a tape-recorder inhibited responses, especially regarding controversial, subjective 
issues. When I was requested to turn off the tape-recorder I complied and frantically took do\\n 
notes. 
This proved successful as I probably obtained more information than I would have by not 
complying with the respondents' wishes. Responses have been quoted verbatim as far as 
possible, and I have translated them into English where necessary. Names have generally been 
kept confidential, especially where respondents requested this. 
In addition to actual methodological problems and concerns relating to the validity and 
reliability of the research, other problems were encountered. Although these difficulties may 
appear to be of a personal nature, they nevertheless mitigate against the gathering of 
information. As usual, the issue of finances and funding of the exercise cropped up. This is a 
universal problem encountered all too often by prospective researchers. Unfortunately bursaries 
and the like were unable to cover both living and research expenses. I attempted to apply for 
additional funds and grants, but to little avail. The efficacy of the research has to an extent been 
hampered by the lack of resources available to me. · 
ADDITIONAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION: 
I would have like to have spent more time "in the field" conducting empirical research, but I was 
in a sense forced to rely quite heavily on other sources of information. 
I made it policy to regularly attend meetings and gatherings, both official and unofficial. These 
ranged from mass meetings, to church services and informal visits to pubs and other social 
events. The information gained and the contacts secured in this ,vay contributed enormously to 
my research. Often more was learned during informal conversation than during structured 
interviews. By visiting historical sites I was able to comprehend the more subtle aspects of the 
culture under investigation. · 
Historical documents and official statistics were also used to extract information relevant to the 
research. Information was also obtained from pan1phlets, periodicals and newsletters distributed 
by the various right wing organizations. Research conducted by journalists and academics alike 
contributed to my overall findings. Certain individuals assisted me by making their data 
available to me. 
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NUMBER OF INCIDENTS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE JULY TO DECEMBER 
1990 
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JULY 147 72 10 20 
AUGUST 102 90 3 15 
SEPTEMBER 69 72 5 4 
OCTOBER 44 55 11 11 
NOVEMBER 54 70 11 6 
DECEMBER 37 57 5 4 
TOTAL 453 416 45 60 
NUMBER OF PEOPLE INJURED IN POLITICAL VIOLENCE JULY TO DECEMBER 
1990 
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JULY· 652 158+ 2 59 
AUGUST 666 1 641 3 24 
SEPTEMBER 158 345 1 0 
OCTOBER 156 119 1 37 
NOVEMBER 221 99 8 10 
DECEMBER 56 451 I 3 
TOTAL 1899 2 813+ 16 133 
NUMBER OF PEOPLED KILLED IN POLITICAL VIOLENCE JULY TO DECEMBER 
1990 
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JULY 20 111 4 9 
AUGUST 65 639 1 4 
SEPTEMBER 33 336 0 O· 
OCTOBER 16 74 9 7 
NOVEMBER 34 170 ..., 5 ., 
DECEMBER 10 259 1 1 
TOTAL 178 1 589 18 26 
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